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I started writing this book in the “before times,” as we say now. e global dis-
ruption caused by COVID-19 has since been swi and staggering, and very 
likely it will be enduring. e global pandemic has exacerbated fundamental 
inequities of the industrialized food system while underscoring its profound 
unsustainability. More than this, the global capitalist food system is a key culprit 
in the emergence of COVID-19 in the rst place. As agricultural capital seeks 
out ways to bring previously uncommodied natures into circulation, the fron-
tiers of agriculture are expanding into ever more previously remote areas of the 
world. is self-expanding logic is “both the propulsion for and nexus through 
which pathogens of diverse origins migrate from the most remote reservoirs to 
the most international of population centers.”1 e rate at which these zoonotic 
diseases – those that originate in nonhuman animals and jump species into hu-
mans – are emerging seems to be accelerating. Indeed, in the past twenty years, 
there have been three signicant pandemics – COVID-19 in 2020, H1N1 in 
2009, and SARS in 2003.2
ough the evidence was already robust, this most recent pandemic has 
strengthened the argument that planetary survival may depend on more socially 
just, ecologically sound, and localized/regionalized food systems. And yet, amid 
the upswing of a second wave of COVID-19 infections in Ontario, the provincial 
government set to “hacking and slashing” legislation that protects landscapes in 
the province. Nested within Bill 229, a pandemic recovery measure, were pro-
visions that dramatically reduced the power of conservation authorities and in-
creased the use of ministerial zoning orders, enabling increased development of 
the countryside.3 e government also fast-tracked approval of a development 
proposed within a y-four-acre wetland, all of which led seven members of the 
Greenbelt Council to resign in protest.4 Not long aer these resignations, the prov-
ince announced plans to revive the Bradford Bypass, colloquially known as the 
Holland Marsh Highway, an east–west thoroughfare linking Highway 400 and 
Highway 404 that runs straight through the northern part of the Holland Marsh.
e socioecological politics of landscape change, the pathologies of the indus-
trialized food system, and the challenges and promise of localized food systems 
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are central themes within the following pages. e story of these themes is one ul-
timately refracted through my own limitations and capabilities as a researcher and 
writer. As the preeminent environmental historian William Cronon reminds us:
When we describe human activities within an ecosystem, we seem always 
to tell stories about them. Like all historians, we congure the events of 
the past into causal sequences – stories – that order and simplify those 
events to give them new meanings. We do so because narrative is the chief 
literary form that tries to nd meaning in an overwhelmingly crowded 
and disordered chronological reality. When we choose a plot to order our 
environmental histories, we give them a unity that neither nature nor the 
past possess so clearly.5
e data I draw on come from a variety of sources. I extensively scoured a 
number of archives for information relevant to the Holland Marsh, including 
the Archives of Ontario, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, Bradford West 
Gwillimbury Public Library, Ontario Workplace Tribunals Library, Simcoe 
County Archives, and a variety of online repositories. Additionally, the Pro-
Quest Historical Database helped me nd several hundred useful news accounts 
of the Holland Marsh published by some seventeen news outlets.
I also spent a good deal of time in and around the Holland Marsh over the 
course of nearly eighteen months. I made many trips to the area for interviews, 
which took place on farms, in barns or storage facilities, or on the front yard of 
a Marsh home (with a glass of lemonade in hand) – and on one occasion in the 
cab of a John Deere tractor during the onion harvest. Oen I travelled there to 
attend specic events. Some of these were large annual community gatherings 
common to other rural areas themed around harvest time and featured crops, 
here including the Bradford West Gwillimbury Carrot Fest and the Holland 
Marsh Soupfest. I also attended meetings of the Holland Marsh Growers’ Asso-
ciation and a screening of a lm it had produced, e Marsh Mucker’s Tale (2013). 
I also spent two days at the 63rd Annual Muck Vegetable Growers Conference, 
talking to farmers and researchers, listening to presentations, and walking the 

oor (an erstwhile hockey rink) of the farm-equipment and chemical trade 
show. On a handful of occasions, I simply wound up in the Marsh and wandered 
around, driving around the perimeter on the severely narrow Canal Road or cut-
ting through the area on the idiosyncratic and potholed interior roads. With my 
dog, I hiked through Scanlon Creek Conservation Area, which is grazed by the 
Holland River as it heads toward Cook’s Bay and Lake Simcoe. And out of sheer 
curiosity, I tracked down the point where the river – a marshy, slow-moving 
Preface xv 
version of it at any rate – empties into Cook’s Bay – roughly een kilometres 
north of the elds. I also draw on existing works about the Marsh by local histo-
rians, including George Jackson, Dorothy Cilipka, Albert VanderMey, and the 
Bradford West Gwillimbury Local History Association. I am grateful for the 
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L ike many kids who grew up in southern Ontario, I sometimes went north in the summer for family vacations. As the family drove along High-way 400, leaving Toronto behind us, I always looked forward to passing 
Canada’s Wonderland. e theme park – a sprawling spectacle of games, bright 
lights, and roller coasters in Vaughan, Ontario – seemed like an urban capstone. 
It was a carnivalesque punctuation to the urban agglomeration of Toronto and 
its ancillary suburbs. Beyond Canada’s Wonderland was Canada’s hinterland – a 
bucolic landscape of rolling hills, mighty forests, and pristine lakes.
From Canada’s Wonderland to the south canal of the Holland Marsh – a 
three-thousand-hectare protected agricultural area – is about twenty kilometres, 
or roughly a ten-minute drive north on the highway. Despite the short distance, 
the two places could not be more di
erent, or so I used to think. e low-lying, 
verdant 	elds of the Holland Marsh are a stunning aesthetic counterpoint to the 
towering infrastructure of the roller coasters, aer all. e twenty kilometres 
between the two seemed like a transition zone – a liminal space between the 
city and not the city, between nature and society. e Holland Marsh was where 
society ended and nature started.
I have driven across the short stretch of Highway 400 that bisects the Hol-
land Marsh dozens of times over the years, somehow always missing the obvious: 
e Marsh is not the natural place I imagined it to be. Crisscrossed with roads, 
teeming with tractors, and dotted with houses and barns, it is patently more 
unnatural than it initially seemed. While the 	elds in their bucolic splendour 
might belie the fact, even the land within the Marsh is far from natural, having 
been – quite literally – made in the mid-1920s, exhumed from the wetlands of 
the Holland River through an amalgam of human ingenuity, labour, and hubris. 
To borrow and adapt a phrase, in many ways this is culture’s marsh.1
is, though, is only the most recent instantiation of the Marsh. Over the 
last 14,000 years or so, the material landscape has changed, how it has been 
interpreted has varied, and the ways it has been used have shied profoundly. 
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As the Ice Age was drawing to a close, Paleoindian populations saw the area as 
temporary trapping grounds for arctic fox and arctic hare.2 By about 6000 BC, 
Huron, and Algonquin peoples aerward, established more permanent camps 
near the Marsh, using it both for its nutritional bounty and for its convenient 
proximity to the Carrying Place Trail.3 For some of the earliest European set-
tlers to the area, the Marsh was understood as “a mere ditch” and a dangerous 
place to be avoided.4 Soon aer, colonial “foot soldiers in the manufacture of 
land,” with a zeal for the “paramilitary regularization of the land into rectilinear 
parcels,” largely understood the New World landscape as unruly, a commodity 
to be surveyed, inventoried, and brought under control.5 By the early twentieth 
century, enterprising agriculturalists looked out over the Marsh and saw farm-
land, a “promised land with its broad acres of unbroken greatness.”6 Not long 
aer this, a canal was dug around the wetland, the water was drained o, and a 
three-thousand-hectare polder assembled for the production of market garden 
vegetables, primarily carrots, onions, and celery.
By recounting the creation, use, and protection of the Holland Marsh, this 
book explores the complex, oen overlooked, entanglements of nature and soci-
ety, which are far less separate, or separable, than we assume. At the heart of this 
narrative is the notion that ideas about nature shape our concepts of agriculture, 
and that agriculture in turn shapes our ideas about nature. Nature is not the 
xed thing we imagine it to be, but rather it is polysemous. Nature is social and 
nature is political. I explore these outwardly knotty ideas through an examina-
tion of the transformation of the Holland River lowlands and the agriculture 
this transformation enabled.
In the twenty-rst century, we mostly think of wetlands as places to pro-
tect, not dredge, drain, and farm, yet in the 1920s, support for the conversion 
of the Holland Marsh was all but unanimous. Indeed, in 1920, not converting 
it to farmland would have been unthinkable. e irony, of course, is that since 
2004, the Holland Marsh has been protected – not as wetland, but as farmland. 
Despite lingering around discursively in the moniker of the area, the anteced-
ent landscape has been mostly expunged, though signs remain for the careful 
observer. As plans developed to drain the Holland River lowlands, the explicit 
intent was to reconstitute the wetland to produce orderly, productive, and prof-
itable elds. Local media celebrated the fact that the “dismal swamp” in Brad-
ford, Ontario, was nally being drained to make way for a much more agreeable 
contingent of “smiling farms.”7
Fast-forward roughly a century, and in many ways, the resulting farmland is 
being similarly threatened, despite – perhaps because of – the farmland- protection 
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measures pertaining to the area. While the idea of farmland protection is cur-
rently de rigueur among many scholars, activists, and government ocials, the 
story of the Holland Marsh demonstrates that its dominant paradigm is insuf-
cient to eectively preserve such areas. Widespread simplistic and ahistorical 
understandings of the very character of farmland and landscape change have 
resulted in the development of preservation policies and practices that may fall 
short of their intended outcome. Put simply, conventional farmland-preservation 
measures are typically designed to protect a particular kind of capital-intensive 
farming, not the land itself: Farming preservation must be seen as distinct from 
farmland preservation, yet this distinction is rarely, if ever, made in scholarship, 
public discourse, or policy debates. e case of the Holland Marsh demonstrates 
that farmland preservation is a product of normative ideas about landscapes and 
land use, ideas that are ever changing and based on historically contingent no-
tions about “nature.” e Marsh, protected as a Specialty Crop Area under On-
tario’s Greenbelt Plan, has become a poster landscape for farming protection 
under the guise of farmland protection. And yet, these protective policies may be 
hastening the demise of this iconic, multimillion-dollar agricultural juggernaut 
known widely as Ontario’s salad bowl.
e stakes for how we think about “nature” and how we use our peri-urban 
landscapes could not be higher. It is becoming increasingly dicult to overstate 
the multiple, intersecting, and coproduced socioecological crisis of the contem-
porary period. From mass malnutrition and the arrival of a planetary re age to 
global pandemics and an imminent climate reckoning, the socioecological limits 
of the earth are seemingly within sight.8 Agriculture is at once a key culprit in 
these crises and essential to their resolution.
From as early as the mid-nineteenth century – when a thriving trade arose to 
replenish Europe’s soil with guano from South America – agriculture has been 
enabled through a global metabolic ri.9 e so-called externalities of global 
agricultural production were vastly intensied during the green revolution as a 
ra of chemical and technological innovations were hastily embraced, rational-
ized within complementary neo-Malthusian and productivist discourses. e 
consequences have been catastrophic.
More recently, examples abound of the ways in which agriculture can con-
tribute to repairing the widening socioecological ri. Lessons from this work 
are worth underscoring. Agro-ecologists and allied academics and practitioners 
have demonstrated the promise in reexamining the socionatural relations inher-
ent in agriculture. Rather than taming nature – the operative logic of contempo-
rary industrial agriculture – agro-ecologists insist on a more humble approach 
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that rejects the premise that “nature” is controllable in the ways proponents of 
industrial agriculture assume.10 At the same time, a broad consensus is emerging 
suggesting that key crises related to the contemporary food system can be miti-
gated – and reversed – in place-based eorts focused on strengthening existing 
and forging new links between eaters and growers within discrete geographies.11
is work reveals the social and ecological benets of relocalized food systems 
and compels us to reexamine our reliance on long-haul industrial agriculture.
I focus specically on the Holland Marsh for a variety of reasons – its pro-
ductivity, its iconic status, and its proximity to Canada’s most populace region 
and North America’s third-largest city. On a clear day, the elds of the Hol-
land Marsh are visible from the top of the CN Tower, the quintessential icon 
of downtown urban Toronto. at some of the most protable and productive 
farmland in Canada is in such close proximity to, and increasingly threatened 
by, the nation’s largest urban agglomeration itself makes this a noteworthy case 
within the catastrophe of the contemporary moment.
In this sense, the Holland Marsh is a proverbial canary in the coal mine – an 
example that can help us understand the history and complexity of the land at 
the centre of any putative eorts to relocalize food systems. e prized muck soil, 
as it is colloquially known, is a central character in the history of agriculture in 
the Marsh and receives herein an extensive explanation of its social and material 
signicance.12 Suce it to say for now, muck soil is relatively rare and extremely 
fragile, much more so than mineral soil. As a result, from the moment the Marsh 
was drained nearly a century ago, this soil began to degrade. More than this, even 
if it were never farmed, the muck would inevitably disappear – agriculture is 
certainly hastening its demise. e Marsh, then, serves as a fascinating case study 
that reveals insight into human-environment relations, accentuates the contra-
dictions and deciencies of contemporary farmland-preservation paradigms, and 
highlights the challenges of forging more socioecological rational food systems.
Holland Marsh
Travelling northward from Toronto, the northern slopes of the Oak Ridges 
Moraine highlands give way to a gentle descent to the elds of the Holland 
Marsh. Within the span of the southern canal – roughly een metres across 
– a variable landscape of cultivated elds of corn, pastureland, exposed glacial
debris, and wooded hillsides cedes to uniform elds of lush, green vegetables.
e farmed area of the Marsh – which vaguely resembles a banana if seen from
a sucient height – is separated into two sections. e main polder is known
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colloquially as the “Big Scheme,” from which the much smaller “Little Scheme” 
is pinched o at its north end at Yonge Street. e Holland River runs through 
the middle of the Marsh, serving as both a natural and political-administrative 
boundary. e elds on the west side of the river are in Simcoe County, those on 
the east side lay in King Township. As the river continues its northerly ow to-
ward Cook’s Bay on Lake Simcoe, the orderly elds give way to a landscape that 
resembles more closely the scenery conjured by the image of a “marsh.” Marsh 
grasses, reeds, and small conifer shrubs populate both land and water, blurring 
the boundary between the two as if in a Group of Seven painting. Just before the 
Holland River empties into Cook’s Bay, destined for Lake Simcoe immediately 
beyond, it is once again dammed, canalized, pumped, and diverted around a 
nal small agricultural area known as Keswick Marsh.
In all, the Holland Marsh is a mixed-use wetland of some 7,400 hectares 
(roughly 18,200 acres), 60 percent of which is drained agricultural land and 40 
percent is preserved marshland.13 e cultivated land (roughly 3,000 hectares 
[7,400 acres]) supports 125 farms, together producing many millions of dollars 
in annual revenue by growing a range of market garden vegetables.14 According 
to the Holland Marsh Growers’ Association (HMGA), the total annual eco-
nomic impact of the Marsh – the farm-gate value of the vegetables in addition 
to packaging, processing, and transportation – is $1 billion. is includes $130 
million in annual carrot production and $160 million in annual onion produc-
tion.15 A 2009 study found that gross farm receipts were $7,130 per hectare in the 
Marsh, 3.7 times higher than the provincial average.16 is makes the farmland 
there some of the most protable in all of North America.
While the soil can support a wide diversity of crops, the pressure to be prag-
matic within an age of capitalist agriculture has resulted in a highly homogenous 
crop base. Combined, onion and carrot production account for 70.9 percent 
of the annual output in the Holland Marsh. Other crops, including celery (7.3 
percent), mixed greens (7.3 percent), “Chinese vegetables” (2.7 percent), and po-
tatoes (0.7 percent), are less commonly grown.17
Conceptual Framing and Scholarly Landmarks
Agriculture and the Dynamics of Change in the Holland Marsh
Food for human consumption has existed in the Holland Marsh since time 
immemorial, and by a suciently lenient denition, probably always will. But 
agricultural production per se arrived in the Marsh within a very specic social, 
Figure I.1. A: An aerial view of the manicured landscape of the Holland 
Marsh. B: e stark dierence between the orderly agricultural elds of the 
Marsh and the land beyond the canal. C: Highway 400 bisects the Marsh. 
Courtesy of Holland Marsh Drainage System Joint Municipal Service Board.
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cultural, political, and historical conguration. Emphasizing that food and ag-
riculture in the Holland Marsh are distinctly capitalist in character puts a ne 
point on one of the main themes of this book. e Marsh serves as an exemplar 
of, but importantly at times a foil to, much of the recent literature concerned 
with the state of the contemporary agro-food complex. For over a century, schol-
ars have questioned the extent to which agriculture is capitalist.18 While no clear 
consensus has emerged, they have convincingly demonstrated that agriculture is 
signicantly shaped by the constraints and opportunities to capital in the ongo-
ing process of attempting to fully rationalize food production.19
Food regime theory, developed by Harriet Friedmann and Philip McMichael, 
is helpful in tracing the implications of this insight within the case of the Holland 
Marsh.20 Friedmann and McMichael argue that historically contingent congu-
rations of modes of agricultural production, capitalism, and state power have re-
sulted in discernable periods of stability and crisis in the global economy over the 
past 150 years or so.21 As they put it, the food regime analytic brings together “in-
ternational relations of food production and consumption to forms of accumu-
lation broadly distinguishing periods of capitalist transformation since 1870.”22
e rst period of relative global stability demarcated by Friedmann and 
McMichael was from 1870 to 1914. is rst food regime was characterized 
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by monopoly trade relations between colonial (mainly the United Kingdom) 
and colonized states. Settler states in particular (such as Canada) were, during 
this era, important to maintaining British hegemony by providing the colonial 
market with a relatively cheap and abundant source of grain.  e sociopolitical 
instability wrought by the two world wars also created economic uncertainty 
during which, according to Friedmann and McMichael, there was very little 
structured coherence to the global economy. As a result, there was no decisive 
food regime during the years 1914–47. But with the conclusion of the Second 
World War and the emergence of the United States as a postwar power, a second 
food regime emerged, lasting from roughly 1947 until 1973.  is regime was 
characterized by the rise of the United States through the pretense of interna-
tional development, primarily through the distribution of  US grain surpluses. 
 is was also an era characterized by the secular trends of intensive industri-
alization and commercialization of the agricultural sector. As national regula-
tions – o en through international agreements such as the  General Agreement 
of Tari s and Trade ( GATT ), which lasted from 1948 through 1994 – were 
altered to accommodate the in ux of capital demanded by a rapidly industrial-
izing global agriculture, state power began to erode vis-à-vis a burgeoning cor-
porate globalization. 
% of area by product type 
Carrots Onions Celery Mixed greens
Mixed flowers Garlic Parsnips Turnips
Beets Celery root Chinese vegetables Potatoes
Greenhouse
Carrots Onions Celery Mixed greens
Mixed flowers Garlic Parsnips Turnips
Beets Celery root Chinese vegetables Potatoes
Greenhouse
Source: Planscape, “Holland Marsh Agricultural Impact Study,” August 2009, p. ii, 
https://www.greenbelt.ca/holland_marsh_agricultural_study.
Figure I.2. Percentage of area by crop type grown in the Holland Marsh, 2006.
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Owing in part to the intellectual force of the paragons behind the staples 
thesis, much of the social-scientic scholarship related to agriculture in Canada 
has tended to focus on macroeconomic trends, countrywide aggregate data, and 
commodity- or sector-specic analysis.23 is rich body of work is invaluable, yet 
its shadow is long, and it has sculpted the trajectory of Canadian food and agri-
culture studies for decades.24 Recently, however, the study of Canadian agricul-
ture has beneted from a more particularistic, place-based approach.25 Within 
this body of work, rather than forming the centre of analysis, macrotrends and 
global food regimes constitute the backdrop on which equally compelling and 
important histories of agriculture, food, and culture play out.26 is study of the 
Holland Marsh is similarly positioned: It recognizes and attends to structural, 
global, and national trends in farming, biotechnology, and the like, but always 
in terms of how these trends aect and/or are aected by the goings-on within 
the Marsh. While the dynamics of capitalist nature play out there, they do so 
mediated through the specicity of place and time. As Shannon Stunden Bower 
observes in her seminal work on agriculture in the wet Manitoba prairie, this is 
“capitalism at a dierent scale.”27 My aspiration is not to gaze into the muck-soil 
elds of the Holland Marsh from the outside, but rather to stand in them, look-
ing out at the world beyond.
Within this context, historians of agriculture have identied liberalism as 
a central modality through which agriculture and environmental change are 
mediated and modied in Canada. As James Murton puts it, understanding the 
environmental history of Canada requires moving beyond ideas about nature to 
recognizing “more general logics – such as liberalism – that implicitly encourage 
a particular form of engagement with nature.”28
is perspective builds on Ian McKay’s inuential work asserting that Can-
ada, as an ontological category, can be productively studied as a contradictory 
and complex project of liberal rule.29 Countering the notion that it is simply a 
“vacant lot” and a “relatively minor” bounded geography where the dynamics 
of social and natural history play out, McKay insists that the country should 
denote within scholarship “a historically specic project of rule.”30 Initial waves 
of the violent colonial resettlement of what would become Canada were driven 
by political, economic, and social rationalities premised on aristocracy and def-
erence to crown and clergy.31 roughout the course of the nineteenth century, 
this system would be replaced by one girded more rmly on the core elements of 
liberalism – liberty, equity, private property, and the primacy of the individual. 
As McKay argues, this emerging social ideology was “set down on the land,” 
shaping both the landscape and its people.32
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While there is a sociological distinction to be made between the Victo-
rian liberalism that fuelled agricultural expansion across Canada from the 
mid-eighteenth century through the beginning of nineteenth century and the 
New Liberalism that emerged in the early 1800s, the functional role of nature 
(and, by extension, agriculture) was largely consistent.33 And this remains true of 
the contemporary neoliberal era. A common thread stitching together the cha-
meleonic and persistent liberal philosophy is an instrumentalist view of nature 
“in which the natural world is judged solely on its usefulness to human ends.”34
is manifests as a “a culture and society built on, and absolutely dependent on, 
a sharply alienating, intensely managerial relationship with nature.”35
is managerialism requires rationalization. Unable to contend with the 
enormous complexity of the (socio)natural world, states have historically sought 
to make nature “legible” in ways conducive to facilitating control, regulation, 
and the extraction of prot. As Bruce Braun puts it, “far from constituting a 
eld of readily intelligible objects, nature enters into history in part through its 
cultural legibility.”36 Nature emerges as legible to the state through the processes 
of inventorying, abstraction, and standardization of both landscapes and the 
discrete bits of biophysical nature that compose them. Land surveys, cartogra-
phy, soil classication schemes – these are among the technologies that made the 
Holland River lowlands legible to the aspiring agriculturalists who transformed 
it. Braun extends James C. Scott’s inuential work by illustrating the “complex 
eld of social practices” implicated in nature’s rationalization.37 While Scott 
conceptualizes the state as distinct from civil society, Braun demonstrates the 
ways in which knowledge about nature generated outside the state ultimately 
inuences how it sees and acts on nature. In other words, the state is not a total-
izing force, but rather more uidly denes and acts on nature in strategic ways, 
informed by a wide array of social, political, and economic forces.
By exploring the ways in which capitalism and liberalism collided in the Hol-
land Marsh, this book adds weight to the point. Refracting the global dynamics 
of capital through the lens of liberal-state rationality enables a more nuanced 
and place-specic analysis than allowed for by more economistic modes of anal-
ysis. e Marsh is a quintessentially idiosyncratic landscape – while capital and 
the state have certainly shaped it, so too has technology, civil-society institu-
tions, biophysical properties, ecological crisis, and a range of other socionatural 
elements. Stunden Bower’s work helps us understand how the internal logic of 
liberalism, in operation through the provincial government, propelled drainage 
on the Manitoba prairie. In contrast to this, the drainage of the Holland Marsh, 
while certainly supported by the state, was led by individuals (and supported 
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further through the Ontario Agricultural College). Liberalism in Canada has 
shaped – and been shaped by – a range of actors, from voluntary associations to 
legal apparatus and academic institutions.38 is book contributes to the small 
but important body of work revealing the ways in which capitalism and liberal-
ism collided in place within the context of locally and regionally bounded areas 
of agriculture production in Canada.
Nature and Society
One of the foundational concepts of this book is that society and nature do 
not exist as separate entities, but rather they are constitutive elements of each 
other. Neil Smith was not the rst to speculate on the conjoined character of 
nature and society, but his production-of-nature thesis remains among the most 
inuential scholarship on the subject. “What jars us so much about the idea of 
the production of nature,” Smith writes, “is that it dees the conventional, sacro-
sanct separation of nature and society.”39 He forwards the production-of-nature 
thesis, in part, through an analytic distinction between rst and second na-
ture. Previous to the spread of capitalism, Smith argues, rst nature could be 
described as what is typically thought of when the word “nature” is invoked – a 
tree, a carrot, or a mountaintop. Second nature, on the other hand, is made from 
rst nature – tables, carrot juice, or landscape paintings. As Smith puts it, “sec-
ond nature is produced out of rst nature.”40
Under capitalism, however, the distinction between the two vanishes within 
the self-expanding logic of capitalist accumulation, for no rst nature is le unal-
tered as “capital stalks the earth in search of material resources.”41 In other words, 
Smith argues that, either through direct manipulation (turning a tree into lum-
ber) or indirect consequence (melting polar ice caps as a result of human-driven 
climate change), no area on earth has been le unchanged as a result of human 
activity. Within this context, the dierence between rst and second nature 
“ceases to have real meaning . . . [because] human beings have produced whatever 
nature became accessible to them.”42 He continues:
Where nature does survive pristine, miles below the surface of the earth or 
light years beyond it, it does so only because as yet it is inaccessible. If we 
must, we can let this inaccessible nature support our notions of nature as 
Edenic, but this is always an ideal, abstract nature of the imagination, one 
that we will never know in reality.43
Critical geographers, in particular, have elaborated on ways to transcend di-
chotomous and rigid conceptions of nature and society “to grasp nature’s social 
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character . . . to see how, in both thought and practice, the natural and the social 
melt into one another.”44 Noel Castree oers three specic ways to substantiate 
the conjoined character of nature and society. First, he points to the work crit-
ical geographers have done to demonstrate that knowledge of nature is always 
inected with subjectivity. is both calls into question the possibility of an 
“objective” nature and hints at the ways in which nature can be thought of as 
irrevocably social. In an early and noteworthy essay, the preeminent critical ge-
ographer David Harvey takes on a neo-Malthusian establishment in arguing 
that global resource “shortages” were in fact nothing more than the uneven dis-
tribution of resources, the ow of which was largely determined by powerful 
Western nations. is critique calls into question assumptions about overpop-
ulation and its relationship to starvation, resource degradation, and the like. In 
other words, Harvey exposes neo-Malthusian arguments to be fundamentally 
ideological and premised on a particular (and powerful) conception of nature.45
Others have since moved the critique of “knowing” nature beyond its ideological 
implications, focusing instead on the discursive work mobilized toward priv-
ileged knowledge(s) of nature. ese critiques demonstrate the ways in which 
power, articulated through ways of knowing about nature, is activated within 
gendered, racialized, and colonialized knowledges.46
Yet nature is clearly constituted by more than particular kinds of knowledge. 
To argue otherwise would be to deny the fundamental material aspect of bio-
physical nature. e second way nature can be seen as social is by understanding 
that its ever-present materiality is socially mediated and contingent. As an exam-
ple, photosynthesis and its results are clearly not socially produced – that process 
initiated long before humans arrived. Yet photosynthesis can be harnessed and 
deployed in ways, such as through agriculture, that tend to reproduce conven-
tional power structures and perpetuate inequalities.47
Taking this second argument one step further, Castree points to the third 
way critical geographers have challenged the supposed dichotomy between so-
ciety and nature. Here, the claim is that material nature is not only engaged 
with in socially contingent and mediated ways but also physically reconstituted 
through those interactions.48 As Erik Swyngedouw puts it, contemporary schol-
ars recognize “that natural or ecological conditions and processes do not operate 
separately from social processes, and that the actually existing socionatural con-
ditions are always the result of intricate transformations of preexisting cong-
urations that are themselves inherently natural and social.” Given the extent to 
which nature is imbricated with social processes, he argues that the social and 
natural are better reected in the hybrid conception of “socionature.”49 Castree 
Introduction 15 
observes that employing this term “is not at all a denial of the material reality 
of those things we routinely call natural.  .  .  . Rather it’s an insistence that the 
physical opportunities and constraints nature presents societies with can only 
be dened relative to specic sets of economic, cultural and technical relations 
and capacities.”50
Taking seriously the notion that the Holland Marsh is a socionatural land-
scape helps reveal important aspects of the dynamics that have gone into pro-
ducing and reproducing the area. e Marsh was not created in a vacuum of end-
less possibilities – it was produced precisely because of the specic material and 
geomorphological character of the area. at it was once a wetland very much 
matters to the history and the development of agriculture there. It is important 
to underscore the materialist commitment of socionature – biophysical nature 
does not simply bend to every human whim but instead presents a variety of 
“obstacles, opportunities, and surprises.”51 To help clarify this admittedly tricky 
concept, scholars have delineated between the formal and the real subsumption 
of nature within industrial, capitalist production. In some industrial processes 
– mining, for instance – the characteristics of biophysical nature are such that
it cannot be fully transformed, only exploited. Rocks can be mined, crushed for 
aggregate, and used in a variety of end-use products, but the biophysical charac-
ter of the rock remains largely unchanged. In other industrial dynamics – agri-
culture, for example – the real subsumption of nature is able to occur through
biological manipulation at the cellular scale. Seed germplasm is altered, soils are 
augmented, and plants are designed to be ever more ecient: “Nature, in short,
is (re)made to work harder, faster, better.”52 is drive to control the landscape
and the discrete bits of biophysical nature within it has been woven into the very 
fabric of the Holland Marsh. e “imaginary” of orderly, “smiling farms” has
long been a seductive promise in the Marsh, and yet completing this project has
remained always just out of reach due to the materiality and ongoing unpredict-
ability of biophysical nature.
Yet the “social” contributions of socionatural production in the Holland 
Marsh have remained undeterred for nearly a century. Politics – the formal op-
erations of governments in addition to social movements, civil society action, 
and the like – are fused into the elds and yields of the Marsh, enveloped in the 
process of nature’s production. Limits to the production of socionatures, while 
partly material (as mentioned above), are also socially produced.53 Within this 
context, environmental politics are seen to matter profoundly to the process of 
the production of socionature – an insight on display at various points in the 
history of the Marsh. e production of socionature is animated and negotiated 
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through the environmental-political tensions between ocial state policy and 
the dissenting civil-society actors. Demonstrating that the government and pol-
itics matter to the production of nature (as I do below) reveals the process to be 
a highly contingent one. e Holland Marsh as a produced socionature was not 
inevitable, but rather produced (at least in part) through a conuence of con-
tingent state power, institutions, and contentious politics unfolding over time.
And yet, while there are material and social elements that go into the produc-
tion of the Holland Marsh landscape, there are equally important imaginaries 
that have contributed – and continue to contribute – to its production and os-
tensible protection. e story attached to the rst vegetables to emerge from the 
Marsh is infused with technology, human ingenuity, assembly line precision, 
and a sterilized, cling-wrapped nature. In some of the earliest commercial ad-
vertising, potatoes from the Marsh are positioned by Eaton’s as the equivalent 
of expensive hats and fur coats – items every modern woman should never be 
without.54 Notions of progress, technological advancement, and even decadence 
were, in eect, inscribed onto the “nature” of the potato. In the contemporary 
period, conventional commercial ads as well as a variety of nonprot organiza-
tions promoting Holland Marsh vegetables – Sustain Ontario, Local Food Plus, 
Friends of the Greenbelt, the HMGA, and others – privilege decidedly dierent 
notions of nature based on neopastoralism and rustic environmentalism. Con-
temporary boosters of the area have invoked a cultural and natural imagery of 
a romanticized past and the de rigueur language of “local food” to construct an 
imaginary that eschews the material reality and history of the area in important 
ways. Such eorts, ironically, attempt to recapture a bucolic character deliber-
ately blanched from the area and its yields by Marsh boosters of a bygone era. So 
while agriculture in the area is rooted in a deep materiality mediated through 
politics and institutions, it also exists as a dematerialized spectacle of signs, ref-
erents, and symbols.55
Importantly, the development and deployment of various idyllic constructs 
is not merely a function of particularistic commercial interests. ese ecolog-
ical imaginaries are cast from within dominant structural systems, including 
capitalism, colonialism, patriarchy, and the like.56 Put dierently, imaginaries 
of nature are not xed, nor are they politically benign. Smith underscores this 
point by noting that, “much as a tree in growth . . . the social conception of na-
ture has accumulated innumerable layers of meaning in the course of history.”57
Nor are perceptions of nature formed ex nihilo, but rather imaginaries of na-
ture – or ecological imaginaries – are ideologically and discursively mediated.58
As Smith puts it, there is an ideology of nature, riven with the logic of capital, 
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that inuences how we think about and experience nature. As an example, the 
unrelenting exploitation of biophysical nature – trees, bituminous sands, rock 
quarries, soil – is enabled by the deeply engrained notion that nature is innite, 
out there somewhere, and unlimited.59 In recent Canadian history, the extent to 
which the state tends to protect this idea has been vigorously enforced, through, 
for example, the defunding of scientic research, the shuttering of libraries, and 
the labelling of environmental activists (particularly so called anti-petroleum 
ones) as “terrorists.”60 Similarly, privileged imaginaries of what nature in the 
Marsh “ought” to be is a key ingredient in how that area has been reproduced 
through the decades. And these normative commitments are reective of the 
historical, social, cultural, and political congurations of the day.
In just a few generations, the Holland Marsh has undergone a profound 
socionatural transformation. e physical terrain of the area, once a swampy 
ood plain for the Holland River, exists now as a manicured landscape of elds, 
roads, houses, barns, irrigation canals, and culverts. At the same time, con-
ceptions about what the Marsh “is” have also changed. Variously imagined as 
a mosquito-lled wasteland, an investment opportunity, a place for home and 
work, an agricultural site, and, more recently, a centre of high-end niche food 
production, its identity has been as unxed and variable as its material referent.
It is important to highlight the socionatural dynamics at play in the Holland 
Marsh, partly because crops are not widgets and elds are not workshop oors. 
Farming is dierent from many industrial processes in that it is heavily inu-
enced by weather conditions, pests, wind, and a litany of other factors that are 
not fully under human control – despite the best eorts of farmers, scientists, 
and agro-industry interests.61 Biophysical and climatic elements introduce a siz-
able amount of unpredictability into agriculture, making it distinct from typical 
industrial formations. So while it is possible to think of agriculture as capitalist, 
it is also relevant to think of the components of agriculture as being shaped by 
capitalism. As some would have it, crops, seeds, and soil can all be considered 
bits of “capitalist nature.”62
Emphasizing the notion that agricultural environments are fundamen-
tally caught up in the broader processes of nature’s production also brings 
to the foreground the unique character of stability and crisis associated with 
capitalism-in-place. Specically, the ostensibly self-expanding character of cap-
ital is signicantly restrained by the need for nonproduced (that is, “natural”) 
inputs.63 As capital uses biophysical inputs and creates outputs (pollution and 
such), it tends to draw down the resources available to its successful reproduction. 
In other words, biophysical properties are “underproduced” by capital, leading to 
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the second contradiction of capital: In order to reproduce, capital needs ecologi-
cal inputs (water, landscapes, plants, and so forth), but in the process of reproduc-
tion, it destroys (or renders unusable) these things. Within the Holland Marsh, 
this process can almost be demonstrated in centimetres of soil per year. e very 
moment the wetland was drained, exposing the rich composition of centuries’ 
worth of decayed plant material to vastly increased levels of oxygen, was the in-
stant this complex soil became more susceptible to oxidization, wind erosion, 
and water erosion through ooding. While there are mitigation techniques and 
technologies being employed by farmers to stabilize the soil, one of the dening 
features of the Marsh’s local competitive advantage, its demise is inevitable.
Emphasizing the specicity of the kinds of biophysical nature transformed in 
the Holland Marsh reveals that accounts of the broad structural and historical 
trajectory of capitalist agriculture constitute perhaps an overly blunt approach 
to untangling agriculture’s inherent dynamics.64 Agriculture in the Marsh is in 
part a result of the postwar global industrial-food regime. At the same time, 
there are important lessons to be learned from exploring the specic processes by 
which the area became enlisted in global agriculture and by investigating points 
of disjuncture between global agriculture and agriculture in the Marsh. Look-
ing at the specicity of nature in the area – or more accurately, the socionatural 
imbroglios that have resulted from the collision of global agro-industrial forces 
and local particularities – reveals insights into the complex interplay between 
agriculture, food, history, and capitalism.
Sociopolitical Aspects of Soil and Farmland Degradation and Loss
Its hydroponic variant aside, agriculture depends on the soil, and one of the cen-
tral purposes of this book is to bring soil back in to view. Dirt, as the preeminent 
anthropologist Mary Douglas famously described it, is “matter out of place.”65
Douglas’s anthropological and structuralist commitments led her to understand 
dirt (and its inverse, cleanliness, or the absence of dirt) as part of a broader so-
ciocultural arrangement of meaning in which dirt was an ordering antagonist. 
“Where there is dirt there is system,” she argues.66 I largely agree with this as-
sessment but take a slightly dierent tack, arguing that dirt, at least in part, is 
matter out of view. It is rare that we ever think about dirt unless – as Douglas 
observed – it is within the context of an absence of cleanliness. For most of us, 
dirt is something to be swept away from the kitchen oor, sprayed o the dog, 
or scrubbed out of our clothes.
Yet dirt is instrumental to our survival. We cannot live without food, almost 
all of which grows from the earth. Soil is also responsible for the cycling and 
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purifying of fresh water, it is a condition of production for the growth of bres 
the world depends on, and it supports untold numbers of ora and fauna. Ignor-
ing the complexity and crisis of dirt is a luxury for only the most privileged – 
those who have access to consumable goods from around the world without ever 
having to confront the biophysical and ecological requirements of those items. 
As a normative commitment, then, this book is an attempt to bring attention to 
the “quieted disaster” of soil degradation and farmland destruction.67
While soil degradation and farmland loss are global scourges that threaten 
livelihoods, destabilize populations, and exacerbate climate change, conven-
tional accounts of the problems typically miss the point by rendering soil and its 
uses apolitical. Indeed, this was largely the case up until Piers Blaikie and Har-
old Brookeld developed critical insights in the mid-1980s revealing the politics 
that adhere in all landscapes.68 e critical subdiscipline their work inspired 
– political ecology – interrogates how landscapes and other things we deem to
be natural (such as soil) are also always social, cultural, and political. In other
words, landscapes are always produced by humans within particular historical
and cultural contexts, though this is not always easy to see (recall my longstand-
ing misreading of the Holland Marsh).
Some of the earliest policy and program interventions aimed at dening and 
remedying soil degradation focused on erosion in Africa in the 1930s. Employing 
questionable scientic methods, colonial agronomists ignited a moral panic that 
led to the imposition of compulsory antierosion practices, the prohibition of cer-
tain farming techniques, and the forced destocking and displacement of animal 
herds across the continent.69 In assessing these early soil-conservation eorts, 
political-ecology scholars have demonstrated how concern for soil degradation 
in Africa in the 1930s incubated in the United States and spread throughout 
the so-called developed world as an expression of anxiety about the global im-
plications of the American Dust Bowl. White occupiers demonized Indigenous 
farming methods as backward and destructive, and the colonial powers capi-
talized on this by expanding their land holdings under the facade of scientic 
management and ostensibly modern farming techniques.70
By the early 1990s, critical historians and others were deepening the critique 
of soil-degradation science and remediation eorts in 1930s Africa. e professed 
science of the colonialists was exposed as soil politics – unduly alarmist, dismis-
sive of local biophysical conditions and knowledge, and ultimately deleterious to 
African agriculture.71 is was a top-down colonial approach to both dening 
and providing solutions to the problem of soil degradation. A key insight of 
this body of work is that to deem a given soil as degraded is to implicitly place it 
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within a normative context of ideal use. If the expectation is that a patch of land 
should produce a constant and prolic stream of fruit for export to the United 
States, then the slightest drop in phosphorus levels could be considered subopti-
mal, and thus the soil degraded. If the expectation is instead that the same patch 
should produce more moderately for the domestic market, then slight drops in 
various key chemicals may not constitute degradation.
e point, as Blaikie and Brookeld made thirty years ago, is that soil degra-
dation, while not without a biophysical component, is really a social and political 
problem.72 As Salvatore Engel-Di Mauro puts it: “Soil degradation implies a po-
litical position relative to how people relate to soils. is is why the matter of soil 
quality and hence degradation must encompass a study of social relations, not 
just soil properties.”73 Put dierently, the extent to which a given ground is con-
sidered degraded is largely a function of its social, cultural, and political context.
e very fact that soil is primarily considered an agricultural input tells us a lot 
about the expectations we have of it. In Canada, as in most capitalist countries 
of the Global North, it has long been seen in instrumental terms – a natural re-
source to be exploited for prot through agriculture. Here, the rst substantive 
eorts to survey and dene soil (along biochemical, geochemical, and taxonomi-
cal lines) were initiatives of the Ontario Agricultural College.74 e earliest sur-
veys investigated how soil erosion aected farming and explored the feasibility of 
agriculture in previously unworked areas. e production of scientic knowledge 
about Canadian soil has been, since the rst survey in 1914, largely a commer-
cial enterprise dening soils only in relation to agriculture.75 In the intervening 
century, the commercialization of soil science has intensied as publicly funded, 
nationally coordinated research has given way to privately funded, proprietary 
studies. ese “specic-purpose surveys” are increasingly common for agricul-
tural lands, but especially over the past decade or so, they are the purview of oil-
and-gas companies looking to exploit bituminous soils and landscapes.
A key idea in this book is that farmland-preservation policies are based on 
normative, context-specic, and political ideas about soil and landscapes. If the 
normative assumption is that soil is really only useful in as much as it can be used 
for farming, then there is scarcely little opportunity to understand it separate 
from agriculture. Farmland-preservation policies, in a very real sense, “produce” 
soil as little more than a farming medium. And the preservation of farming is 
not necessarily compatible with the preservation of soil, particularity within the 
Holland Marsh, given the biophysically delicate character of its muck.
Within this context, the imposition of agriculture on the landscape can be 
framed as a normative expression of an idea about the “purpose” of nature. e 
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original Marsh boosters were motivated by a variety of factors –moral, technical, 
nancial, and others – but behind all these is the more basic notion that agricul-
ture is a higher-order use of the landscape than is the preservation of a wetland.
To underscore this point, the Holland Marsh is now heavily protected as an 
agricultural area, the wetland having been expunged nearly a century ago. Yet, 
for reasons further elaborated below, the legislated protections leave the soil vul-
nerable. e degradation of farmland soil, as Blaikie and Brookeld point out, is 
a social problem, not only a biophysical one – this remains true within the con-
text of farmland-protection policy. Nutrient leaching, wind and water erosion, 
and even soil subsidence can occur with or without human intervention, “but 
for these processes to be described as ‘degradation’ implies social criteria which 
relate land to its actual or possible uses.”76 Degradation is then, in many ways, 
a perceptual, relational problem. As an example, the terminal depletion of key 
soil nutrients on a piece of near-urban property would result in its devaluation 
as farmland and thus would be considered degraded by the farmer-owner, farm 
advocates, and others of a similar persuasion. But to a suburban land developer, 
devalued farmland may represent a promising opportunity to acquire premium 
development land on the cheap. Degradation, in other words, is somewhat in 
the eye of the beholder.
Suggesting that land degradation is partially perceptual in no way annuls the 
seriousness of the issue. e loss of farmland continues to exacerbate poverty, 
marginalization, ecological degradation, starvation, and other untold horrors 
throughout the world. But the biophysical phenomenon of degrading soil is 
not the proximate cause – rather the determining factor is the social context 
that enables and allows such devastation to result from changes in the bio-
physiology and biochemistry of soil. Farmers are, on the whole, compelled by 
the edicts of pragmatic production to pursue the maximization of short-term 
prot. Highly intensive agriculture depletes farmland in as much as it reduces 
its capacity to sustain similar levels of production (without the introduction of 
soil amendments in the form of fertilizers and the like). A given piece of land 
may be perfectly ne from a biophysical perspective but classied as depleted 
when the expectations of intensive cultivation and the demand for prots are 
placed on it.
So how do we move toward a perspective on farmland degradation that might 
prove to be more ecacious in terms of farmland preservation? At minimum, to 
better understand the character of the problem requires seeing farmland degra-
dation as the product of irrevocably conjoined social and biophysical processes. 
Soil is only considered degraded in relation to the expectations placed on it; any 
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perceived biophysical degradation is typically the result of human activity in one 
form or another.77 e next step in understanding would ideally include know-
ing something about the history and context of both the biophysical properties 
of the soil as well as the social uses of it. Assembling an exhaustive historical 
record of a farmed area, its people, the soil, local culture, and so forth is obviously 
not always possible. Indeed, in the case of the Holland Marsh, there is scarce 
historical scientic and quantiable data on the muck soil itself. Yet striving to 
assemble the clearest image possible of the socionatural conditions of the land 
through time, as this book attempts, is a promising methodological manoeuvre.78
Next, moving toward a more thorough picture of farmland degradation (and 
its remedy) requires investigating the “chain of explanation.”79 is requires an 
analysis that takes into account the individual, social, and biophysical specicity 
of a given unit of agricultural production, then moving out to examine the con-
centric, interlocking spheres of relevant phenomena. is will vary case by case 
but can include the relations between producers within a given area, regional 
climatic conditions, and local political conditions through to national and su-
prastate actors and world economic trends.
e nal step in developing a more nuanced understanding of farmland deg-
radation is through adopting an inclusive denition of degradation itself. In 
conventional accounts, the assessment of whether a particular piece of farm-
land is degraded is premised on an analysis of some combination of the physical, 
chemical, and biological components of the soil. If certain thresholds of a given 
nutrient are absent, or the percentage of organic matter per unit is deemed in-
sucient relative to production demands, the soil is labelled degraded. At that 
point either the land is abandoned as farmland or eorts are made to remedi-
ate the soil. What technocratic denitions miss, however, is the broader social 
context of soil’s degradation. I use Engel-Di Mauro’s more ambitious denition 
of healthy farmland being that which “fulll[s] everyone’s needs in a commu-
nity and contributes to developing or maintaining egalitarian relations.”80 is 
approach creates a much more complex picture of land degradation, its causes, 
consequences, and potential solutions, than conventional approaches have al-
lowed. Ideally such an approach will lead to transcending the impasse that has 
seen the confusion about this issue continue unabated over the last few decades.
Before reviewing the conceptual development and deployment of farmland- 
preservation paradigms in Canada, it is useful to rst briey historicize two an-
tecedent and related ideas, conservationism and environmentalism. is is only 
a cursory eort, though, as summarized below, with much more having been 
written about these shiing and historically contingent categories elsewhere.
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A concerted conservation movement was part of the European zeitgeist from 
as early as 1880 and informed – along with US inuences – the shape of early 
conservationism in Canada.81 In the earlier part of the nineteenth century, con-
servationism in the colonies had little purchase, given the prevalence of the no-
tion of an extensive, inexhaustible nature and related policies to support resettle-
ment and natural-resource extraction.82 ere was a “myth of superabundance,” 
of a land “rich in soils, and minerals, and forests, and wildlife.”83 But this was 
not a monolithic perspective – in the early decades of the nineteenth century, 
the Hudson’s Bay Company developed and implemented a wildlife conserva-
tion program in response to rapidly declining beaver populations. is included 
harvest quotas, resulted in the shuttering of some trading posts, and led to the 
development of some of the rst fur sanctuaries in North America.84
e conservationism of early twentieth-century Canada reected 
Enlightenment-era conceptualizations of nature and liberal ideals with respect 
to human-environment relations. Nature was to be inventoried, categorized, and 
managed in ways that supported economic development and territorial expan-
sion. A practical, instrumental desire to protect the environment thus fused with 
a perspective that nature could be managed and improved on through science 
and human ingenuity.
Perhaps no institution embodied this perspective better than the Commis-
sion of Conservation (CoC), a federal nonpartisan conservation-advisory body 
composed of academics and business leaders, ex-ocio members from the federal 
departments of the interior and agriculture, and representatives from the pro-
vincial governments. e CoC was initiated in 1909, following a commitment 
by the Canadian delegation at an international conference on the conservation 
of natural resources, hosted by the so-called conservationist president, eodore 
Roosevelt.85 Its named committees hint at the tactical character of conserva-
tion at the time – mines, waters and hydropower, lands, forests, sh, game and 
fur-bearing animals, public health, and public relations. e CoC produced an 
impressive body of work – over two hundred reports from its founding through 
its disbandment in 1921.
e Committee on Land, chaired by Dr. James Robertson, is particularly 
salient here. Robertson was among one of the most forward-looking members of 
the CoC, rejecting chemical fertilizers in favour of compost and manure and ad-
vocating for a conservation-research agenda “by far the most advanced” among 
the academics involved with the commission.86 For him, farmers were the foot 
soldiers of conservation, and the best farmers convened with divine and earthly 
elements to nurture productivity from nature. As he wrote in 1912,
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Farming is the marriage of the strength of old Father Sun to the inherent 
strength of old Mother Earth. e plant is the child and the farmer manages 
the business. at is his place in the economy of nature. So this is a noble 
calling at its best . . . [e farmer is] . . . a partner of the Almighty to make 
a new earth wherein dwelleth righteous farming and righteous living.87
In his remarks in the commission’s rst annual report, Robertson spoke evoc-
atively and reverently about Canada’s agricultural resources as “the chief asset 
in the landed estate of the people of the Dominion” and the CoC’s role in man-
aging those resources to extend “their enjoyment through the wise use of what 
we have.”88 He also warned of the “tremendous temptation for rst settlers to 
become surface miners instead of real farmers who use and husband the trea-
sures of the soil.”89
e productivist, instrumental character of early-twentieth-century conser-
vation was underscored most poignantly by US president William Ta, who 
Robertson quotes extensively in his opening remarks. At this time in history, 
draining wetlands for agricultural production was sound land stewardship. As 
Ta put it:
In considering the conservation of the natural resources of the country, the 
feature that transcends all others, including woods, waters, [and] minerals, 
is the soil of the country. . . . To this end the conservation of the soils of the 
country should be cared for with all means at the government’s disposal. 
eir productive powers should have the attention of our scientists that 
we may conserve the new soils, improve the old soils, drain wet soils, ditch 
swamp soils, [and] levee river overow soils  .  .  . [so] that the soils from 
which they come may be enriched.90
e CoC was disbanded in 1921, representing waning support for the conser-
vation agenda within the federal government.91 ough by the 1930s, and in part 
spurred on by civil-society initiatives, an evolving form of conservationism was 
emerging across Canada. e National Parks Act was passed into law in 1930, the 
Federation of Ontario Naturalists was formed in 1931, Ducks Unlimited opened 
a Canadian chapter in 1938 to facilitate wetland restoration, and the Canadian 
Quetico-Superior Committee was founded in 1949 (an oshoot of its sister orga-
nization, the Quetico-Superior Council, based in the United States and founded 
in 1928).92 ere was a qualitative shi in this emerging conservationism that 
nudged the instrumental and productivist impulses of earlier iterations toward 
preservation.
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is was a less anthropogenic eort, one that began to subtly recast the 
human-nature relationship. While certainly more radical than many of his 
contemporaries, Aldo Leopold’s ecological philosophy is indicative of this shi. 
In the middle of the twentieth century, Leopold insisted that nature was still 
largely understood as something to be owned and used for human benet. He 
famously called for a new ethic to inform human-nature relations: “ere is as 
yet no ethic dealing with man’s relation to land and to the animals and plants 
which grow upon it. Land, like Odysseus’ slave-girls, is still property. e land 
relation is still strictly economic, entailing privileges but no obligations.”93
Despite this critical posture, Leopold was optimistic that the nascent conser-
vationism in North America at that time was indicative of a deepening respect 
for the so-called natural environment. For him, the land ethic was about extend-
ing to nature the same considerations community members show each other. As 
he put it, “e land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to 
include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land.”94 e leaky 
ontological categories of nature and society can be seen to be dissolving within 
Leopold’s ecological philosophy – humans and nature were irrevocably inter-
twined in much more profound ways than earlier instrumental versions of con-
servation implied.
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring put a ne point on this and contributed to the 
emergence of an environmental movement that began to grapple with ecological 
contamination and collapse. In Ontario, a number of environmental organi-
zations emerged in the 1960s and 1970s that rejected the liberal conservation 
ideal of instrumental use and instead developed a deep ecological rationale for 
nature’s protection. e Algonquin Wildlands League, formed in 1968, agitated 
for – and won – extensions of protected wilderness areas in Algonquin, Lake 
Superior, and Killarney Parks and was instrumental in realizing a ban on log-
ging in Quetico Park.95 e rst Earth Day was observed in 1970; Greenpeace 
launched in Victoria, British Columbia, in 1971; and DDT was banned in the 
United States, although more slowly phased out in Canada, beginning in the 
early 1970s. is was an emerging environmentalism that would inform the con-
temporary movement focused on public health and well-being, toxic landscapes, 
climate change, and the intersectional ways in which environmental (in)justice 
cleaves along gendered, racial, class, and spatial lines.
While concern for land quality had percolated as early as the late nineteenth 
century, deep concern for farmland degradation and preservation began to 
emerge in Ontario in a broader sense during the 1950s. Unlike the earlier anxi-
ety circulating in the global context, which pinned farmland precarity on issues 
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of soil erosion and poor farm management in the developing world, the threats 
in Ontario in the 1950s were tied to rapid postwar (sub)urbanization.96 ese 
earliest concerns were sparked by threats to high-value agricultural land, partic-
ularly the fruit-growing area on the Niagara Peninsula. In 1959, Ralph Krueger 
captured the latent anxiety:
In recent years there has been much concern in Canada over the spread of 
urban land uses onto the choice Niagara fruit land. Commentators and ed-
itors of all the news media, as well as industrialists, fruit growers, planners, 
and government spokesmen, have been debating how much urban expan-
sion has been aecting the fruit industry, and whether anything should be 
done to direct urban growth away form the best fruit land.97
Subsequent research in the area conrmed fears of farmland loss and eventu-
ally contributed to the creation of the Food Land Development Branch – later 
renamed the Food Land Preservation Branch – of the Ministry of Agriculture 
of the Ontario government in 1973.98 By the late 1970s, Ontario had developed 
its rst explicit strategies and guidelines for farmland protection, demonstrat-
ing that the issue had begun to have traction at the highest levels in provincial 
government.
Concern at the federal level had already coalesced in response to a national 
conference titled Resources for Tomorrow, which resulted in the creation of 
the Canada Land Inventory (CLI) in 1961. e CLI’s mandate was an ambi-
tious yet simple one – to inventory the nation’s land and assess its “productive” 
capabilities.99 e body found that only 15 percent of Canadian territory had 
any potential as farmland, quantifying – for the rst time – Canada’s agricul-
tural potential. Far-smaller pockets in the Montreal Plain, southern Ontario, 
and the Lower Mainland in British Columbia were the only areas with land 
deemed to be Class 1 and Class 2 – the most productive, highest-quality farm-
land. Not surprisingly, subsequent to CLI’s work, these three areas in Quebec, 
Ontario, and British Columbia became the main focus of farmland preserva-
tion work in Canada.100
Given that Canada’s prime agricultural land was shown to be clustered 
around its most populated areas, the impetus behind what might be considered 
the rst wave of protection policies and initiatives in Ontario came in response 
to anxieties over the loss of farmland in the face of urbanization. In the postwar 
boom, agriculture was losing out to suburban expansion in the zero-sum game 
of land use. Yet, over time, the actual loss of farmland proved to be fairly modest, 
estimated at around 3 million hectares country-wide between 1941 and the early 
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twenty-rst century.101 And while farmland loss can have signicant local and 
regional consequences, the rationalization and industrialization of agriculture 
meant that farming output increased at the national aggregate level despite a 
shrinking farmland base.102 e productivist/scarcity rationale thus lost steam in 
the face of this empirical reality. Any worry that agricultural production would 
be stunted in Canada due to a shrinking land base waned in the face of a growing 
faith in agro-technologies to perpetually increase per-hectare yields.
In part as a reaction to this perspective and beginning in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, a second wave of farmland preservation grew out of the nascent Ca-
nadian environmental movement. is was a shi in focus from the quantity
to the quality of land.103 Invoking Leopold’s notion of land ethic, Mary Raw-
son was one of the rst Canadians to write about farmland protection from 
an ecological perspective. Addressing the BC context, she noted that “the crit-
ical task of preserving food-producing lands” was, in part, a way to “nurture 
the growth of a new understanding of man’s relationship to land, a new land 
ethic.”104 In Ontario, the Ontario Coalition to Preserve Foodland was formed 
in the early 1980s as an alliance of sorts between environmental groups and those 
interested in farmland protection. At the same time, larger mainstream environ-
mental groups, such as the Sierra Club and Friends of the Earth, began taking 
on the issue of farmland preservation as a matter of key business. Within this 
perspective, protecting farmland was seen as a way of preserving the natural en-
vironment. Proponents of this perspective point to the environmental services 
of farmland – as a sink for carbon, a habitat for wildlife, preservation of the 
countryside, and the like.
While the environmental-protection perspective is still prevalent, a stronger 
inuence in contemporary farmland preservation has more recently emerged – 
amenity protection. As Canada has become an increasingly (sub)urban country, 
the countryside is seen as a place to escape to for weekend getaways, summer 
holidays, aernoon drives, or permanent relocation. is “rural migration,” 
as it is known, is characterized by “the movement of largely a­uent urban or 
suburban populations to rural areas for specic lifestyle amenities, such as nat-
ural scenery, proximity to outdoor recreation, cultural richness, or a sense of 
rurality.”105 e inux of amenity migrants to the countryside has led to an 
exurban gentrication, whereby farmland protection is framed as part of a 
broader community- preservation paradigm by local governments in attempts 
to lure new residents.106 Farmland-preservation policies are in this case bound 
up – perhaps subsumed by – those to accommodate the exurbanite imaginary 
of the pastoral rural.
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is leads to the nal theme under which the impetus for farmland preser-
vation can be grouped – the agrarian ideal. Some argue that, in the Canadian 
context, the notion that agriculture has both cultural and economic signicance 
– that there is an inherent rural virtue – can be traced back to the country’s 
earliest history as a producer for colonial-export markets. Indeed, early farming 
in Canada was intimately tied to the creation of a national identity. Michael 
Bunce points out that there is both an economic and cultural aspect here. In an 
economic register, “physiocratic agrarianism – the belief that the true wealth 
of the nation is drawn from the land,” imbues agriculture with a productivist 
authority – farming contributes economically, provides jobs, supports families, 
and builds sturdy societies. Farmers, too, are elevated – in the famous words of 
omas Jeerson – to “the chosen people of God.”107 e normative corollary 
of this leads to what some call the romantic iteration of agrarianism.108 From 
this perspective, farmers come to be (unwittingly, perhaps) celebrated as land 
stewards, not (merely) farmers. Here, Henry David oreau is the patron saint, 
and both the urbanization and the industrialization of agriculture are seen to 
be the true threats to farmland. ese pressures, from this perspective, can only 
be neutralized through a “back to the earth” movement emphasizing a culture 
of “traditional” farming from an idealized, bygone era. e rise of so-called 
agro-tainment and pick-your-own models illustrate the extent to which farmers 
are now cast as curators of the countryside – stewards of both the land and an 
idealized rural community.109
is is all to say that the impetus driving farmland preservation is not eas-
ily parsed. e truth is, there are multiple and at times competing perspectives 
driving these eorts. Yet, to reiterate, conventional farmland-preservation 
measures are typically designed to protect a particular kind of capital-intensive 
farming, not the land itself. Farming-preservation polices need to be understood 
as distinct from farmland-preservation policies, yet this distinction is rarely, if 
ever, made. e focus of this book – unearthing the socionatural history of the 
Holland Marsh and exploring the conditions and processes through which that 
farmland was made and maintained – reveals the specicity of the Marsh land 
base and sheds light on the limits of contemporary farmland-protection policies.
e following chapters draw on and develop these three conceptual touch-
stones – agriculture and capitalism, nature and society, and the sociopolitics of 
soil and farmland degradation and loss – through an empirical examination of 
agriculture in the Holland Marsh. It is important to understand these not as 
discrete categories, but rather as overlapping analytics with which to parse the 
ever-shiing conguration of change within the Marsh. e driver of a distinctly 
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capitalist form of agriculture propelled the area’s initial draining – a capitalism 
always refracted through the liberal project of the Canadian state. We see in the 
story of the Holland Marsh a kind of double movement – a to and fro of capital 
penetration followed by periods of liberal regulation to address the (ecological) 
externalities of production, as described by Karl Polanyi. e latest iteration 
of this – the Specialty Crop Area designation – ostensibly nds a resolution 
between ecological and economic sustainability. Yet the apparent resolution of 
this contradiction of capitalist agriculture is incomplete and temporary. Impor-
tantly, this approach as used in the Marsh is reective of broader patterns of the 
regulation of biophysical nature within the Canadian liberal state. We cannot 
understand the history of agriculture without also understanding something 
about the history of “nature” in Canada.
What we witness in the Holland Marsh is not a wholesale and unregulated 
expression of global industrial agriculture because the geologic history and bio-
physical composition of the area resists being so neatly integrated into industrial 
models of production. Yet this is not to suggest that the productivist impulses 
of capitalist agriculture were nonexistent in the Marsh. Indeed, they were, and 
continue to be, but they are continually refracted through, modied by, and 
complicated within the biophysical specicity of the area. More than this, as 
socionatural theory demonstrates, are the discursive elements and imaginaries of 
nature that (re)produce agriculture in the Marsh. e ideas that various actors – 
farmers, boosters, marketers, policymakers – have about the biophysical nature 
of the Marsh are a key driver in shaping the material landscape.
e most important expression of this dynamic is with respect to the soil 
– the raison d’être for draining the area in the rst place. Shiing understand-
ings of conservationism and environmentalism have modied the (re)produc-
tion of the soil over time. e original drainage of the Holland River lowlands
was enabled through a matrix of regulation and justied through a rhetoric of
improvement as fundamentally conservationist. Fast-forward nearly a century,
and the landscape is protected as a Specialty Crop Area, cased within a logic of
environmentalism and farmland protection. Yet despite decades of regulation,
justied within shiing discourses of conservationism, environmentalism, and
farmland protection, the soil’s steady subsidence has continued.
Chapter Overview
In the following chapter, I take up a discussion of the very earliest history of the 
Holland Marsh area, from roughly 14,000 years ago up until roughly 1925, and 
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explore how various aspects of the past have enabled and shaped the current-day 
Marsh. I focus explicitly on how relevant social and natural elements collided 
and eventuated in the production of the material agricultural landscape of the 
Marsh – in other words, how the physical land came to be produced out a “dis-
mal swamp.” Within this context, the geology of the area stands as a sturdy 
foundation, serving as the biophysical canvas on which the socionatural activity 
of muck farming would eventually emerge. Before the farms, however, was the 
wetland, a complicated, vernacular landscape accommodating to various uses 
before it was transformed into elds. I discuss how a wider regional reclamation 
geography, enabled by a shared Great Lakes basin geology, provided the early 
Marsh boosters – in particular Professor William Day – with examples of drain-
age projects to study in southern Ontario, Michigan, and Ohio. While Day and 
the Holland Marsh Syndicate would draw on other similar projects throughout 
the region, ultimately they would create their own social and political congu-
rations in order to mobilize the resources (not only nancial but also political) 
necessary to drain the Holland River valley.
In Chapter 2 I attend to the period of time between roughly 1925, when the 
excavation of the canal system began, through to 1935, by which point meagre 
commercial agricultural production had begun. is is the period during which 
the material landscape of the Marsh was thoroughly transformed from an ab-
stract idea of land into actual, farmable elds through a conuence of policy, 
technology, labour, and capital. I discuss the Herculean eorts required to 
dredge a twenty-seven-kilometre-long canal out of the peaty bog and argue that 
the spectacle of it all whetted the appetite of would-be farmers and hungry con-
sumers alike. e transformation of the landscape was also predicated on a host 
of institutional and legislative supports that preceded the draining, establishing 
important legal and discursive precursors to the agricultural activity to come. 
As the elds emerged out of the swampy water, they were thrust into abstract 
exchange relations, assigned (inated) value, and propelled into a complex and 
multispatial political economy of food and agriculture.
For the farmers in the Marsh, the timing of the land’s emergence could hardly 
have been worse. I begin Chapter 3 (1935–54) by exploring the hardships those 
early families had to endure as a result of the eects of the Great Depression. 
e socionatural conuence of low consumer demand, on the one hand, and 
prodigious supply crowding the newly minted elds, on the other, made for a 
disastrous start to commercial agricultural production. As I detail in this chap-
ter, the crops emerge as a stability strategy for the farmers, while agriculture 
in the Holland Marsh truly ourishes during the immediate postwar years. 
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Farmers there (and elsewhere) leveraged their newfound clout, as producers of 
calories to feed the war eort at home and abroad, to engage in unprecedented 
social organizing. e Marsh emerged during this era as part of the “modern 
countryside.” Liberal notions of an ordered, productive, and protable rurality 
animated state-making projects, making farms and farmers an important part 
of the postwar transition. At the same time, advances in chemical synthesizing, 
cooling technologies, and transportation infrastructure began to change farm-
ing in the Marsh and elsewhere. For the farmers, who had typically only ever 
shipped to the Toronto area, improvements in produce durability and trans-
portation and storage technologies suddenly made markets accessible around 
the country, the continent, and even overseas in Europe. is empirical reality 
resulted in a period of protability and stability in the Marsh, though this was 
not to last.
e enthusiasm with which farmers embraced the tenets of an emerging 
mechanized, productivist, and chemical-dependent global agriculture continued 
well into the post–Second World War period. In Chapter 4 (1954–80) I explore 
how these tendencies and related socioecological contradictions led to crises of 
farming in the Holland Marsh. e period is bookended, on the one hand, by 
Hurricane Hazel (1954), a devastating and deadly storm that exposed the hubris 
of modernist notions of human domination over nature. Hazel demonstrated 
that the Marsh boosters had not in fact conquered nature along the Holland 
River. is lesson would inspire farmers, with ample state support, to redou-
ble their eorts to expunge the area of nature and its inherent contingencies 
and unpredictability. By 1980, on the other hand, this cavalier attitude toward 
the biophysical environment had resulted in the emergence of ecological and 
public-health disasters that would put the production of nature in the Marsh 
under intense external scrutiny.
In Chapter 5 (1980–present) I pick up on the theme of crisis in the Holland 
Marsh by exploring the details of two prominent crises that surfaced in the early 
1980s – elevated birth anomalies in and around the area, and algal-bloom out-
breaks on Lake Simcoe. e “smiling farm” narrative was severely undercut by 
revelations that Marsh agriculture was implicated in both of these quiet disas-
ters. is, in turn, catapulted the area into a constellation of emerging regional 
environmental politics. As a result, farmers have been made to adjust to prevail-
ing environmental sentiment through various regulatory and legislative mea-
sures. At the same time, (sub)urban expansion has accelerated in recent years, 
bringing suburban yards in almost direct contact with the elds and resulting in 
increased tensions on both terrains. As the social and political conditions within 
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which nature is produced in the Marsh change, farmers have sought to enlist 
biophysical nature in ever-more ecient ways to search for ways to control their 
elds and crops with (ostensibly) increasing precision in order to get as much 
out of the biophysical nature as possible. Ultimately, however, uncertainty and 
contradiction persist in the elds of the Holland Marsh.
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e Production of Land, 14,000 BC–1925
C ultivating an appreciation for the complexity of the trans-formation of the Holland Marsh begins with understanding the socio-natural origins of the land. ere was nothing inevitable about the 
arrival of intensive cultivation to the area, but neither could the same kind of 
agricultural land there be produced just anywhere. e Marsh is the result of a 
conuence of biophysical, topographical, ecological, sociocultural, and political 
conditions, yet these all rest – at times uneasily – atop a sturdy geological foun-
dation. ese elements collided and eventually produced the material agricul-
tural landscape of the Marsh.
e material foundation for the farmland was established over 14,000 years 
ago, assembled within a millennia-long, prehuman history of grand geological 
processes. e resultant wetland was used by various waves of human inhabitants 
– rst Indigenous populations, then later colonial settlers – in very dierent
ways. Initially, Indigenous people used the area as a hunting and shing ground
and as a node along the Carrying Place Trail.1 Later, white-settler sensibilities
initially rendered the landscape a wasteland – a mere ditch, as John Galt put it.
Yet over time, perceptions shied as the result of changing material conditions,
including less available, less accessible farmland and the ow of information and 
knowledge about marsh farming throughout the shared geology of the Great
Lakes basin. e pursuit of prot was part of the motivation for transforming
the wetlands into elds – importantly, this transformation did not occur until
aer capitalist farming was commonplace throughout Ontario – but the driving
impulse was more than simply money. Deeper-seated cultural desires to harness, 
manipulate, and control “nature” with human ingenuity and technology were
equally integral animating factors.
Despite all this, the transformation from wetland to farmland could not have 
occurred without an enabling political milieu. A range of regulatory, legislative, 
and quasi-judicial infrastructure buttressed the initial drainage plan. e state, 
not just the market, put its full weight behind the production of a particular 
34 chapter 1
form of landscape in the Holland Marsh. Consistent with conservationist sen-
timent of the day, canalizing and draining the wetland was understood as land 
improvement and as part of the broader agricultural tradition of the edgling 
country. e opportunity, within this context, to renovate a wasted landscape 
into useful elds was far too attractive to pass up.
e Material Origins of Muck Farming
e story of the Holland Marsh starts before the Holland River lowlands were 
drained and transformed into farms, before Paleoindian populations were hunt-
ing and gathering in the wetland, and even before there was any wetland in the 
area to speak of. e natural history of the Marsh, a precursor to its socionatural 
history, starts roughly 14,000 years ago at the end of the last Ice Age. During the 
Quaternary glacial period, the Laurentide Ice Sheet, an expanse covering a good 
deal of what would become Canada and the United States, advanced and re-
treated in response to temperature uctuations over many millennia.2 e hard 
crystalline rock of the Precambrian Shield, beginning just north of Lake Simcoe, 
was largely impervious to the erosive weight of the ice. But as the sheet advanced 
and retreated over the soer limestone and shale rock abutting the Precambrian 
Shield to the south, it scoured out depressions that would become the Lake Sim-
coe watershed. As the ice of the Wisconsinan glaciation period made its terminal 
retreat northward, it le behind a mix of crushed limestone and shale debris in 
the form of gravel, sand, silt, and clay.3 ese depressions and deposits accumu-
lated into four physiographic regions within the West Holland subwatershed: 
the Oak Ridges Moraine, the Schomberg Clay Plain, the Peterborough Drumlin 
Field, and the Simcoe Lowlands.4 e latter is a broad valley extending south 
from Cook’s Bay, hemmed in by the higher-relief moraine, plain, and drumlin 
features.5 What is now the Holland Marsh sits at the top of a nger of the Sim-
coe Lowlands that slopes gently toward Cook’s Bay and Lake Simcoe beyond.
While this landscape resembled “an old gravel pit or quarry” in the imme-
diate postglacial period, vegetative life soon began to blanket the barren land-
scape.6 Paleovegetation reconstruction paints a picture of a shiing vegetative 
prole of the Lake Simcoe watershed over time – from a forest-tundra mix, to 
a boreal parkland/forest mix, through to a mixed-forest landscape.7 As water 
drained slowly through the Simcoe Lowlands into Cook’s Bay and Lake Simcoe, 
what would become the Holland Marsh slowly began to form. And as climatic 
conditions shied over time, so too did the vegetative composition of the wet-
land, ranging from arboreal swampland to herbaceous marsh.8 Today, the Marsh 
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shares its portion of the Simcoe Lowlands with a variety of wetland types, includ-
ing deciduous and mixed swampland in the south end, north end, and in patches 
along the east side along with shallow marsh and rare open and shrub fen in the 
north where the Simcoe Lowlands empty into Cook’s Bay.9
For centuries, the ora grew, died o, then grew and died o again. Over 
time, the decaying plant material – what would become peat – spread out across 
the section of the Simcoe Lowlands now occupied by the Holland Marsh.10 Over 
millennia, an expanse of accumulated plant material lled the shallow water of 
the valley, creating the marshy wetland. Technically, the Marsh, before being 
drained, would have likely been classied – according to the Canadian Wetland 
Classication System – as an organic peatland marsh, a central characteristic of 
which is the accumulation of peat.11 By denition, organic peatlands contain 
greater than forty centimetres of peat accumulation. Although the peat has al-
ready vanished in some spots on the edge of the Marsh, in the middle, where the 
muck and peat are deepest, there is still up to around two metres le.12 Prior to 
draining, the peat would have been signicantly deeper than this.13
Long before the landscape was resettled through colonial agricultural expan-
sion, the wetland provided for Indigenous populations. Indeed, archeologists 
have identied Early Paleoindian, or Clovis, sites in and around the Holland 
Marsh dating back nearly 14,000 years. No fewer than ten sites scattered along 
the Holland River from Cook’s Bay up through to the southwestern tip of 
present-day Holland Marsh indicate that the area was intermittently populated 
throughout the Early and Late Paleoindian periods as well as into the Archaic 
period.14 ese earliest inhabitants gathered on what was at the time the shores 
of a receding Lake Algonquin, a landscape of spruce-parkland, and adjacent 
areas interspersed with various grasses and sedges.15 While migratory caribou 
were the game of choice, evidence indicates that the Clovis people would have 
had access to a prehistoric array of culinary choices within the broader Great 
Lakes basin, including
mastodons and mammoths up to ten feet tall at the shoulder; woodland 
muskox; shrub fox; fugitive deer and stag moose; at-headed and long-nosed 
peccary pigs the size of small deer; the short-faced bear, a superb predator 
twice the size of [the] modern grizzly; the tapir; the wild horse; giant beaver 
the size of a bear; the dire wolf; and ground sloths the size of cattle.16
While there is some debate with respect to the cause, there is consensus on the 
conclusion that many of these charismatic megafauna did not persist through 
the Younger Dryas, or the Big Freeze, which lasted about a millennia, from 
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between 12,900 to 11,700 years ago. e Indigenous hunter and gatherers in the 
area would have continued to hunt caribou, in addition to deer and moose, as 
the climate warmed aer the Big Freeze. As early as 5,000 years ago, Indigenous 
populations installed permanent shing weirs between Lake Couchiching and 
Lake Simcoe. From 4,000 to 1,000 years ago, agriculture began to supplement 
hunting, shing, and gathering. By about AD 1100, the “ree Sisters” – the sa-
cred triumvirate of corn, beans, and squash – were being cultivated throughout 
the Great Lakes basin.17
By about AD 1350, the Holland Marsh area was under the stewardship of the 
Wendat, whose territory included a large swath of land from the north shore of 
Lake Ontario to Georgian Bay. As a result of disease and warfare inicted on 
the area by incoming colonialists, the Wendat population was decimated and 
eventually dispersed. By the mid-seventeenth century, the Haudenosaunee con-
trolled the territory. ey were soon aer displaced by the Anishinaabeg, who 
later entered into three treaties within which the Marsh still exists. e Toronto 
Purchase (or Treaty 13) was signed in 1805 and covers the southwestern tip of the 
Marsh. In 1818, the Nottawasaga Purchase (Treaty 18) was negotiated for a tract 
of land that includes the western part of the Marsh. Finally, in 1923, the Wil-
liams Treaty was signed for a tract that includes the eastern side of the Marsh.
A Swampy Imaginary:  
Revealing Agriculture in the Holland Marsh
John Galt, a surveyor for the Canada Company, famously remarked of the Hol-
land Marsh in 1825 that it was a “mere ditch swarming with mosquitoes, ies, 
bullfrogs and water snakes.”18 e place of which he spoke had been named in 
1791 by Canada’s rst ever surveyor general, Major Samuel Holland, who like-
wise failed to see any agricultural potential in the wetland.19 In part, the swampy 
landscape was a toss-away to the early surveyors – unimportant, inconsequential, 
empty, and perhaps seen as little more than a nuisance. Holland Landing, just 
east of the Marsh, was the prized location of the area. Long used by Indigenous 
people as an important trading post, Holland Landing was even considered 
briey in the 1820s as a possible capital of Upper Canada. e botanist John 
Goldie extolled the site for its natural and unique beauty, noting in 1819: “Since 
I came here I have seen a number of rare plants. . . . ere are a species of Asclepias
with orange owers very handsome, a species of Euphorbium with white owers, 
a Ranunculus, together with some others which were not in ower, that I had 
never seen before.”20
e Production of Land, 14,000 BC–1925 37 
In contrast to this was the Holland Marsh to the west. Settlers in the 
mid-nineteenth century saw this area as a useless swamp.21 is echoed the sen-
timent of the inuential British journalist and social reformer George Godwin, 
who devoted a good deal of his 1859 book, Town Swamps and Social Bridges, to 
expanding on the notion that marshes are “dark and dangerous” places of “deg-
radation and lth.”22 Similarly, the nascent Canadian state did not recognize the 
area in any ocial capacity other than as an agglomeration of physical features 
to be catalogued and accounted.
e early colonialists had little interest in draining wetlands initially, pre-
occupied as they were with “inventory science,” the “mapping and cataloguing 
of resources and other natural phenomena.”23 is was no politically benign 
activity, though, tied up as it was with Baconianism (the belief that accumulat-
ing facts led to new scientic theories) and Newtonianism (the idea that nature 
is orderly, mechanical, and subject to universal precepts). Instead, these early 
scientic forays cataloguing the nation’s “resources” were instrumental in the 
forging of a national identity and the expansion (materially and ideologically) 
of the liberal Canadian state. Agriculture was not only an incipient economic 
driver of the economy but also crucial to the idea of Canada as a thriving – and 
worthy – colonial partner. Agriculture, in other words, was a central tenet of 
successfully making the Canadian state. As Suzanne Zeller puts it, “Canadians 
realized that their very future depended upon Canada’s image abroad as an ag-
riculturally promising country.”24 ere was an additional normative, ethical el-
ement to these attempts to rationalize the landscapes of the new world – taming 
the wild frontiers was, for the colonial settlers, part of the process of developing 
a “proper” civil society.25
On the one hand, then, it is curious that Holland and others did not un-
derstand the reclamation potential of the Marsh, especially given that wetland 
farming has been an important agricultural practice for millennia. is method 
can be traced back to the very cradle of civilization in Mesopotamia, where peo-
ple congregated along river valleys and ood plains for the fertility oered by the 
mucky soil. While there is no accurate appraisal for the total quantity of global 
freshwater wetlands, there have been estimates that in some regions – including 
Australia, Europe, and North America – up to 50 percent of marshlands have 
been transformed to agricultural use, suggesting that wetland conversion has 
been a widespread historical phenomenon.26 In Ontario, up to 80 percent of 
wetland areas have been transformed, lost, drained, or converted to other uses.27
On the other hand, given the preponderance of much more accessible and 
easily reclaimed land well into the mid-nineteenth century, it is not surprising 
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at all that the early surveyors failed to seize the agricultural potential of the area. 
Compared to converting a wetland into farmland, the investment required to 
transform far drier and very abundant land in what is now southwestern and 
central Ontario into productive farmland paled in price and eort. Besides this, 
the specic conguration of state regulations and supports were designed to 
enable the conversion of woodlands, not wetlands, throughout the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. e rst and far more signicant wave of agricul-
tural transformation in the province was aimed at the vast tracts of woodland 
throughout southwestern and central Ontario. Indeed, as David Wood puts it, 
“e domain of southern Ontario was transformed from one ecologic category 
to another – from woodland to farmland – in less than a hundred years by an 
army of axe-wielding settlers and woodsmen.”28 e rush to clear woodland for 
farmland in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was so fevered 
that Robert Leslie Jones referred to the would-be farmers as “land-butchers.”29
No doubt perilous and exhausting work, however backed as it was by state sup-
port, woodland farming was far preferable to wetland farming.
Yet there was something more going on here to dissuade the colonial agri-
culturalists from pursuing wetland farming. e ecological imaginary of the 
wetland – the cultural signicance it held at the time – prevented such areas 
from being drained and transformed into elds earlier than they were. Holland 
Marsh was projected on, its materiality discursively transformed, by generations 
of settlers who were fearful and wary of swampland. Beset with Puritanical un-
dertones and moral panic, the Holland River wetland of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries was perceived as t only for Indigenous populations, 
bootleggers, and desperate settlers. But the social context that ensured it re-
mained undeveloped for so many years also contributed as a precipitant for its 
eventual reclamation. e fear and mistrust the rst generations of settlers had 
for wetland ecologies eventually inspired eorts by subsequent generations to 
tame the Marsh through agriculture. at the landscape became legible as pro-
ductive farmland when it did was a result of the shiing socionatural context 
within which the Marsh was understood, a double-headed process through the 
demonization of wetlands and the lionization of marshland farming.
Of Morality and Muck
John orpe had passed on long before the rst crop was harvested from the 
elds of the Holland Marsh. A Bradford resident, mill owner, and a demonstra-
bly pious man, orpe wrote a series of circulars in the latter stages of his life 
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vilifying intemperance.30 e fact that a robust bootlegging industry was thriv-
ing in the Marsh, just down the hill from his house, no doubt provided plenty of 
inspiration. His papers are moralizing expositions, ample evidence that he would 
not have been a supporter of the bootleggers toiling away in the swamp below his 
perch atop the Bradford highlands. Would-be whisky makers were likely drawn 
to the area for a number of reasons. e Holland River wetlands oered ample 
protective cover against the prying eyes of the authorities (moral and otherwise) 
in the stands of coniferous trees and shrubs. Also, the abundant supply of water 
provided a key ingredient for the “swamp water” spirits, while the ready supply 
of peat provided plenty of fuel for the res needed to roast the malted barley, an 
essential step in the process.31
e peat, of course, had less controversial uses, most notably as fuel for home 
heating. As a matter of routine – and initially a noncommercial activity – res-
idents of the Marsh area would cut large bricks of peat out of the wetland for 
home use. Perhaps not coincidentally, discussions at York County Council to 
ramp up commercialization of such peat harvesting emerged around the same 
time as talks to convert the area into farmland began.32 To a man with the tem-
perance zeal of orpe, however, one can imagine that peat harvesting was a sus-
pect activity. And although his derision was not directed primarily at it per se,
the peat likely would not have fully escaped his scorn, given its role in the mak-
ing of whisky. To be fair, neither orpe nor Galt were alone in their derision 
of the landscape – well into the early twentieth century, the area was regularly 
referred to as “a “useless marsh” and a “desolate waste.”33
In the Toronto area in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, mis-
trust of wetlands was not simply due to the general attitude toward the land-
scape. Instead, in the early 1890s, a more specic threat loomed, as warnings of 
a potential cholera outbreak in downtown Toronto escalated. Ashbridge’s Bay, 
a wetland in very close proximity to the city centre, was ngered as the culprit, 
putting a ne point on the perceived dangers of marshes. Kivas Tully, a city coun-
cillor and engineer, began writing about the public-health and economic benets 
of transforming that wetland into a working harbour in the mid-nineteenth 
century. In 1892, just one year before a cholera outbreak was predicted for To-
ronto, he wrote that if the development was allowed to commence, “the source 
of these endemic diseases (e.g. cholera) which aict the citizens, would be thus 
destroyed, and what is now a positive evil would be converted into a benet – 
and a prot to the city.”34
e spectre of cholera created panic among the public and policymakers 
alike.35 At the time, the world was in the midst of a h international cholera 
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epidemic, and fear of the disease was rampant. Within this context, wetlands of 
all descriptions took on a nefarious reputation and were assumed to be certain 
breeding grounds for cholera and other diseases. Along with other landscapes 
unfamiliar to European settlers such as tropical rainforests, they were considered 
sickly places.36 e fear was such that one need not even come in direct contact 
with the materiality of a particular marsh – simply smelling the noxious stink 
of a fecund wetland was assumed to be enough to contaminate one’s health. De-
spite the miasma theory of disease transmission being widely discredited by the 
1880s, notions that a fog or vapour waing from a wetland might cause disease 
persisted for much of the nineteenth century.37
Even before this, there was already a pervasive and deeper-seated suspicion of 
wetlands in the settler populations of North America, as suggested with John 
Winthrop’s famous utopian call, in the 1630s, for the New World to comprise 
cities “upon a hill.”38 In an era of tense confrontation between Indigenous and 
colonial populations, Winthrop’s pronouncement amounted to a proverbial line 
in the sand – the hills were for the Europeans, and the lowland swamps for 
everyone else. is Puritanical prescription, already pervasive in Europe, “oth-
ered” swamps and wetlands and established them as dirty and godless places. 
Certainly, they were no place for respectable, productive, or pious people.
Within this cultural perspective, however, is a liberal, productivist corollary. 
Informed by the impulses of modernity and the liberal logics of improvement 
and prot, wetlands became revealed as ideal landscapes through which to man-
ifest order, cleanliness, and productivity. By the mid-nineteenth century, most 
of the available agricultural land in Ontario was taken, compelling enterprising 
farmers to turn their attention away from the woodlands.39 In the process, a nor-
mative politics emerged within which the act of draining became valorized as an 
antidote to what the wetlands represented. is was more than simply a way of 
making productive farmland: It was a way of purging the landscape of the evils 
of disease and waste, a way of improving the land and bringing its resources to 
bear on the material and spiritual well-being of the edgling nation.
On the Canadian frontier, the impetus behind landscape transformation was 
an important part in the colonial attempt to bring “social order to an apparently 
disordered world.”40 As James Giblett puts it, “Wetlands were like heathen sav-
ages to be converted by the gospel of discipline and drain[ed] in order to live 
clean and useful lives.”41 Within this context, “taming nature” through agricul-
tural drainage was more than simply a matter of landscape change, it was a way 
of introducing civilizing values to the Canadian colony. By the late nineteenth 
century, a culture of “aquaterracide,” backed by a range of policy and scientic 
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innovations, had arrived to the North American colonies, with farming be-
coming a viable, even celebrated, antidote to the wetland condition.42 And, of 
course, all this t very squarely within the logic and ethic of colonial agricultural 
expansion.
Reclamation Geographies and the Genealogy of Drainage
Once the agricultural potential in the landscape became legible, marshes, bogs, 
and other wetlands were understood as opportunities for investment and de-
velopment through the imposition of agriculture. In the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, they became important sites within which biophysi-
cal nature and capital were brought together within the context of agriculture. 
As Holland Marsh–area technicians, scientists, politicians, and residents began 
to take seriously the prospect of reclamation farming, the wetland was trans-
formed in their imaginations into a veritable techno-scape of ordered and e-
cient agricultural production. e emergence of particular, privileged landscape 
“legibility” is shaped by ongoing human interpretations about the value of a 
landscape. us, as word of the success of other reclamation projects travelled to 
the Bradford area – within a milieu of shiing wetland perceptions and imagi-
naries – farming as a viable land use for the Marsh slowly became legitimated.43
is opened up many opportunities for the penetration of capital and power 
into the Holland River lowlands. While the area had supported meagre under-
ground distilling and marsh-grass-harvesting operations, as well as larger-scale 
commercial mattress manufacturing, the economic activity resulting from the 
introduction of agriculture immediately dwarfed these preceding industries.44
Aer the initial wave of agricultural colonization that saw the transformation 
of the Ontario woodlands, word of the economic success of muck-crop farming 
ltered in from towns within the shared Great Lakes basin – specically from 
parts of Michigan and Ohio.
Crucially, as the landscape was revealed as potentially productive and prot-
able, novel private-property relations were formalized and enacted in the Holland 
Marsh.45 While the vast majority of the Marsh had been privately owned for de-
cades previous to being drained, the land was more or less valueless in nancial 
terms. Indeed, at the time of one of the rst surveys of the area, in 1819, the land 
was considered so valueless that no eort was made by the original surveyor to 
continue the concession and lot lines through the Marsh to the actual Holland 
River. In a paper delivered to the Association of Ontario Land Surveyors over 
a century later, in 1934, Edward J. Cavell remarked that the original surveyor 
Figure 1.1. Ryan’s survey. e lot lines on this 1852 map can be seen to be 
extending through to the Holland River. Areas north of the Concession 3 
lines on the east side of the river are not complete in this survey. Courtesy 
of Archives of Ontario, ARDA – Holland Marsh, RG 16-1, B388426.
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“posted the lots on the high land, carrying his concession lines only to the edge of 
the marsh and on his plan shewed a large tract of waste land.”46 Another survey 
of the area, conducted in 1852 by John Ryan, a provincial land surveyor, included 
work to extend the previous lines through to the river on both sides (see Figure 1.1).
is extension of the lot lines is indicative of a subtle recasting of the charac-
ter of available land aer 1850. Wetlands were still largely considered valueless, 
but given rapid population growth and a dwindling land base, settlers began 
looking for arable land beyond what was most easily accessible. e best parcels 
were snapped up by eager settlers in the early nineteenth century, largely from 
Britain and Ireland – oen via the United States – who were drawn to Upper 
Canada with the promise of cheap land. Between 1840 and 1850, the population 
north of the Great Lakes more than doubled, from 450,000 to 1 million resi-
dents. Eighty-three percent of these people settled in rural areas and initiated a 
“rising tide of land clearing, burning, and turning.”47 For those with land adja-
cent to the Holland River, the marshy section was likely an inconvenience. As 
local historian George Jackson has observed, “By 1852 most of the highlands had 
been taken up and the marsh lots were an extension of the highland lot and not 
considered to be of much value.”48 In other words, the farmland on the higher 
ground surrounding the Marsh – and throughout many other areas of what 
would become Ontario – was the coveted commodity.
While at least part of the Marsh landscape can be considered a commod-
ity from 1805 onward, in as much as it was exchanged within the context of a 
treaty between the British and Anishinaabeg, it remained essentially worthless. 
e marshland had very little exchange value in that it was simply tacked onto 
existing parcels of land and was largely ignored. It also had very little use value 
– being unfarmable, in the conventional sense, in its current state – within an 
emerging settler state in which agriculture was a centrepiece.
Despite the increasing importance of agriculture to the social and economic 
development of the colony by the 1850s, it would be inaccurate to label the settler 
agriculture of Upper Canada or Lower Canada as distinctly capitalist during 
the rst half of the nineteenth century. In Lower Canada (Quebec), agricul-
ture was typically a mix of subsistence and market farming “more committed 
to family-centered well-being than to prot.”49 France created a propertied class 
– seigneurs – through a system of land grants and associated political rights. 
e farmers in Lower Canada were allowed to work sections within a particular 
efdom, though they did not own the land. In exchange for use of the land, the 
seigneur would take “feudal appropriations” from the farmers in the form of 
surplus wheat, labour, or cash.
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In Upper Canada, the early agricultural system was quite dierent. Settler 
farmers were granted land – free or at a nominal rate – by the government as 
part of the colonization process into the mid-nineteenth century. is served the 
colonial ocials in a few ways: On the one hand, over 1 million settlers arrived 
to the region in the rst half of the nineteenth century.50 e promise of free 
and cheap land drove the newcomers to settle and “improve” ever more of the 
landscape. Oen, stipulations were attached to the grant – settlers were expected 
to build a small house, clear elds, and make the land productive. Land was the 
cost the colonial government was willing to pay the settlers for the heavy work 
of clearing it, building transportation networks, and simply occupying territory 
farther westward. On the other hand, as the settlers cleared elds and began 
growing wheat for export to the homeland, the British government was forti-
fying access to a steady supply of grain. is was a settler-colonial, mercantilist 
system of exchange – subsistence farming still being very much a part – more so 
than it was a fully developed iteration of capitalist farming. At the same time, 
these early Upper Canadian farmers were girding their households and local 
economies. While wheat production constituted the largest source of revenue 
for most (composing 20–50 percent of farm income), in the early to middle 
nineteenth century, many operations were quite diversied. Farmers produced 
potatoes, peas, pork, butter, horticultural vegetables, fruit, and poultry to feed 
their families. Small surpluses – usually no larger than what might support one 
other family – were sold and traded locally.51
e precise moment in which farming became capitalist (whether in Ontario 
or simply within farming generally) is the subject of much debate and beyond 
the scope of this book.52 But it is worth emphasizing that the social and cultural 
dynamics aecting the Holland Marsh were fundamentally altered as it was 
brought under production through agriculture. While the Marsh remained a 
valueless casto landscape through the nineteenth century, this changed fairly 
suddenly with the prospect of drainage.53
e moment of drainage is crucial to the production of nature in the Holland 
Marsh. Not only was new physical material land “made” through the drainage 
of the marsh, but the process also necessitated new social formations and rela-
tions. Exchange relations, policies, legislation, novel scientic and technological 
innovations, and a land-ownership syndicate all became folded into the process 
of the Marsh’s production. As others have demonstrated, making landscapes 
legible – and making biophysical nature legible to capital – always involves social 
and political decisions that inevitably reect various relations of power. In the 
case of the Marsh, a new privileged legibility was instituted, one that continued 
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to dismiss the value of the wetland, though it began to see the prot potential 
inherent in transforming the landscape into orderly elds.
Indeed, in 1911, a councillor for King Township speculated that, if properly 
drained, an acre in the Holland Marsh would escalate in price from one dollar to 
between forty and y dollars.54 By the mid-1920s, news stories about the possi-
bility of draining the Holland River lowlands calculated the nancial windfall 
by highlighting the per-acre returns (in the range of three hundred to ve hun-
dred dollars) of similar reclamation projects in the geologically cognate areas of 
southern Ontario and northern Michigan. Newspaper editorialists emphasized 
specically that the Marsh, when drained, would yield vast wealth, not just car-
rots and onions.55 At the same time, local drainage boosters speculated that the 
new land would support “a thousand families of workers growing fresh vegeta-
bles” while countless others worked in various “factories springing up from year 
to year as the area develops.”56
One of the most evocative expressions of fervour came from the Bradford 
grocer W.D. Watson, who, in 1911, wrote to Professor Day, the eventual patri-
arch of agriculture in the Holland Marsh. Watson reported, “As I stood tonight 
at sunset and looked over our promised land with its broad acres of unbroken 
greatness with the wooded hills of King [Township] in the background I felt a 
glance of pride at the immense possibilities which lies [sic] in the scheme.”57 is 
was a bold imaginary for someone standing at the edge of what had been known 
for decades as a dangerous, undesirable wasteland. Similarly, the anticipatory, 
even celebratory, tone of local news columns reporting on the expected prots 
and economic benets of farming in the Marsh belied the physical materiality 
of the wetland. Where did this optimism come from? Why did Watson see “im-
mense possibilities” in the landscape, while generations of settlers before him 
had dismissed it? ese shiing attitudes and the growing faith in the landscape 
as a potential ally, not foe, can be understood as part of the broader process of 
nature’s production and connected to a wider reclamation geography.58
is shi, of course, was unequal, and not everyone was convinced of the 
ecacy of marsh-drainage projects, particularly ones the magnitude of Holland 
Marsh. e Bradford West Gwillimbury town council began seriously discuss-
ing the possibility of draining the Marsh as early as 1910, committing twenty-ve 
dollars to “help defray the expenses of an engineer toward the lowering of the 
water in the Holland River and marsh lands adjacent thereto in connection with 
the Township of King.”59 Alexander Baird, a civil engineer and Ontario land 
surveyor, was retained to draw up a preliminary drainage plan, which he led 
with King Township in July 1910.60 But due to lack of interest from “the owners 
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of the marshland in the Gwillimbury side of the Holland River,” the plans were 
shelved, if only temporarily.61
Draining the Holland Marsh was not seriously discussed again until 1924, 
when a West Gwillimbury bylaw was introduced and passed appointing Baird 
once again as the engineer to undertake an “examination and to prepare a report, 
plans and specications” for a drainage project.62 In his context, Baird was a key 
conduit through which this regional reclamation was spread. He was a well- 
respected, experienced drainage engineer, having worked on projects throughout 
southern Ontario – indeed, he references some of these smaller undertakings in 
Essex and Kent Counties and Point Pelee in his Holland Marsh report. In the 
introduction to his ocial report, Baird speculates on how protable the Marsh 
will become, comparing it very favourably to other existing projects: “ese 
lands when reclaimed and placed in a condition to permit of their cultivation 
and usefulness will become one of, if not the greatest producing sections of your 
part of the country and its most valuable lands and will enhance and enrich the 
township treasury.”63
Meanwhile, farther south in northern Michigan and Ohio, marsh farming 
was already well established and attractively protable. As momentum for the 
Marsh drainage project began to build by the mid-1920s, rumours about the 
success of wetland farming in the United States began circulating in local media. 
e Globe reported on an interview with Professor Day: “Mr. Day is very much
interested in the survey which has just been made. . . . He claims that the soil,
latitude and climate are identical with those at Kalamazoo, Mich[igan], which
is famous the continent over for the quantity and quality of the celery produced 
on the marshes of that vicinity.”64 Early in the 1900s, the Kalamazoo-area celery 
industry was yielding between 4 and 5 million dollars’ worth of celery every
year.65 In addition to prodigious crops, the area was also publishing trade mate-
rial promoting muck-crop farming. Kalamazoo in the late nineteenth century
was akin to the Wild West – except celery, carrots, and onions were the prized
commodities, not gold. Operations like the Kalamazoo Celery Company were
key exponents of the increasing enthusiasm for muck-crop farming during the
era. In 1896, the company – leveraging a moment of alleged exasperation in the
face of an overwhelming clamor for information – sponsored the publication of 
How to Grow Celery Anywhere.66 e introduction sets the book’s overall tone:
Kalamazoo has no successful competitor in Celery Culture, either for 
quality or quantity produced. e celebrity of Kalamazoo celery has awak-
ened so great an interest and desire to imitate, that inquiries received (from 
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almost every section of the country) by principal shippers at this point 
regarding its cultivation, are becoming a serious burden if any attention 
whatsoever is paid to them. At best these inquiries could be answered only 
to a very limited extent. To meet the emergency we have published this 
book “How to Grow Celery,” being a complete exposition of the methods 
of successful celery growing in this “famous Kalamazoo Celery” district.67
ere is no doubt that Kalamazoo’s success served as inspiration for Day 
and the other Holland Marsh boosters. Indeed, in 1910, Day noted that the soil 
samples he took from the Marsh were “almost identical in composition to the 
famous onion lands of Point Pelee, the strong sugar beet area of Wallaceburg, 
the wonderful celery lands of edford in our province, and the world renowned 
celery sold of Kalamazoo, Michigan.”68 Ever the savvy salesman, he organized 
a scouting trip in 1924 for councillors from the towns of West Gwillimbury 
and Bradford, and King Township to tour several drainage schemes in Kent 
and Essex Counties. Day recounted a few years later, “Everyone in the party 
was fully convinced that the reclamation of the Holland Marsh was entirely 
feasible, and easier than some of those inspected.”69 Even now, contemporary 
farmers in the Marsh reminisce about reconnaissance trips to Kalamazoo and 
parts of New York and Ohio in the 1960s and 1970s. In any event, the muck-
crop farming in Essex and Kent Counties of southern Ontario, as well as the 
Kalamazoo site, were undoubtedly inspirational and instructional to Day and 
the other early boosters.
A striking element common to drainage reports like Baird’s and the quasi- 
commercial communication/propaganda materials like How to Grow Celery 
Anywhere is the emphasis on the tools and technologies of the drainage trade. 
Clearly, there were prots to be made from the development of wetlands – even 
today, the Holland Marsh remains one of the most protable per-hectare agri-
cultural landscapes in North America. And as discussed above, there was an 
ethical undercurrent operating below the surface contributing to the compul-
sion to drain the wetland. But to reduce the impetus driving the reclamation of 
the Holland River valley to either prots or a moral imperative to tame the land 
would be a mistake. For the boosters of the reclamation economy, taming the 
wild landscape also provided an opportunity to showcase audacious technolo-
gies and cutting-edge scientic research.
Indeed, before moving to the Holland Marsh to try his hand at drainage and 
farming, Day was a physicist with the Ontario Agricultural College (OAC).70
Under his direction, and with ongoing research support from the school, the 
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bold plan to drain the wetland was developed. For him and the other boosters of 
the original drainage scheme, the feat was as much about creating new farmland 
through reclamation as it was about transforming the landscape with technol-
ogy. Day authored a number of technical scientic booklets, published by the 
inuential OAC, on everything from how to handle on-farm sewage disposal to 
tillage and crop rotation and, of course, tiling and drainage.71
Day’s central academic work on drainage is essentially a report-cum-how-
to-manual, very much in the style of other work published by the OAC. Day 
was clearly a believer in the technologies of drainage and water management to 
transform landscapes, writing, “many farms and various districts once wet and 
useless have been transformed by underdrainage into the most productive in 
the land.”72 As a long-time scholar of drainage theory and practice, he puzzled 
over why more farmers had not undertaken drainage work: “Contact with the 
people tells us why . . . the critical operations of drainage are even less understood 
than its benets – farmers, generally, have no way of telling whether they have 
fall enough for underdrainage, what the grade of a proposed drain should be, 
nor any method of digging to a grade, or planning a general drainage system.”73
Drainage constituted a body of knowledge to which the average landowner 
or farmer had very little access. Day undertook the study to impart the highly 
technical, specialized knowledge to others – in eect, to proselytize on behalf 
of the liberal state in order to make converts of those who failed to see the latent 
productivity and prot of the wetland. In an eort to advertise the benets of 
drainage and educate landowners and potential farmers on the practical tech-
niques, Day and the OAC held workshops across the province. He was holding 
such sessions in the Holland Marsh area as early as 1910 and advertising through 
local media. One such announcement read: “is meeting should be of special 
interest as some diculty to drain is involved. Besides the discussion of the par-
ticular problem there will be a demonstration of methods of nding the fall over 
a ditch, determining the grade, dening true to grade, etc. ose of our readers 
interested in drainage should not miss this meeting.”74
ere is, then, an element of technological fetishism to the early impulse 
driving the drainage of the Holland Marsh. One can imagine the farmers in 
attendance at one of Day’s seminars learning the tools and techniques of drain-
age and having their perceptions of what farming consisted of fundamentally 
transformed. His message was that farming was not a dirty, tiresome drudgery 
but, instead, a rened pursuit for thinking men and scientists. e people of 
the Marsh would not simply work existing land with plough horses and hand 
tools, they would use modern techniques and cutting-edge technologies to build
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and master a landscape. Day was not alone in convincing would-be farmers of 
this techno-dream, however. Instead, he was only one, albeit a central gure, in 
a larger network of individuals and institutions involved in the production of 
nature in the early days of Marsh agriculture.
e Holland Marsh Syndicate and the Emerging 
Social Formations of Nature’s Production
e Holland Marsh Syndicate was born shortly aer the Bradford grocer Wat-
son rst invited Professor Day to visit and assess the Marsh in 1909. In addition 
to a noted and experienced technician, Day proved to be an adept businessper-
son, forming the syndicate in 1911. e group consisted of ve members – Wat-
son and Day, who each held ve of the een existing shares; R.L. McKinnon 
and David Baird (the son of Alex Baird, the chief engineer on the drainage 
project), who each held two shares; and W.G. Lumbers, a produce wholesaler in 
Toronto, who held one share.
e syndicate’s initial concern was to seek out private capital to pay for the 
technology, materials, and labour it would take to drain the Holland Marsh. 
Day took on the brunt of this work, seeking nancial support from businessmen 
in Toronto. While he was busy attempting to raise capital, Watson remained in 
the Bradford area, leveraging his local connections to sign options with local 
landowners within the Marsh for the right to purchase the land at a later date. 
In all, he negotiated options with over seventy individual landowners in the area 
for 970 hectares (2,395 acres) of the wetland on the West Gwillimbury side and 
1,310 hectares (3,236 acres) on the King side, or 80 percent of the entire area pro-
posed for draining. To be clear, this meant that, in eect, within about a year of 
forming, the Holland Marsh Syndicate eectively owned 80 percent of the land 
intended to be reclaimed. Watson, however, abruptly le the syndicate in 1912. 
On his departure, he signed his shares and the land options over to Day, making 
him the majority landowner within the proposed drainage area.75
Meanwhile, Day’s eorts to secure funding from venture capitalists had 
stalled. Prior to the start of the First World War and the end of the rst food 
regime, markets for grain were as close to a sure bet as exists in farming, given 
the grain-hungry British markets, the recent arrival of publicly nanced grain 
elevators, and favourable state policies for grain production in general.76 At the 
same time, a signicant nancial downturn in Canada in 1912–13 meant that in-
vestment capital was scarce. Within this context, investing in a scheme to drain a 
wetland to grow market garden vegetables likely seemed unduly risky. e global 
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austerity pressures of the Great War meant that investors were in no hurry to 
dedicate scarce resources to a massive construction project to create what was 
essentially an experimental farm (success with marsh farming in other places, 
notwithstanding). Indeed, from roughly 1913 onwards, all activities to drain the 
Holland Marsh were more or less suspended until the conclusion of the war.
In the years immediately following the Armistice, however, public spending 
was emerging as a way of boosting home economies and to develop job markets 
for the returning veterans. Perhaps sensing opportunity (while also conceding 
that private investment funds were likely not forthcoming), Day and the Hol-
land Marsh Syndicate leveraged public tools. As stipulated within the Ontario 
Municipal Drainage Aid Act of 1916, nancing for such a project could be pro-
vided by money borrowed from the implicated municipalities, with the province 
providing a grant for up to 20 percent of the gross costs of the endeavour.
Day and the syndicate worked with a supportive council in West Gwillim-
bury and led a petition under the Drainage Aid Act in 1924. Given the geog-
raphy of the wetland – and that the Holland River is both a natural and legal 
border between King and West Gwillimbury – the drainage plan could not be 
completed unless King Township council also signed on to it. But that body 
was reluctant to participate, unconvinced that the project would be successful. 
Exercising its right under the Drainage Aid Act, King Township led an appeal 
to the petition with the drainage referee. Its primary argument in the appeal 
lling was “that the scheme of the drainage work as it aects the Township of 
King, should be abandoned as same will not be successful.”77
Drainage law in Ontario has a complicated, almost two-hundred-year his-
tory.78 It began with the 1835 Act to Regulate Line Fences and Watercourses, 
which, for the rst time, codied in legislation an authorization process for 
manipulating the ow of water through farming landscapes. e 1835 law also 
enshrined a funding principle establishing that the cost of drainage construction 
would be shared among the individuals and bodies concerned in proportion to 
their interests. Given that more of the land proposed to be drained from the 
Holland Marsh was on the King side of the river than on the West Gwillimbury 
side, King Council would be responsible for more of the cost. e Drainage Act 
also enabled the appointment of a drainage referee, whose role it is to interpret 
the legislation, hear submissions and appeals, and generally sort out the inevita-
ble and frequent concerns over the burden to pay construction costs.
Ultimately, King Township’s appeal was denied, and the Holland Marsh 
drainage petition was approved. e drainage referee at the time was K.C. 
Henderson (whose long tenure ran from 1906 to 1934). Henderson was an 
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experienced drainage lawyer from Ottawa who had little time for those seeking 
to use appeals to block the progress constituted by drainage projects. His cavalier 
attitude toward drainage roughly matched that of the Kalamazoo Celery Com-
pany. At the 1915 annual meeting of the Association of Ontario Land Surveyors, 
Henderson, a regular attendee, reportedly gave a memorable speech, at one point 
opining, “Of course the danger, as we know, is mainly in the Court of Appeal, 
because I have never hesitated to say this from the bench and I say it now, that 
I try to work the Drainage Act out in such a way as to dig drains and not print 
appeal books.”79
In hindsight, given Henderson’s perspectives on drainage projects as well as 
those of the state, King Township’s appeal had virtually no chance of resulting 
in a cessation of the project. Yet it is notable that in his ruling, Henderson em-
phasized – twice – that while he ultimately dismissed the appeal, he empathized 
with the lling of it. “is is one of those peculiar cases where I do not at all 
criticize the section of the township council in bringing this matter before the 
court.”80 Even with nearly two decades of experience at this point in his career, 
he recognized the near-singular ambition of the Holland Marsh project. “is 
is not an ordinary drainage scheme. . . . I have seen several cases where streams 
have been dammed, although I must frankly say I have had none where as large 
a portion of [a] stream has been dammed as this.”81
Once forwarded on to the provincial government, approval was largely a 
regulatory formality.82 at the Holland Marsh Syndicate secured additional 
funding for the drainage project through the Drainage Aid Act underscores the 
liberal-state imperatives of instrumental land use and improvement. e cost for 
the project would be shared by each municipality in proportion to the amount of 
drained land each would have in its jurisdiction. e reluctant King Township 
would be on the hook for the greatest part, totaling $76,663.80; West Gwillim-
bury’s bill would be $52,281.00; and the village of Bradford would owe $1,825.20. 
Culture’s marsh, already present in the imaginations of Day, Baird, and the other 
Marsh boosters, was about to become a material reality.
Conclusion
While the instrumental pursuit of prot played a part in driving the imposi-
tion of agriculture, as conventional political economists would point out, there 
were other, equally important dynamics propelling the process. e liberal de-
sires to tame the landscape, to advance the colonial project through cataloguing 
the territory, and to improve the land through cultivation were each crucial to 
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the development of agriculture in the Holland Marsh. e culture of “aqua-
terracide,” backed by a range of scientic and policy interventions, was part of 
a broader thrust of “taming nature,” a social ideology being “set down on the 
land,” as Ian McKay puts it, and in this respect part of normalizing nation build-
ing through landscape change.
Notwithstanding the bootleggers and marsh-grass harvesters, up until 1925, 
human-driven physical changes in the Holland Marsh landscape had not been 
systematic: at is, there had been no widespread agricultural-related changes 
there. Yet the production of nature in the Marsh required a good deal of discur-
sive and material work well before a single crop was ever grown. e land became 
subject to dierent ownership and regulatory regimes; it was bought, sold, and 
traded for; and it was projected on by a generation of eager farmers – again, all 
before a single seed had been sown.
Yet while the Holland Marsh boosters had, to some extent, mastered the 
imaginary of nature through excited news headlines and tales of abundant 
yields in Michigan and Ohio, they had yet to confront the messy materiality of 
the landscape. As the dredging machine was about to make its rst cut of the 
twenty-seven-kilometre canal that would eventually encircle the Marsh, one can 
imagine that the mood among the boosters and onlookers was generally opti-
mistic. eir mastery over nature was about to be realized, as the smiling farms 
were chopped out of the dismal swamp.
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e Production of Fields, 1925–35
N ature’s form (the geological history and marshy materiality of the wetland) and imaginary (created through the general dismal-swamp, smiling-farms rhetoric) contributed to producing the land, laying the 
groundwork for the future development of agriculture in the Holland Marsh. 
e state encouraged the drainage through enabling legislation, the support of 
pro-improvement bureaucrats, and capital in the form of funds to pay for the 
project. For their part, Marsh boosters and a supportive media deployed a range 
of imaginaries heralding a Promethean dream of tamed landscapes, corralled 
water, rich muck soil, and prot. All of this, however, occurred before a single 
metre of the canal had been dug, before a single excavator had been started, and 
well before a single vegetable had been grown in the Marsh.
From 1925, when excavation of the canal nally began, into 1935, by which point 
regular, however unprotable, crop production had been established, was a semi-
nal decade for the Holland Marsh.1 Its material landscape was thoroughly trans-
formed from an abstract idea of reclaimed wetland into actual, farmable elds 
through a conuence of policy, technology, labour, and capital. is was the pe-
riod during which the liberal ideals of an orderly, productive, and protable nature 
– shepherded within a paradigm of private-property relations – were carved into
the land, and capital began circulating through the landscape like never before.
But while the land was commoditized and taken under private ownership in 
ways not previously seen there, a contradictory dynamic resulted from canaliz-
ing the wetland. As the dredger cut a twenty-seven kilometre canal, ostensibly 
severing the Holland Marsh from its immediately adjacent landscapes, it simul-
taneously bound together the farmers, Bradford, West Gwillimbury, and King 
Township in a shared administrative geography. ough the implications may 
not have been fully appreciated initially, such an extensive and complex canal 
and hydrological system would require intensive management, persistent main-
tenance, and ongoing monitoring. is eventually bore novel administrative 
arrangements designed to facilitate nature’s (re)production.
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During this period in the history of the Holland Marsh, elds emerged from 
the wetland – created, portioned o, bought, traded for, and sold. e land of 
the Marsh was commodied – as elds – in ways that departed dramatically 
from anything that had occurred previously in the area. e discursive and ma-
terial transformation of the landscape also had an attendant conceptual element. 
As the dredging machine cut its way through the peat and clay, and as arterial 
drainage ditches appeared and tile laid, elds emerged. Yet the visceral mate-
riality of the process of making this farmland belies the attendant conceptual 
abstraction that was taking place. Just as the elds were emerging, the land was 
being thrust into abstract exchange relations, assigned (inated) value, and pro-
pelled into a complex political economy of food and agriculture. is transfor-
mation, then, was no simple material process, rather it was a dening moment 
in the history of the Marsh.
At the same time, the materiality of the process of drainage cannot be ignored. 
Up until work on the canal began, draining the Holland Marsh remained purely 
theoretical. William Day and Alex Baird did have some experience with other 
drainage projects in southern Ontario and were familiar with the details of still 
others in northern Michigan and Ohio, yet neither had been at the helm of one 
so large – indeed, a drainage project the size of the Holland Marsh scheme was 
without precedent in Ontario. Meanwhile, the dredge workers, local residents, 
and would-be farmers who had all heard so much about the promise of a drained
Marsh were confronted with the inconvenient reality of the draining itself, a pro-
cess that ended up taking three years longer than expected. e form of biophys-
ical nature is not always so easy to change. roughout the transformation, the 
physical materiality of nature presented itself, stubbornly resisting the tidy image 
Marsh boosters had in mind. Heat, cold, frozen ground, broken machinery, and 
exhausted workers all exposed the fact that, if agriculture was to come to the Hol-
land Marsh, it was going to take more than a few headlines about smiling farms.
e Science and Politics of Underdrainage
Controlling water, as it continues to be in the contemporary period, was a cen-
tral preoccupation of agriculture in the early part of the twentieth century. In-
deed, as Ross Irwin put it, “Protable returns from farmlands depend rst of all 
on eective drainage.”2 is was particularly true within the Great Lakes basin, 
with its shared geological history, but also applied to other parts of Canada.3
e challenge of controlling water in the elds with the latest techniques and 
technologies seemed to be the main preoccupation of boosters at times, with 
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crop production an ancillary benet.4 Within the Holland Marsh, Day was the 
chief prognosticator of drainage, and he brought with him the gravitas of the 
Physics Department at the University of Guelph and the Ontario Agricultural 
College (OAC).
From the mid-1920s until the postwar recovery, Ontario’s economy, partly 
based on agriculture, struggled, as did most other agriculture-dependent econ-
omies. Day understood that large drainage projects required public investment, 
but he also knew that there was precious little funding to go around during the 
lean years of war. Yet for him, the preponderance of potential (that is, undrained) 
farmland in Ontario was seen as an attractive investment opportunity. Day’s 
own estimates, in 1909, put the number of hectares of current farmland simply 
in need of improved drainage in Ontario at over 1,906,000 hectares (4,710,000 
acres). He added to this another 2,023,000 hectares (5,000,000 acres) of un-
touched landscape comprising “slash land . . . swamp, marsh and wasteland” for 
a total of nearly 4,050,000 hectares (10,000,000 acres) simply in need of drain-
age.5 Day argued further that those 1,906,000 hectares only requiring improve-
ment would see an average production increase of $50 per hectare, a total growth 
in annual yield of $94,200,000 – this before factoring in the economic stimulus 
of draining the untouched land or of the labour required for such an ambitious 
project. In the articles he published on the subject, Day does not provide much 
in the way of details about his assumptions and estimates. is is likely due, 
in part at least, to the fact that the OAC Bulletins were more a tool of popu-
lar education and communication (or perhaps popular imagination) than they 
were an academic forum. As a result, it is dicult to conrm the veracity of the 
estimates. But it is clear that invoking the potential of a $94,200,000 increase 
in provincial farm prot would have piqued a broad interest (and surely at least 
some skepticism) during a period of acute economic depression.
To facilitate realizing the promise of a thoroughly drained province, the OAC 
sent a small army of drainage advisers to traverse Ontario, convening with will-
ing farmers and landowners free of charge – part of the liberal state’s eorts to 
support agriculture and increase the total amount of land under active produc-
tion. e majority of the costs involved – the advisers’ salaries – were paid for 
by the government, with the farmer or landowner covering the other marginal 
costs. Day described the details of the OAC’s expectations in a 1909 publication: 
“ere is no charge for the services of our drainage advisors . . . but their travel-
ling expense, consisting of railway fare at a cent a mile each way for this work, 
meals on the way, if any, and cartage of instruments, if any, must be paid by the 
parties for whom the surveys are made.”6
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e work of the OAC under Day’s direction further underscores the state’s 
land-use preference – agriculture over almost anything. Within the context of 
an entrenched drainage interest, wetlands were seen as little more than inputs 
into the production of protable agricultural landscapes. At the same time, 
however, Day’s drainage work with the college was not only about the pursuit 
of prot. In addition, it aorded him the opportunity to ex his intellectual 
muscle – to solve problems with emerging technologies, something that surely 
would have appealed to the professor. Day’s passion for drainage in general, and 
for draining the Holland Marsh in particular, was certainly fuelled by the desire 
to see a prot, but it was at least equally motivated by his desire to solve the land-
scape by managing and controlling it. A two-part Bulletin publication authored 
by Day in 1909 articulates the penchant he (and by extension, the OAC and 
Ontario) had for drainage and shows the extent to which drainage was a priority 
for the provincial government in particular. e rst part explains the benets of 
drainage and tiling, extolling the advantages of better soil, earlier seeding times, 
control of water through damming, and the like, while the second describes 
the process of building the infrastructure. Day describes the tricky process of 
surveying the land – an essential step in corralling it for use as farmland – while 
pointing out the indispensability of the college:
When it comes to planning of a general system for 50 or 100 acres, a system 
composed of several miles of drains, every part of which must t in with 
every other part, the grades of which must be sucient for eectively drain-
ing all low spots, and yet not require too deep digging in knolls, the depths 
of which must, nevertheless, be great enough in ats to protect the tile from 
frost, the outlets for which must be ample and free – when it comes to the 
planning of such a system, many of which are imperative in almost every 
county if proper drainage is to be secured, few, if any, have been or are now 
in a position to undertake such work intelligently, and for obvious reasons: 
Firstly, because some knowledge of surveying and mapping is needed, and 
secondly because a surveyor’s level is essential, neither of which the farmer 
has. Nor until recently has he been able to obtain assistance in the matter.7
Although somewhat condescending in tone, Day is right in his assumption 
that very few farmers would have had any formal training in conducting land 
surveys and likely would not have had the resources to purchase surveying equip-
ment – thus the need for provincial support to train a generation of farmers to 
transform wasted wetlands into productive elds. Even if some immigrant farm-
ers brought with them specic skills, expertise, or knowledge about drainage 
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from their home countries, Day and the OAC would likely have not been in-
terested, preferring instead to institute a routinized, scientic set of protocols. 
ese newcomers were conscripted into the mammoth project of laying a mesh-
work of drainage tile clear across the province, one eld at a time, and were 
expected to heed the direction of authorities like Day. Elaborating the strategy 
in part, he continues:
In the autumn of 1905, however, the department of Physics, which had 
for some years been teaching the subject of drainage, was authorized to go 
out through the Province, when farmers applied for assistance, and make a 
general survey of the land, locate the outlets and the drains, determine the 
grades and size of tile, and nally send the farmer when ready a map of his 
farm showing the complete system of drains, the grades, the sizes of tiles, 
etc. It is the writer’s intention to give here a brief description of the method 
of surveying the land and laying out the system, and a detailed description 
and interpretation of a map, not in the hope of enabling farmers to under-
take these general surveys, for we know the work is too involved and the 
instruments needed too delicate and expensive for that, but in order that 
when we have made a survey for a man and sent him his map, a copy of this 
bulletin will enable him the better to understand the map and construct 
his drains according to it.8
e OAC’s extension work, led by key prognosticators like Day, can be seen 
as a device by which the state promoted and reinforced privileged ways of living 
in and interacting with particular landscapes. Providing farmers with maps of 
their land – lain over with technical measurements and drainage infrastruc-
ture – was also a way of cultivating a particular legibility. Farmers, the impli-
cation was, needed to see their elds not for what they were, but for what they 
might become if properly drained. ere is a clear instrumentality in the per-
spective of the early Holland Marsh boosters, backed by the Ontario govern-
ment, which positions the landscape as useful only in as much it is acceptably 
ordered, controlled, and protable. Certainly, the Marsh had use value to many 
people previous to the introduction of agriculture – Indigenous populations, 
bootleggers, and dra -dodgers-cum-naturalists made use of the area previous 
to its transformation. By the early part of the twentieth century, the promoted 
use, in keeping with the agriculture-driven economic-development policies of 
Canadian settler-state politics, was to transform the wetland into elds. Various 
appendages of the state apparatus – including the Drainage Aid Act, the OAC, 
and its bulletins – built up a cultural, discursive, and legal scaold to support 
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the material transformation of wetland landscapes and the production of nature 
in the Holland Marsh.
In this respect, the eorts of Day, the OAC extension program, and the pro-
vincial government to cultivate a prodrainage milieu cannot be ignored. Appeals 
to science and technology, emphasizing the technical diculty of the work, were 
ways of imbuing this perspective with authority. Underdrainage within this con-
text was not simply about turning swampland into elds, but rather it reected 
a higher purpose animated by the mobilization of cutting-edge science, technol-
ogy, and techniques. Unprecedented in ambition and scope within 1920s On-
tario, drainage of the Holland Marsh clearly ts within the sentiment of the day 
while extending and amplifying that logic. To onlookers, the Marsh project was 
an exemplar of the prodrainage perspective, a showy project backed by academic 
experts, the OAC, and the provincial government. e scientic dazzle captured 
the imagination of local residents and the media in a profound collision of cul-
ture and science. As the Globe reverentially reported in the autumn of 1926, the 
drainage of the Marsh was the showcasing of scientic advancement – a shared 
cultural moment and the expression of a dream:
Seeing this great change, those watching this great reclamation project 
begin to understand in a concrete way that it is not an experiment, that the 
dream of a generation of advanced agriculturalists is about to be realized 
and the Holland Marsh will be converted into a garden that will blossom 
as the rose and support a thousand families of workers growing fresh vege-
tables for Toronto and other cities of the dominion.9
Dredging began on September 25, 1925, following the design set out in Baird’s 
engineer’s report. e plan was an audacious one – to cut a twenty-seven-
kilometre- long ditch, up to twenty metres wide and two metres deep, around 
the Holland River Marsh; dam the northern end of the Holland River near 
Yonge Street; and install two pumps nearby capable of moving over seventy-ve 
thousand litres of water each per minute.
Dredging the canal was as much a public spectacle as it was an engineering 
construction project. When the scow – a large platform built in the Marsh on 
which the dredger would oat – was complete, it was celebrated with a commu-
nity dance. “A very large crowd attended the dance on the new scow on Saturday 
night. Mr WG McLellan was the oor manager, with the Schomberg Orchestra, 
led by Bill George, playing for them.”10
On the rst day of dredging, “e crowd on the riverbank raised a cheer as the 
dredge nosed into the bank and li ed the rst buckets of muck, soil and water; 
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the rst cuts in carving out the 27-kilometre canal around the perimeter of the 
Holland Marsh.”11 is machine was brought to the Bradford area by rail in four 
pieces and assembled onsite. It was almost twenty-ve metres long and nine metres 
wide, with a twenty-metre boom. ere was a shorter eleven-metre “dipper stick” 
mounted to the main boom, on which a large shovelling device, capable of exca-
vating about one-and-a-half cubic metres of material at a time, was mounted. e 
dipper stick swung on the boom through a system of cables and pulleys, propelled 
by a steam-powered engine. As the dredger worked, it would cut through the plant 
material and moss to a layer of clay below. is material was pulled up and depos-
ited on the outside of the canal to create an embankment as the work proceeded.12
e dredger itself, which required ve people to operate, was more or less 
amphibious. It was designed to be able not only to drag itself through the hybrid 
landscape with its boom arm but also to oat in the canal as it was dug. e 
engines were powered by coal, wood, or a combination thereof. Two houseboats 
followed the dredger: One provided sleeping and eating accommodations for the 
crew, while the other carried fuel. Two much-smaller dredgers were simultane-
ously in operation, one digging the “Little Scheme,” the other working on the 
eastern part of the main canal. e main dredger would typically work twenty- 
four hours a day, from the time the marsh had thawed in the spring until it had 
frozen in the winter.
Figure 2.1. Drainage plan from 1924. An earlier version of this map 
was included in Baird’s original drainage proposal in 1911. Courtesy 
of Archives of Ontario, ARDA – Holland Marsh, B388426.
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e work to build the main canal lasted from the fall of 1925 until the spring 
of 1929 – roughly three years longer than originally intended. Cold, long win-
ters; regular and unexpected maintenance of the dredger; layovers in quicksand; 
crew exhaustion; and tight nances all served to delay the project. Nevertheless, 
by 1930, when the initial canalization was complete, Day had become embold-
ened by the relative success of the scheme:
At every stage of this project from its inception to the present time there 
has always been some wise one to rise in his wisdom and solemnly warn us 
“it can’t be done.” But all diculties to date have been safely negotiated . . . 
It appears, therefore, that the Holland marsh reclamation is one of the 
biggest events that have happened in Ontario in recent years.13
Eager to show o the new land, Day planted a thirty-seven-acre ( een hect-
are) test plot that year, from which he grossed twenty-six thousand dollars. He 
boasted that wholesalers in Toronto had never seen Canadian-grown head lettuce 
throughout the entire growing season until he provided them with it from July 
Figure 2.2. People on the dredger. Front row (le  to right), Margaret 
Campbell, Margaret MacDonald Saint, and Katherine Wilma Saint. 
Back row (le  to right), Gordon Davey and Bill Davey. Courtesy of 
Bradford West Gwillimbury Public Library, Joe Saint Fonds.
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through October. And, according to Day, this was no uke. e modern elds he 
had created were disentangled from the perennial concerns of weather, able to re-
spond equally well in wet and dry seasons: “Our pumps protect us in wet seasons. 
But now, besides having pumps for the wet ones, we have irrigation for the dry 
ones, hence we fear neither wet or dry.”14 For him, the test plot was proof of con-
cept that the emergent technologized landscape of the Holland Marsh had tran-
scended the material constraints of farming elsewhere. Even seasonality could be 
transcended with adequate planning and investment in technology: “We’ll have 
diversied crops, and canning and soup factories and then see how easy it is. In 
the summer, we’ll sell everything we can and what we can’t we’ll can, and then 
in the winter we’ll sell all we can, and by spring be ready to start all over again.”15
As the Globe pointed out, Day was a convincing visionary sort. If a wetland 
could be transformed into such prodigiously protable farmland, nothing 
seemed impossible: “A few years ago this portion of the Bradford district was 
not even thought of agriculturally, but a few facts submitted by Professor Day 
tend to disillusion even the most skeptical.”16
At the heart of this transformation was the soil – virginal muck soil, mil-
lennia in the making, and exposed for the very rst time. e muck took on an 
almost magical quality, and indeed Day opined in one public presentation that 
wheat farmers in the highlands (the areas directly adjacent to and surrounding 
the Holland Marsh) would have to raise a preposterous one thousand bushels 
of wheat per acre (about 67,000 kilograms per hectare) to equal the revenue 
enabled by the muck soil.17 is was not a simple nancial appeal: Day, having 
been embedded in agriculture for as long as he had been, would have known that 
even one hundred bushels per acre (roughly 6,700 kilograms per hectare) would 
have been a stretch for the vast majority of wheat farmers anywhere. Instead, 
his exaggerated claim is a reection of the mysticism attached to the muck soil, 
something he certainly worked to cultivate through salesmanship.
Similarly, the amount of time and eort it had taken to drain the Holland 
Marsh added to the almost supernatural character of the muck soil. While lesser 
dirt could be had by simply removing a few shrubs, muck soil required the pains-
taking work of dozens of men and women over many years, highly advanced 
machinery, and signicant public investment. For almost ve years, a rapt public 
watched workers, dredgers, engineers, and scientists plod away on the drainage 
project. Readers of the the Globe were assured that “samples of the soil in the 
swamp [were] taken and sent to Ottawa for analysis,” where tests conrmed that 
“the soil is of the very highest quality.”18 e Homemaker, a weekly women’s 
column in the Globe, gushed over “the level verdure of the Holland Marsh.”19
Figure 2.3. A: e dredging machine. B: Men stand in front of a tile machine 
with a row of tile. C and D: e drained marshland is broken. From Bradford 
West Gwillimbury Local History Association, Governor Simcoe Slept Here 
(2006), and courtesy of Bradford West Gwillimbury Public Library.
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By the early 1930s, headlines in both the Globe and the Toronto Daily Star raved 
about Day’s test-plot harvest.20 In 1933, an editorialist waxed about the “‘black 
muck’ soil, enriched by yearly decay of lush vegetation,” assuring readers that 
when it was under full cultivation, “the Holland Marsh, so long a desolate waste, 
will be the scene of intensive cultivation on a scale hitherto unknown in Can-
ada.”21 So central was the yield of the drainage – the muck soil – to the identity 
of the area that farmers in the Marsh would come to be known colloquially (and 
somewhat disparagingly at times) as “Marsh Muckers.”22 By the early 1930s, the 
Marsh was well on its way to becoming as famous as Celeryville or Kalamazoo 
– Canada’s own salad bowl. And similar to those places, the muck soil was the
featured star.
Socionatural Soil: Pedology and the Anatomy of Muck Soil
All the years of work, planning, public and private investments to carve the 
canal through the Holland River lowlands were all done for one reason – to 
access the muck soil. e near-legendary status of such earth throughout the 
Great Lakes basin had engrossed Day and others in the Bradford area for de-
cades. And for decades, it had lain tantalizingly close, yet frustratingly so far 
away, covered by millions of litres of swampy water. And while the ultimate 
intention was to grow vegetables, controlling the water to expose the muck soil 
was a massive victory on its own.
is is all to suggest that the muck soil in the Holland Marsh has both a social 
and natural basis – a product of popular imaginary and human intervention 
as much as the biochemical and biophysical properties of a millennia’s worth 
of rotting vegetation. e dynamics that created (and subsequently continually 
re-create) the muck soil are essential to the making of food, farmland, culture, 
and farmland protection in the Marsh.
Soil of any type is a very complicated thing. Its basic unit is known as a 
“pedon,” dened as “the smallest, three-dimensional body at the surface of the 
earth that is considered to be a soil. Its lateral dimensions are 1–3.5 mm and its 
depth is 1–2 mm.”23 Pedons accumulate into dozens of dierent kinds of soils, 
dened through a complicated taxonomic system consisting of orders, great 
groups, subgroups, families, and series. is taxonomy has developed iteratively 
over the course of roughly one hundred years in Canada through the work of 
regional soil surveys.24
e earliest versions of soil surveys were largely an exercise in Newtonian in-
ventory science, mostly tailored to the burgeoning Canadian resource economy. 
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Pedology (the study of soil) grew rapidly in the early 1900s in Canada, and by the 
mid-1930s, most provinces had some modest survey infrastructure in place. Typ-
ically, university departments of agriculture, soil, or chemistry work with pro-
vincial and federal departments of agriculture to conduct soil surveys on areas 
of commercial interest. Given the economic importance of soil to the regional 
agricultural-dependent economies of Ontario, Saskatchewan, and Alberta, it is 
not surprising that these areas were the most heavily surveyed in Canada by the 
mid-1930s.
Yet soil surveying remained largely fragmented across the country until a 
shared technical language emerged through the National Soil Survey Commit-
tee of Canada, formed in 1940. e Soils Section of the aptly named Canadian 
Society of Technical Agriculturalists held the original organizing meeting. Later 
changed to the Canada Soil Survey Committee, and currently known as the 
Canadian Soil Information Service (CanSIS), the variously named body has al-
ways been housed within the federal department responsible for agriculture (a 
title that also changes periodically). In addition to establishing and enforcing a 
shared technical language and taxonomy of soil for all provincial and territorial 
counterparts, the early version of the national organization also provided stan-
dardized denitions for key terms and the taxonomic structure, lending an air 
of authority to the burgeoning science of soil. In its modern form, CanSIS acts 
as an authority and clearinghouse for information on soil designations while 
also functioning as a “coordinating body among the soil survey organizations 
in Canada supported by the Canada Department of Agriculture, provincial de-
partments of agriculture, and departments of soil science at universities.”25
e rise of pedology in Canada and the attendant emphasis on soil classi-
cation in the early to middle 1930s is crucial to understanding how the muck 
soil was understood by the earliest Holland Marsh farmers and how this has 
continued. As John R. McNeill and Verena Winiwarter point out, soil’s history 
has too o en been ignored in accounts of agricultural and economic history. 
As remedy to this oversight, they argue that soils need to be understood as 
“entities with histories” that are both aected, and in turn aect the so-called 
human world. ey argue further: “What people believe about soils inuences 
(although it does not necessarily determine) what they do with them, whether 
they conserve and nurture them, whether they abuse and abandon them. What 
people understand – and misunderstand – about soils is thus a necessary part 
of any history of the nexus between soil and society.”26
For Day and the original Holland Marsh boosters, there seemed to be a cen-
tral misunderstanding, willful or otherwise, about a fundamental characteristic 
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of the soil. e organic order of soil – which includes the Marsh’s muck soil 
– is dened by the Soil Classication Working Group as being composed of
30 percent “organic” material (as distinct from clay, rock particles, crushed min-
erals, and so forth) per volume. ese organics making up the soil are always at
dierent stages of decomposition: For example, leaves worked into a garden in
the fall will, by midsummer the following year, likely be fully decomposed and
unrecognizable as leaves. Similarly, bogs, swamps, wetlands, fenlands, and the
like all have organic materials at dierent stages of decomposition, ranging from 
a brous, peaty texture through to a fully decomposed silt-like material.27 is
makes for a dynamic situation because the humication (the degree to which an 
organic is decomposed) of the plant material is constantly changing, a complex
process sensitive to oxygen levels, temperature, soil microbes, and the like.
e earliest Holland Marsh farmers and boosters either did not understood 
this complex dynamic of the muck soil or were not particularly concerned with 
such details. e central contradiction of the organic order of soil, when brought 
into the context of capitalist agriculture, is that the moment the water that cre-
ated it is removed, the muck becomes far more unstable and ultimately will van-
ish completely. is is an illustration par excellence of a key contradiction of 
capitalist agriculture – elements essential to production are destroyed through 
the process of production.
Swamp and marsh water are hypoxic, or low-oxygen, ecologies due to the fact 
that they contain so much dead organic material. As plants grow, mature, and 
die o, they fall into the water that supports them, creating layer on layer of 
dead material. Since the process of decomposition is signicantly inhibited by 
the absence of oxygen and marsh water is hypoxic, this material decomposes at 
an extremely slow rate. is also means that the peat/muck mix accumulates at a 
very slow pace. According to a report jointly published by the Ontario Ministry 
of Agriculture, Food and Rural Aairs, and the Muck Crops Research Station, it 
takes roughly ve hundred years of plants growing, dying o, and slowly decom-
posing to result in just thirty centimetres of muck soil.28 In other words, muck 
soil is not a renewable resource on a commercial, capitalist time scale.
e relatively stable dead material, once uncovered, becomes very unstable and 
oxidizes, thus decomposing, at a rapid rate – the technical term for this process 
is “subsidence.” According to the same report, this constitutes a “major chronic 
problem” of organic soils (within the context of capitalist agriculture, though not 
stated as such).29 Cameran Mirza and Ross W. Irwin conducted what appears to 
be the earliest study to measure the rate of subsidence in the Holland Marsh.30
ey found that the organic soil subsides at a rate of about thirty centimetres 
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(one foot) every ten years, constituting a “substantial and serious loss.”31 irty- 
ve years later, Mary Ruth McDonald and Jim Chaput repeated Mirza and Ir-
win’s 1963 calculation and arrived at a similar conclusion, the “muck soil, inten-
sively cropped, subsides at a rate of 30 cm of soil every 10 years.”32 ey continue:
is process can be slowed by the application of copper, a well-designed 
water-control program, a wind abatement and cover crop program and 
minimum cultivation. ese steps are essential for long-term continued 
use of organic soils for agriculture. With good water table control and soil 
management practices, the rate of subsidence can be reduced to 4.7 cm 
every 10 years.33
When optimal subsidence-mitigating conditions are implemented, accord-
ing to McDonald and Chaput, just under ve centimetres of soil will be lost 
every decade. To put this in dierent terms, thirty centimetres of soil (which, as 
pointed out above, would take roughly ve hundred years to form) could vanish 
in sixty years under optimal conditions. In the worst-case scenario, that same 
thirty centimetres of soil would decompose and erode away in as few as ten years 
if Mirza and Irwin’s original 1963 calculation holds true.
e issue of subsidence, however, seemingly was not identied by the early 
Marsh boosters as much of a concern. Day did invoke “settling” of the soil in a 
1927 article in the Canadian Engineer, but he refracts the inconvenient reality of 
subsidence through his optimistic salesmanship, suggesting that that the settled 
soil is all the better for irrigation.
All round the area the water in the canals is on the same level as Lake 
Simcoe. Once the muck is drained, it settles a great deal, so that the land 
surface, originally nearly on a level with the lake surface will in a few years 
be from 1 to 2  below it. Consequently, in dry seasons the water from the 
canal may be led by pipes to irrigate the reclaimed land.34
It is not until Mirza and Irwin’s 1963 study that subsidence seems to be iden-
tied as a signicant problem, and not until the 1970s did any concern over it 
begin to get traction.35 In the decades that followed, a number of subsidence- 
mitigation measures were implemented, from a more careful monitoring of 
water levels (to ensure the soil stays relatively moist and does not dry out and 
blow away) to the application of copper (to reduce the soil enzymes responsible 
for converting organic carbon to carbon dioxide, thus slowing the oxidization 
process).36 But, of course, there is no intervention, or combination of interven-
tions, that will entirely halt subsidence. Farmers in the Holland Marsh now 
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understand that this process is happening and do what they can to mitigate it, 
but they are generally resigned to the fact that there is nothing that can stop it. 
In some areas on the edge of the Marsh in 2020, the muck soil is already com-
pletely gone. Farmers in these areas have either transitioned to other crops, built 
greenhouses, or have simply abandoned the land, at least for now.
In any case, employing mitigation techniques to slow soil subsidence does not 
t within the logic of industrial, commercialized, intensive farming. e political 
economy of capitalist agriculture demands a formula of minimizing input costs 
and maximizing prot. It is a prescription that does not permit for long-term eco-
logical planning, but rather demands immediate-term pursuit of prots. ere is 
a fundamental disconnect between the time horizons of muck soil and capitalist 
agricultural production. Within the context of scrambling to secure an income 
for another year, farmers are largely unable to take on the task of mitigating sub-
sidence to any great extent. e fact that agriculture within the Holland Marsh 
is conducted so intensively (with farmers tending to relatively small concerns, 
ranging from roughly twenty to one hundred hectares) means that they cannot 
aord to let land lay fallow as o en as conservationists might recommend. e 
contradictions of muck-crop farming, touched o as the water drained from the 
land and perhaps underappreciated at the time, shaped and will continue to shape 
the future of farming and land use in the Holland Marsh for decades to come.
e Socionatural Contradictions of Canals and Dykes
As the dredger slashed its way through the perimeter of the Holland Marsh, it 
was exposing yet another set of contradictions. e emerging canal became the 
delineation for a novel administrative geography composed of farmers and the 
three adjacent governments of Bradford, West Gwillimbury, and King. At the 
same time, the canal itself became a novel socionatural feature that required 
intensive monitoring and maintenance. Also in the wake of the dredger were 
the contradictions of nature’s production. All of these have rippled across the 
landscape, and beyond it, for the past ninety years.
Before the drainage project was complete, landowners recognized their 
emerging shared fate and formed the Marsh Landowners Association in early 
1929, appointing Day as its president. ey were initially displeased with the pace 
of development and sought to develop a collective platform through which to 
articulate their claims within the complex administrative context.
One of their rst orders of business was to agitate for a commission with pow-
ers to manage the vast, emerging drainage infrastructure. ey wanted to focus 
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on breaking the new land, digging miles of ditches to further facilitate drainage, 
and generally get on with the work of farming. While the canal did facilitate 
a certain amount of draining, a complicated network of ditches and drainage 
tiling was needed as well. Landowners had to carve up their newly formed elds 
with ditches running either inward toward the Holland River, away from the 
river toward the canal, or both. ese ditches facilitated further drainage and 
control over water in the elds. Whereas digging the canal was largely a pub-
lic infrastructure project, in as much as Simcoe County, King Township, and 
Bradford each paid for it in proportion to the amount of drained land in their 
respective jurisdiction, ne-tuning the drainage with ditches and tiling was 
the responsibility of individual landowners. As a result, this interior network 
emerged slowly and unequally, with some land not being ready for crops until 
well a er the end of the Second World War.
In the meantime, however, the Drainage Aid Act furnished provisions to es-
tablish a commission to manage such projects. At the urging of Day and the 
Marsh Landowners Association, the Holland Marsh Drainage Commission was 
established in 1930.37 e commission’s membership comprised the reeves of the 
three jurisdictions within which the Marsh lay – the village of Bradford and 
the townships of West Gwillimbury and King. Its name and composition has 
changed over the decades, but the commission’s function as an administrative 
and political vehicle to manage matters in the Marsh has remained largely con-
sistent. is has, at times, been an uneasy partnership, and most recently there 
have been calls by those on the Bradford West Gwillimbury side to have the 
legal boundary redrawn such that the entire Marsh falls under its administrative 
jurisdiction.38 Not surprisingly, politicians in King Township do not agree.39
From as early as 1933, even before the entire area was under production, the 
commission was concerned with the state of the canals and their associated 
banks and dykes, which in some cases doubled as roads. e banks – mounded 
muck soil dumped beside the canal as the dredger did its work – were settling, 
subsiding, and being pounded down by increased trac, ultimately becoming 
unsafe for travel and at risk of failing.40 By the 1940s, the canals and river were 
lling with silt, washing away the precious muck soil and compounding the 
problem by lling the watercourses back in. is made the area more suscepti-
ble to ooding and increased wear and tear on the pumping infrastructure. is 
issue persisted into the 1950s as yet others were introduced, namely, the building 
of Highway 400, which essentially served as a large dyke and severed the Hol-
land Marsh east to west into two parts, each of which required additional pump-
ing infrastructure. In the 1960s, drag lines were used to clean the main drain (the 
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erstwhile Holland River) at a cost of nearly sixty-thousand dollars annually.41
By the 1960s, the river and canals were also being overrun with plant growth, 
fed by the fertilizer runo from the elds. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, two 
barges were purpose built, one for each side of Highway 400, to remove weeds 
from the main drain. On top of all this, there remained continual maintenance 
to the pumps, pipes, tiles, roads, and bridges.
e administrative burden of managing the persistent maintenance work and 
nding the necessary budget falls to the commission, now known as the Holland 
Marsh Drainage System Joint Municipal Service Board. Working in coordina-
tion with the drainage superintendent, the board sets the annual levy assessed to 
farmers in the Marsh and coordinates budgetary priorities with the governments 
of Bradford West Gwillimbury and King Township. Fiduciary pressures, in part 
a result of the complex administrative arrangement, eectively means that the 
commission (or board) has operated on a shoestring budget since its inception 
ninety years ago. While the work of managing the complex drainage system is 
essential, no one wants to pay for it.
e maintenance crisis came to a head in the 1990s. While upkeep of the ca-
nals, main drain, dykes, and pumps has been ongoing since the original drainage 
of the Holland Marsh in the late 1920s, with the exception of more substantive 
work done immediately a er Hurricane Hazel in 1954, it was never more than 
the minimum necessary for continued operation. By the 1990s, up to 65 percent 
of the south canal was full of sediment, including portions that were virtually 
fully lled in, to the extent that surveyors could walk across the south canal 
without getting wet. Additionally, lower water levels in the canals resulted in 
higher water temperatures. When combined with the high level of runo nutri-
ents available, this created ideal conditions for weed growth, which exacerbated 
the problem, further restricted water ow, and increased the risk of ooding.42
Signicant – and costly – repair work was needed immediately.
Initially, King Township balked at this project. e drainage superintendent 
at the time, Art Janse – in the position for three decades – sent a tersely worded 
letter to the King Council threatening to disband the commission if the town-
ship refused to support the eort. As Janse pointed out, disrepair of the drainage 
scheme now became a legal and insurance liability. If a ood did occur, and the 
commission, Bradford West Gwillimbury, or King Township were found to be 
negligent in their responsibilities for the drainage scheme, they could be found 
liable. And, indeed, there was plenty on the line. In a 1999 assessment of the 
Holland Marsh, its land, 501 houses, 350 barns, 125 garages, 256 greenhouses, 
two halls, one church, one library, three pumping stations, and one experimental 
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station were valued at $110,000,000. is estimate did not take into account 
the abundant farm equipment and any crop loss that might result from a one-
hundred- year storm event.43 Janse’s ultimatum was no idle threat – he, perhaps 
better than anyone, understood the risks of not addressing the crisis of the canals.
While these old tensions continued to broil, new ones were emerging. e 
administrative boundary of the Holland Marsh, always rmly established by the 
perimeter of the canal system, was always just that – administrative. What Day, 
Baird, and the original Marsh boosters neglected to recognize was that, despite 
fundamentally altering the hydrological system of the area, the Marsh remained 
rmly embedded within a larger watershed. By the mid-2000s, both in response 
to a need for an expanded ratepayer base to pay for the extensive required canal 
work and in recognition of the upstream sources of sediment clogging up the 
canals, the administrative boundary and watershed boundary were united.
is, of course, was a contentious process – indeed, the resulting legal case 
found its way to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. At the heart of the mat-
ter was the issue of assessments. From the very beginning, the costs related to 
the drainage system had been shared between Bradford, West Gwillimbury, 
and King in proportion to the amount of reclaimed land in each jurisdiction. 
ese costs were o en passed on to the farmers in a similar fashion, with each 
farmer given an assessment each year for their share. By the late 1990s, Bradford 
West Gwillimbury was proposing that assessments be made also for landowners 
in East Gwillimbury, Caledon, Newmarket, and New Tecumseth – the towns 
within the broader watershed (King was also a respondent in the case, still re-
luctant to pay for the canal and dyke work). Its claim hung on Section 76 of the 
Drainage Act, which states:
e council of any local municipality liable for contribution to a drain-
age works in connection with which conditions have changed or circum-
stances have arisen such as to justify a variation of the assessment for main-
tenance and repair of the drainage works may make an application to the 
Tribunal . . . for permission to procure a report of an engineer to vary the 
assessment.44
e original assessment schedule from Baird’s report in 1924 (updated in 
1949 and again in 1990) was the one used through the early twenty-rst century. 
In 1931, Caledon, New Tecumseth, and King paid a one-time fee of $1,200 to 
Bradford in acknowledgment of the 23,000 acres (9,300 hectares) in their ju-
risdictions that empty into the Holland Marsh Drainage System. Beyond this, 
however, the communities within the watershed had not contributed nancially 
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to the maintenance of the system. For Bradford, it was clear that in the inter-
vening ninety years, “conditions had changed and circumstances had arisen.” 
Ken Smart, an engineer with extensive experience in the Holland Marsh, noted 
two signicant changes in the tribunal proceedings. First, he argued that, in 
the 1920s, most of the highland agriculture above the Marsh consisted of rela-
tively small-scale cattle operations. By 2002, the same land was being intensively 
farmed with cash crops, which dramatically increased the amount of eroded soil 
and fertilizer runo that ended up in the Holland Marsh canals. Second, Smart 
underscored that the vast (sub)urban, residential, and commercial development 
in the area put multiple and intensifying pfressures on the drainage system.45
In other words, the upstream conditions – incorporating some 65,000 acres 
(26,000 hectares) of land – had changed fundamentally since the 1920s, con-
tributing signicantly to the deterioration of the drainage scheme.
In his ruling, drainage referee Delbert A. O’Brien noted the “rather unorth-
odox circumstances” of including thousands more landowners, for the rst time 
ever, in assessments for the Holland Marsh drainage system.46 Yet he agreed that 
the threshold of Section 76 had been met – conditions had changed enough 
and sucient circumstances had arisen to justify a reassessment. Interestingly, 
he noted that the case involved a public-policy component. e Holland Marsh 
– as a drainage system – was of such signicance that it needed to be looked at
through the broader lens of public benet and safety.
e host Municipality [Bradford] was legally obliged to commence report 
to a Drainage System which is much more than a conventional drainage 
system and which embraces the interests of not only thousands of residents, 
but of Government Authorities at all levels. e public safety factors are 
foremost and involve potential serious ooding, a risk of highway acci-
dents resulting from faulty barriers on the dyke roads, as well as inade-
quate bridge structures. Progress is stalled until the assessment puzzle is 
resolved.47
In the end, O’Brien ruled that 75 percent of the total cost of developing a 
comprehensive reassessment – some $1.1 million – would be paid for by Bradford 
and the residents within the interior of the canal system. e remaining 25 per-
cent would come from the respondents in the case. is eectively increased the 
drainage landscape of the Holland Marsh from 7,000 acres (2,800 hectares) to 
65,000 acres (26,000 hectares) and from a few hundred people to several thou-
sand. Interestingly, the new de facto members of the Holland Marsh drainage 
assessment base would only be on the hook for the maintenance of the canals 
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and dykes. e other components of the drainage system – the main drain and 
the pumping infrastructure – would continue to be assessed to the interior land-
owners only.
A er a lengthy environmental assessment process, lasting from 2004 until 
2008, and the preparation of a nearly seven-hundred-page engineer’s report, 
completed in 2009, work on the Holland Marsh Drainage System Canal Im-
provement Project began in 2010, with completion in 2016. e plan was nearly 
as ambitious as the original drainage scheme and included full relocation of 
some sections of the canals and widening and deepening others elsewhere.48
e total cost of the project was over $26 million, with landowners within the 
Marsh in Bradford and King Township on the hook for roughly 90 percent of 
the cost. For the rst time ever, however, landowners in those districts outside of 
the Marsh, as well as those in Caledon, East Gwillimbury, New Tecumseth, and 
Newmarket, were also charged for this maintenance, expanding slightly, though 
importantly, the administrative geography of the Marsh.
e Syndicate Aair: Power and the Politics of Drainage
While the legal troubles of the canal and dyke system have played out over de-
cades, another important legal issue related to the original drainage scheme 
emerged before all of the elds had even been broken. In the winter of 1932, 
Cliord Case, a Conservative member of the provincial parliament for York 
North (which overlapped with the King side of the Holland Marsh) accused 
the drainage project of being “fraudulent and iniquitous.”49 Case had essentially 
two main claims. e rst, a er an extensive investigation, was allegations that 
the original drainage petition prepared by the Holland Marsh Syndicate and 
sent to the province was lled with forged signatures of “stenographers, broth-
ers, sisters, and farmers’ sons,” most of whom did not own land in the wetland 
and many of whom lived 125 kilometres away in Guelph (where Day had lived 
previously).50 He argued that the petition had been padded with names of people 
who did not own land in the area as a way of skirting the residency requirement 
of the drainage-petition procedures. If this were true, it would have been a clear 
violation of the Drainage Aid Act, which requires that signatories own land in 
the area pursuant to the petition.
Case’s second charge against the syndicate was that it had failed to pay the 
taxes on the drained land and schemed to have King, Bradford, and West Gwil-
limbury landowners (in addition to the province through the Drainage Aid Act 
of 1921) pay for the entire drainage through their property tax. He claimed that 
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the syndicate was refusing to pay $30,000 in back taxes and was selling parcels 
of farmland without disclosing that the taxes on each were in arrears. Case had 
harsh words for the syndicate, claiming: “ey put you [landowners, King and 
York townships] through the wringer . . . [T]hey hung you up on the line and 
they didn’t even come back to see if you had dried up.” In short, his complaint 
was that the syndicate “was in for a big real estate speculation which would net 
it millions of dollars.”51
Day defended himself and his fellow members vehemently in the media, ar-
guing that all the signatures on the drainage petition were legitimate, attached 
to actual local residents, and that the nancial dealings of the Holland Marsh 
Syndicate had always been conducted in good faith. He pointed out that West 
Gwillimbury, as the primary signatory of the petition under the Drainage Aid 
Act, had breached its contract with the group by not upholding its terms stip-
ulating that the drainage work would be completed by 1926. So, while it was 
true that the syndicate had not paid taxes on the land between 1926 and when 
the drainage was completed in 1929, Day argued that its members were not re-
sponsible for the payments because the entire drainage project had not been 
completed. In short, the township was not living up to its end of the bargain, 
and thus, Day claimed, the syndicate did not owe taxes on the land for the in-
tervening years.
More interestingly, Day argued further that the land was valueless until 
drained, the syndicate having held the land in good faith throughout the period 
of the First World War until enough capital and labour could be marshalled 
for the project.52 Its members had paid taxes on the land (even though it was 
undrained) up until they were obligated to (1926), at which point the municipal 
authority, having not met their own responsibility, became the taxpayer.
e situation evolved from a local matter to a provincial one when omas 
Kennedy, minister of agriculture for Ontario, got involved:
I feel the townships should investigate.  .  .  . I have asked King Township 
Council, and I shall ask the Council of West Gwillimbury Township to 
meet me immediately to clean up this situation in the interests of the tax-
payers of the two townships. ere is a petition in the hands of the Clerk of 
West Gwillimbury with names purporting to be signed by W. H. Day and 
R. L. McKinnon, by power of Attorney, when some of these people have 
admitted to me they do not, and never have, owned land in this area, and 
have never, to their knowledge, given Day permission to sign their names 
by power of attorney.53
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Under pressure from the minister, the reeve of King Township, E. Milton 
Legge, requested an inquiry into the matter in mid-February 1932. Legge met 
with Attorney General W.H. Price, who requested that the councils of King and 
West Gwillimbury investigate under Section 257 of the Municipal Act. County 
Judge Charles H. Widdield was appointed to the case a er the rst judge ap-
proached, J. Herbert Denton, oddly said he was too busy.
On reviewing the case, Judge Widdield, a er initially adjourning the in-
quiry on the grounds that the original drainage petition could not be found, 
released an interim report in early March 1932. He found, rst of all, that there 
had been no wrongdoing whatsoever, writing, “If I am right in my construction 
of the statutes, it seems to me there is nothing le  to investigate, and it will be 
a waste of time and money to proceed.”54 At the same time, Widdield went 
on to argue that he did not actually have proper jurisdiction to make a ruling 
because the initial signatory of the original drainage petition had been signed by 
West Gwillimbury (the Simcoe County side), not by King Township. A special 
joint meeting of the West Gwillimbury and King Township Councils and the 
Holland Marsh Drainage Commission was held on March 9, 1932, to review 
the ndings and determine if a Simcoe judge should be appointed to investi-
gate the case.
A few days later, on March 14, and with springtime farming activity ramping 
up, reports stated that the inquiry was going to be dropped altogether. e spe-
cial joint meeting had determined that there was not enough evidence to pursue 
the matter any further. As Reeve Edgar Evans of West Gwillimbury put it, “we 
have nothing to probe, unless we have further evidence.”55
e details of this episode are somewhat obscured by the passage of time and 
the lack of documentation, so it is likely impossible to ever fully understand 
the veracity of Case’s accusations and what the Holland Marsh Syndicate ac-
tually did. What is apparent, however, is the extent to which the state (and its 
appendages) had cause to put an end to any controversy as soon as possible. e 
drainage project, which had initially been approved as early as 1912, had already 
been stalled by the First World War, a lack of capital and labour, and various 
construction delays. Case’s accusations risked furthering delaying farming in the 
Marsh by having the project tied up in litigation for months, possibly years. By 
1932, the land was drained, though not yet all ploughed, and small test plots were 
already producing impressive yields. In other words, the Marsh was tantalizingly 
close to becoming the agricultural juggernaut Day and the other boosters had 
dreamed for decades it would become. At the same time, a provincial govern-
ment looking to boost employment and economic activity during an era of acute 
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economic depression had very little incentive to further delay the development 
of the Marsh.
is is not to suggest that the strong incentive to drain the wetland resulted 
in a cover-up – indeed, there may well have been nothing to cover up. Case’s 
accusations may have been baseless. His angry reaction in the media may have 
simply been political grandstanding. Regardless, what is made clear through this 
episode is the extent to which culture and politics were enmeshed in the process 
of landscape change and the production of nature. e social perceptions of the 
Marsh had changed dramatically in a relatively short period of time. It had once 
been reviled, feared, and simply ignored as a casto. Yet by the 1930s, public bat-
tles were being waged between high-ranking politicians and businessmen over 
the very same landscape. As the political and cultural context outside the Marsh 
shi ed, the landscape within morphed as well. By the early 1920s, Canada was 
facing some of the highest-recorded unemployment rates in the country’s history 
due to declines in manufacturing and an agricultural sector struggling through 
drought and the eects of the Great Depression. e potential of the Holland 
Marsh – the cultivated imaginary of smiling, protable farms that would employ 
thousands of workers – stood as too alluring a prospect to local and regional 
government leaders to be disrupted.
Conclusion
In the decade from 1925 to 1935, the Holland Marsh was transformed materi-
ally and administratively. As the water drained from the land, new socionatural 
hybrids emerged, which required novel political congurations to conduct the 
messy work of ensuring nature’s satisfactory reproduction. As the canal sev-
ered 7,000 acres (2,800 hectares) from its adjacent landscape, it simultaneously 
bound together Bradford, West Gwillimbury, and King. e uncooperative 
character of nature strained this administrative-political apparatus from the 
very beginning. Subsiding soil, silt, failing dykes, sagging canals, and settling 
roads all created tensions and tested the resolve of this uneasy partnership. Re-
alizing the liberal-state ideal of an orderly, productive nature – at least within 
the Marsh – proved a messy process.
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Crops, Markets, and the Production of Stability, 1935–54
B y the mid-1930s, the canal system was complete, much of the ancillary drainage infrastructure had been put into place, and regular agricultural production had arrived to the Holland Marsh. While the Marsh boosters 
had been busy with the production of land and elds for the previous few decades, 
from the mid-1930s onward, the focus shied to the production of agricultural 
crops. As this occurred, a changing constellation of actors, institutions, and bio-
physical characteristics were folded into the production of nature in the Marsh.

e central focus of the farmers during the tumultuous two-decade period 
between 1935 and 1954 was to control the crops in order to produce some stability 
– a condition they had largely achieved by the fall of 1954. At the macrolevel, this 
was partly due to the consolidating US global economic hegemony – a trend in
postwar capitalism that ushered in a sustained period of American geopolitical
and economic dominance – and the stability it temporarily produced in world
agriculture.
In the Holland Marsh, farmers attempted to extend and deepen this stabil-
ity by corralling the biophysical characteristics of the crops in as protable a 
way possible. 
ey did this through three primary mechanisms: by drawing on 
emerging technologies; by organizing for the development of physical infrastruc-
ture, especially storage and packaging facilities and transportation networks; 
and by agitating for and organizing important social infrastructure. 
e social 
and physical infrastructure that emerged during this period signalled the begin-
ning of the process of ne-tuning the landscape and farming practices to the bio-
physical requirements of the crops. 
e carrots, onions, lettuce, and celery grown 
in the Marsh required a di	erent supportive infrastructure than the corn and 
wheat grown immediately outside the perimeter of the canal, with the landscape 
beginning to reect this during the 1935–54 period. For farmers in the Marsh, 
the crops became a route to salvation, a way to manufacture socioeconomic sta-
bility. 
ese socionatural interventions were co-implicated in the production 
of Marsh crops, which, in turn, aided in the production of temporary stability.
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In some ways, the emergence of regular farm production in the Holland 
Marsh could not have come at a worse time. In the mid-1930s, the Canadian 
economy was mired in a deep economic depression, the product of a complex 
amalgam of continental drought, labour surplus, and stock market collapse that 
compounded negative e	ects on both the supply and the demand sides of the 
agricultural sector.
Many agricultural workers – and labourers in other sectors – were le reeling 
in the face of this and struggled to nd jobs. 
e work that was available oen 
paid less than it once did. In California’s Salinas Valley, for example, throngs 
of “Dust Bowl refugees” were considered lucky if they were able to keep a job at 
half of what they were making a decade earlier.1 In Ontario, meanwhile, average 
monthly wages for farm workers fell from $75 in 1920 to a low of $32 by 1933 (see 
Figure 3.1). Making matters worse, scarcity kept commodity prices persistently 
high, meaning food was una	ordable for many. But higher commodity prices 
did not translate into higher prots for farmers. In Ontario, annual total net 
income for farms fell from roughly $133 million in 1926 to a low of $40 million 
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Source: Statistics Canada. “Historical statistics of Canada, Section M: Agriculture. 
Monthly wages without board for male farm labour, Canada and by region and province, 
1909–1974.” 2014. Series M78-88. https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-516-x/sectionm 
/4057754-eng.htm.
Figure 3.1. Monthly farm labourer wage in Ontario, 1920–50  
(unadjusted canadian dollars). 
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In contrast to this trying interwar period, the Second World War and the 
years beyond – roughly 1939–50s – can be considered the twentieth-century apex 
of Friedrich Engels’s much earlier speculation that the “peasant [farmer] is a 
very essential factor in the population, production and political power.”3 As the 
rains came, wartime consumption increased demand, technology improved, and 
nascent welfare-state agricultural policies began to emerge, farmers’ fortunes 
changed dramatically. 
ey would emerge from the turbulent interwar period 
of global instability as a powerful political economic bloc and a key player in 
the consolidation of welfare-state power throughout the mid-1940s and 1950s.4
Perhaps sensing their growing leverage and wanting to insulate against lean 
years like those they had just experienced, a new agrarian politics emerged in 
Canada as farmers redoubled e	orts to organize, network, and strategize as a 
distinct political bloc.5 While Canadian farmers have a long history of progressive 
organizing, including deep ties with the Co-operative Commonwealth Federa-
tion, the more radical forebear of the New Democratic Party, the level and sophis-
tication of their organizations increased dramatically during the 1940s and 1950s.6
During this era, farmers in the Holland Marsh rallied their political and cultural 




























































Source: Statistics Canada. “Net farm income (×1,000).” Table 32-10-0052-01. 
https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3210005201.
Figure 3.2. Total net farm income (×1,000) in Ontario, 1926–50  
(constant 2000 dollars).
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extreme violence in California during the late 1930s and 1940s, manifested itself 
more peacefully, yet still stunningly, in and around Toronto. To protest prices, 
Marsh farmers were known to drive truckloads of lettuce into town, set up in the 
parking lot of major-chain grocery store, and hand out their produce for free. 
is 
illustrates not only the activist political tenor many of them adopted throughout 
the 1930s and 1940s but also the extent to which the produced natures of the 
Marsh were at the centre of this emerging politics. 
e National Farm Radio 
Forum, the Canadian Federation of Agriculture, the Ontario Federation of Ag-
riculture, and the passage of the Farm Marketing Act all served to strengthen the 
agricultural sector as it struggled to adjust to the postwar global economy.7

is was also a period of rapid population growth in the Holland Marsh, a 
process that fundamentally transformed the social and natural fabric of the area. 

e virginal elds of the newly drained Marsh lie in stark contrast to the des-
iccated elds farther west, a fact that drew domestic farmers eastward from the 
prairies. At the same time, many European farmers moved westward to North 
America in search of peace and stability aer decades of war and upheaval in 
their home countries. For a time, this migration satiated the growing demand for 
stoop labour in the Marsh while also addressing the wider problem of unemploy-
ment across Canada. Indeed, programs run by the federal government furnished 
unemployed men with ve acres (two hectares) of land and a modest shack, all 
at no charge. One program represented a partnership between the governments 
of Canada and the Netherlands, which bore the cost equally, for settling Dutch 
farmers in the Marsh during the immediate postwar period.8
Programs like these and others meant that the total land under tillage in the 
Holland Marsh increased from about twenty-ve hectares (roughly sixty acres) 
in 1932 to over four hundred hectares (one thousand acres) by 1934.9 Transplant-
ing so many families into the Marsh meant that not everyone would be success-
ful.10 Yet given the hyperfertility of the newly broken soil, the rapid increase in 
hectares under production, and the access to underdeveloped markets, farmers 
were more likely to fail due to overproduction than to underproduction.

e Confounding Cornucopia
It had always been assumed that the many mouths in Toronto would consume 
the food produced in the Holland Marsh – indeed the city’s growing popula-
tion was built into the original drainage proposal as a justication for the proj-
ect. Until the farmers in the Marsh had their rst signicant yields, however, 
that prospect remained largely an abstraction. Professor Day’s test plots were 
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certainly encouraging, but they did not necessarily suce, on their own, as a 
proof of concept for the broader ambitions of having the Marsh become Toron-
to’s market garden. While they demonstrated that the land could yield an abun-
dance of carrots, onions, lettuce, and celery, this was only part of the equation.
Aer over a decade preparing the landscape and navigating the political and 
cultural apparatus required of that transformation, Holland Marsh farmers were 
for the rst time forced to confront the biophysical nature of crops. Initially, 
however, they had little success in building the social infrastructure necessary to 
realize the prot potential of the productive windfall the muck soil represented. 

e bioavailability of key nutrients in the fresh muck – potassium, phosphorus, 
nitrogen, and others – along with a string of fair-weather growing seasons made 
for bumper crops throughout the 1930s.11 But this did not translate, at least ini-
tially, into bumper prots.
Farmers lured to the Holland Marsh by tales of cheap – sometimes free – 
land and abundant yields had to confront the complex reality of high yields and 
perishability. 
ose from western Canada, eeing the misery and poverty of a 
prolonged drought on the prairies, moved eastward and, on the whole, fared 
no better in the Marsh than where they had out west.12 
ey would have spent 
years struggling to get anything to grow in the dried, desiccated elds of the 
prairies only to nd the opposite problem in the Marsh – overproduction. As re-
ported by the Globe and Mail in 1937, one such family “was driven from Western 
Canada by the drought only to be again faced with threatened poverty because 
[their] crops are too abundant.”13
Conditions that year were so bad that an untold amount of produce was aban-
doned to rot in orderly rows, to be ploughed back into the elds, or to even be 
hauled o	 to garbage dumps. Selling the produce in the midst of such overpro-
duction become almost unthinkable. 
e Toronto market was glutted, and there 
was no way to ship the produce much farther aeld, given the lack of suitable 
technology and infrastructure. 
ese dire circumstances drove prices through 
the oor and many farmers to distraction. 
e Globe and Mail reported on how 
absurd the situation eventually became for at least one Marsh farmer:
He showed the reporter his little pink slip from the market. 
e bushel of 
cauliower was dumped into the garbage when it spoiled before a buyer 
could be found. 
e turnips met the same fate. For the rest of the ship-
ment he received $6.70. From this amount the market deducted $1.41 for 
commission and handling fees. His baskets cost him $2.62 and the charge 
for hauling the vegetables to the market was $2.66. Added together and 
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subtracted from the total return these gures indicated that Mr. Ferguson 
went into debt exactly 19 cents on his shipment of produce.14

e overabundance of crops was in itself only a challenge due to the partic-
ular biophysical characteristics of the crops. 
e true problem was one of both 
quantity and quality. Carrots, onions, celery, and especially lettuce all had an 
extremely short shelf life in the 1930s. People in the twenty-rst century take for 
granted the genetic manipulations and storage and transportation technologies 
that extend the life of vegetables and hasten their delivery to modern super-
markets, but farmers in the 1930s did not have these luxuries. 
ey had to work 
quickly in the elds while seeking out emerging markets and technologies to 
protably corral the biophysical characteristics of their crops.

e farmers’ struggles were clearly not merely a “natural” problem, one born 
only of the fertility of the elds and the copiousness of the crops. Instead, the 
institutions, rules, and practices mediating the production and exchange of pro-
duce were equally implicated. Local grocery stores and markets in Toronto – 
such as the Stop & Shop –invoked the farmers’ hardships to convince customers 
to buy more: “Plan vegetable menus and lend a helping hand.”15 
is, and similar 
ads, were on the one hand commercial appeals meant to increase the Stop & 
Shop’s sales gures. Yet, on the other, they also revealed one of the fundamental 
challenges Marsh farmers faced in the middle to late 1930s. 
e problem was not 
so much an abundance of crops, per se, but rather an abundance of a particular 
kind. Had every farmer in the Marsh been growing a di	erent type of vegeta-
ble, local markets would have likely been able to absorb the supply. As it stood, 
though, capitalist farming in the Marsh sought to exploit specic characteris-
tics of the soil, meaning that production consisted of a highly specialized crop 
base entailing primarily onions, carrots, celery, and lettuce. Growing lower-value 
crops, such as wheat or soybeans, did not make much sense within the logic of 
intensive, small-plot, capitalist agriculture. Growing wheat in the muck would 
be seen as a waste of good soil. Aside from this, the economies of scale required 
for its production in the Marsh were absent – wheat farmers, even in the 1930s, 
required far more than the three or seven hectares most Marsh farmers had in 
order to turn a prot. Crop specialization in the area, at least in the 1930s, had a 
distorting e	ect and revealed a contradiction in the compulsion to grow prot-
able produce: 
e more conventional muck crops the farmers grew, the lower the 
prices went and the less protable their agricultural endeavours became.
Marsh farmers could have diversied their crop base as a way of reducing 
the supply of carrots, onions, lettuce, and celery. Increasing the variety of items 
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grown in the Holland Marsh while reducing the hectares dedicated to conven-
tional muck crops would likely have meant higher prices all around. Farmers 
could have worked in concert to grow a variety of table vegetables, from toma-
toes and asparagus to zucchini and spinach. Yet they likely would have seen 
this as too risky – and certainly outside the script of Celeryville and Kalama-
zoo. Rather than attempting to increase their prots and livelihood security by 
shiing away from growing a narrow group of table vegetables, Marsh farmers 
consolidated their focus on the conventional muck crops. From their perspec-
tive, the problem was not about too many carrots and onions, but instead a lack 
of demand for them. 
e answer seemed simple: band together, organize, and 
develop markets – and the necessary transportation technology – for the crops 
they were already growing.
Market Madness in the Holland Marsh
As the elds of the Holland Marsh continued to churn out a seemingly endless 
supply of fresh vegetables, the contradiction may not have been readily apparent: 
what was heralded as the strength of the area was also its vulnerability. 
e origi-
nal vision Day and the other Marsh boosters had of a socionatural conveyor belt 
churning out fresh market vegetables – aer a lengthy and turbulent start – had 
largely come to fruition. Yet the volume in with which the produce was emerging 
from the elds by the late 1930s, and the fact that it had to be sold fresh, were at 
odds with the social and technological infrastructure available at the time. In 
other words, the volume and freshness of the crops – in the absence of marketing 
infrastructure, refrigeration, and ecient transportation – were clear vulnera-
bilities. Time, then, was not on the Marsh farmers’ side. Unlike producers of 
more storable crops (corn, wheat, and soybeans, for example), Marsh farmers 
had to sell their vegetables within days of harvest. Wheat producers could ration 
their harvests out over months in order to avoid glutting the market and thereby 
maintain some control over price. Marsh farmers, however, did not have this 
luxury in the 1930s.
Exacerbating the absence of supporting technologies to ship, store, and pre-
serve their produce was the fact that there was very little social infrastructure 
for farmers to voice their displeasure or agitate for an improvement in the con-
ditions of their livelihood. As it stood in the early 1930s, Holland Marsh growers 
were at the mercy of the middlemen – brokers who sold the produce to buyers in 
Toronto. Recall the unfortunate farmer who owed the buyer nineteen cents aer 
shipping a load of produce to Toronto. 
e result was that farmers had very little 
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control over their crops once they le the elds and thus had very little control 
over their incomes. 
ey were price takers, not price makers, as the saying goes. 

is uneasy realization had begun to set in by the late 1930s.
Holland Marsh farmers’ frustration was part of a broader discontent sweep-
ing across the province during the era. 
e agricultural-extension work of the 
provincial government and the OAC related to issues like drainage – the very 
kind Day was instrumental in delivering to the Marsh – was increasingly seen 
by farmers to be the function of an out-of-touch, top-heavy bureaucracy. As 
Ruth Sandwell points out:
By the mid-1930s, many rural dwellers across the country had largely given 
up what limited faith they might have possessed in provincial e	orts to 
improve farming and farm life by providing university-educated experts 
to teach farmers scientic methods through farm instruction. 
e Great 
Depression had made it clear that these initiatives were largely beside 
the point.16
To the struggling Marsh farmers – many recent immigrants hardened by their 
experience overseas and the endemic discrimination they faced in their new coun-
try – the top-down advice from the OAC was nearly o	ensive. Farming tech-
niques and drainage, vastly improved by the inux of immigrant Dutch farmers, 
who brought with them an abundance of marsh-farming experience from their 
homeland, were not the issue. 
ese people did not need further education from 
a paternalistic extension program. 
ey clearly did not need help growing vege-
tables, given that high yields was the central problem in the rst place. Farmers 
were clearly tired of so-called experts telling them what the answers were. Within 
this context, a host of farmer-led organizations emerged, giving growers a plat-
form from which to collectively voice their frustrations. 
e chorus from around 
the province by the mid-1930s articulated that the most pressing issues they faced 
were related to “marketing, distribution, farm incomes and social organization.”17
Of course, farm organizations played a role in Ontario previous to the 1930s, 
but they became more active, important, and robust late in that decade and on 
into the 1950s. 
e earliest ones included the Patrons of Husbandry and the 
Patrons of Industry, both of which emerged in the 1880s in response to what is 
considered the rst “cheap food policy” in Canada, initiated by the government 
of Sir John A. Macdonald in 1879. Further along, in 1919, the United Farmers of 
Ontario wielded considerable power in the operation of formal politics and are 
credited with playing a key role in the defeat of the Conservative government in 
the 1919 provincial election.18
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While these earliest organizations did not survive into the 1930s, others 
emerged to take their place. Nationally, the farmers’ movement of the 1930s was 
led by an upstart Canadian Chamber of Agriculture (forebear to the Canadian 
Federation of Agriculture), at times a combative organization and vociferous 
advocate for farmers’ rights. At the provincial level, the era also saw the birth of 
the Ontario Federation of Agriculture (OFA) and the National Farmers Union, 
Ontario Branch.19 In 1936, the founding conference of the OFA, then referred 
to as the Ontario Branch of the Canadian Chamber of Agriculture, brought 
delegates together to outline priorities for the new organization. 
e parent 
Canadian Chamber had, just two years before, established its own priorities, 
including uniting and coordinating the interests of farmers across the country 
through provincial chapters and promoting the social and economic well-being 
of all farmers.20 When delegates met to establish the Ontario branch in Janu-
ary 1936, they ratied support for the national priorities while establishing key 
regional priorities of support for marketing boards and for producer and seller 
collectives for key crops.
In an address to the gathered delegates of the 1939 annual meeting of the 
OFA, President H.H. Hannam forcefully restated these priorities. In his re-
portedly rousing speech, Hannam openly critiqued the Canadian government 
for standing by while a generation of farmers was driven to poverty for lack of 
markets. He emphasized that a familiar culprit – low prices – had caused the 
trouble: “
is factor, which is the most important of all, means continuing hard 
times for primary producers the world over  .  .  . [T]he problem of basic com-
modity prices, to give the producer an adequate living, is one which the leading 
nations have failed to solve.”21
A main concern for Holland Marsh farmers in this respect was the inordinate 
power of the commission agents to draw o	 their already meagre prots. While 
direct-to-market selling was still a common practice in the 1930s, the role of 
commission agents was strengthened as growers became increasingly desperate 
to nd markets for their produce. 
is dynamic put farmers at the mercy of the 
agents, who could provide a network through which to access markets. 
ey 
could facilitate the selling and distribution of produce to markets in Toronto at 
a time when such access was at an exceedingly high premium. Standard practice 
dictated that agents took in excess of 12.5 percent commission on transactions 
plus a set fee based on the size of shipment.
To farmers, the commission agents were selling access to markets in Toronto, a 
precious commodity given the extent to which supply was outstripping demand. 
To the grocers and market owners in the city, they were selling a predictable, 
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reliable source of produce. And in mediating between the two, commission 
agents emerged as de facto graders of produce. In the 1930s, Holland Marsh veg-
etables were not subject to standardized grading schemes like some other com-
modity groups in the province, an absence forming part of the impetus behind 
the initial attempt to launch a growers’ co-op. 
is position gave the agents an 
inordinate ability to manipulate both the farmers and the grocers. When buying 
from the former, the temptation for unscrupulous agents was to convince them 
that their produce was of a lesser grade and o	er a correspondingly lower price. 
When selling to the grocers, they would reverse the claim and insist on the high 
quality of the produce and demand a higher selling price. 
e agent would there-
fore be le with their 12.5 percent commission, a set fee based on the size of the 
shipment, plus the di	erence in price between what they bought the shipment 
for and what they sold it for.22 
e diculties this created for the farmers, of 
course, were only exacerbated by the prolic yields rolling o	 the elds.
Farmers were not alone in their frustration with commission agents. Federal 
legislation enabling the formation of marketing boards passed in 1934, though 
it was ruled unconstitutional by the Privy Council of the United Kingdom (still 
the court of nal appeal at the time) in 1937, in part because it was seen to in-
fringe on provincial jurisdiction. In order to ll the void le in the absence of 
federal legislation, the provincial government passed the Farm Products Control 
Act, 1937, which enabled the development of collective marketing boards. In 
theory, these boards provided new opportunities for farmers to market their pro-
duce as part of a larger collective, within which consistent grading schemes could 
be agreed on and routinized marketing protocols established, thereby closing o	 
opportunities for the middlemen to manipulate prices and giving farmers more 
control over their carrots, onions, celery, and lettuce.
In practice, however, many farmers remained skeptical that marketing boards 
would bring them any benet. 
e government’s overture seemingly was not 
enough – indeed, even Deputy Minister of Agriculture J.B. Fairbairn, himself a 
farmer, was publicly critical of the government’s inaction and began calling for 
the creation of a centralized food terminal. Ideally, the terminal would provide a 
meeting place where farmers and marketers could interact, eliminating the need 
for middlemen altogether. It would “permit control of supply and demand, and 
would yield better prices to the producers as well as bring substantial advantages 
to the consumers and retailers.”23 Yet despite these early calls for a food terminal 
by Deputy Minister Fairbairn and others, funding and materials were dicult 
to acquire during the war years. As a result, construction on the Ontario Food 
Terminal would not begin until 1952.24
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In the absence of a central food terminal, farmers in the Holland Marsh, 
bolstered by the rhetoric and increased activity of the Ontario Branch of the 
Chamber and leveraging the new legislation, banded together to form the Hol-
land Marsh Growers’ Co-operative Exchange in 1937. 
e goal of the Growers’ 
Co-operative was essentially to collectivize aspects of production, distribution, 
and sales. In a dra of its founding document, the group declared its intention 
to “co-operatively produce, grade, buy, sell, manufacture and deal in fruits and 
vegetables and their by-products and all other products of the farm; to buy, sell, 
manufacture and deal in containers, feed, fertilizer, machinery and all other 
farm supplies and to do all things incidental or conducive to the attainment of 
the aforesaid objects or any of them.”25
Typically, marketing boards and producer co-ops comprise discrete commod-
ity groups – for example, potatoes, hogs, or wheat. Indeed, by the late 1930s, a 
number of commodity-specic boards were already well established, including 
the Tender Fruit Producers’ Marketing Plan, the Ontario Asparagus Growers’ 
Marketing Plan, and a marketing board for cheddar cheese (later consolidated 
within the Ontario Milk Marketing Plan). In contrast to this, the rst Holland 
Marsh marketing board and co-op were based on regional origin rather than a 
specic kind of crop. As marketing-board historian John McMurchy points out, 
however, the newly enabled boards and co-ops were designed to succeed through 
uniformity, not heterogeneity.
Regardless of all of the other programs that marketing boards may develop, 
the need to enforce a common position among their own producers is par-
amount . . . It is normal and expected that there will always be di	erences 
in opinion between producers on various points. It is vital for marketing 
boards that they maintain sucient credibility among producers to per-
suade those producers who do not agree with the majority’s decisions to 
abide by such decisions nonetheless. 
is credibility is attained by estab-
lishing the boards as producer organizations elected by producers.26
Despite the promise of the enabling legislation the Farm Products Control 
Act ended up being of little value in the Marsh farmers’ attempts to gain control 
of their vegetables. On the one hand, they su	ered from producing a crop base 
that was too homogenous, too focused on carrots, onions, celery, and lettuce. 

ere simply was not enough demand in the immediate vicinity of the Hol-
land Marsh to absorb the abundant volume of such a relatively narrow range 
of produce. On the other hand, farmers su	ered as a result of their crop base 
being too heterogeneous to be contained within a single marketing board. 
e 
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biophysical distinctions of carrots, onions, celery, and lettuce, and the resulting 
divergences in marketability, growing imperatives, transportation requirements, 
storage needs, and the like, were di	erences not easily distilled into a common 
position and wrangled into one marketing board or co-op. In other words, let-
tuce growers in the Marsh had very little in common – as farmers – with onion 
growers. While a lettuce grower in the late 1930s might want to prioritize mobile 
refrigeration and road and rail construction, an onion grower might be more in-
terested in stationary cold-storage technologies. 
e biophysical characteristics 
of each crop can tend to result in divergent political priorities.
Perhaps a function of the challenging times, latent intercultural tensions 
emerged to reveal some rather xenophobic perspectives within the Holland 
Marsh during this period. Notably, in 1937, existing Marsh farmers balked at 
the idea of bringing immigrants – specically Dutch immigrants – into the area. 
In 1937, they protested to T.A. Crerar, federal minister of mines and resources, 
claiming that bringing more farmers into the elds would lead to more pro-
duce and further saturate an already glutted market.27 
ey also claimed – as 
recounted in a letter from Crerar to the premier of Ontario – that they were 
already only getting ve cents for a dozen bunches of celery and that any further 
downward pressure on prices would put many of them out of business.28

e cultural heterogeneity of the Holland Marsh was also blamed by some for 
the seeming inability of growers there to develop into a more formidable collec-
tive force. 
e reeve of King Township, complaining of the absence of cohesion 
within the struggling Holland Marsh Growers’ Co-operative Exchange, noted, 
“It’s hard going on the marsh, except for the Italian settlers, who ship direct to 
the city in their own truck and cut out the commission agent.”29 Going even 
further, a long-time Marsh farmer by the name of A. Nienhuis opined, “When 
you have Dutch, English, Germans, Italians, Ukrainians, and others, it’s hard 
to get them together in a united front without determined leadership – and we 
haven’t had that.”30 Making matters worse, the spiritual leader of the Marsh and 
an executive on the struggling Growers’ Co-op, W.H. Day, died suddenly in his 
eld in July 1938.31
Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the Growers’ Co-op was struggling just a year 
aer being formed. Its rules specied that the farmers who had signed on to the 
agreement (roughly 140 of the 160 operating in the area at that time) had to 
sell their produce through the exchange. But those who did not join (as well as 
many who did) were accused of “bootlegging” vegetables to wholesalers.32 Mean-
while, those who did sell through the struggling co-op felt that they were not 
being fairly treated. According to one of them, William Valenteyn, representing 
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a group of disgruntled farmers: “Some of us sent produce to the growers’ asso-
ciation for which we got nothing in return. In other cases, we received not 10 
per cent of the value of our crops. Some of us still have money owing from the 
association.”33
While this rst attempt at organizing the farmers of the Holland Marsh 
struggled to unite a relatively heterogeneous crop and cultural base, it also failed 
to address the farmers’ central concern – the extent to which commission agents 
were able to prot at their expense. Indeed, tempers seemed to are precisely 
because those agents were still largely in control of prots, despite the presence 
of the marketing board and the Growers’ Co-op. Dennis Nolan, a Marsh farmer 
and ex-reeve of Bradford, was quoted as saying that the commission agents were 
“cutting [the farmers’] throats” and had the Marsh growers “at their mercy, and 
they’re taking full advantage of that fact.”34
In the end, the tumultuous rst attempt to establish a marketing board for 
the geographic region of the Holland Marsh and to forge a unied farmers’ or-
ganization fell apart about a year aer it began. 
e ocial reason the Ontario 
Farm Products Control Board gave for revoking the rst marketing board’s 
license was that too many farmers were selling outside the Growers’ Co-op’s 
infrastructure, not only an indictment of the co-op’s e	ectiveness but also a 
clear and punishable violation of the board’s rules.35 But the relative heteroge-
neity of the crops, the increasing desperation of the farmers, and the inuence 
of latent cultural antagonisms certainly played a part in the dissolution of the 
marketing board and the Holland Marsh Growers’ Co-operative Exchange. Not 
until seventy years later, in 2008, was there another attempt to launch a similar 
organization, the Holland Marsh Growers’ Association (HMGA), although it 
is more an advocacy organization than a marketing board.36 To date, no other 
marketing board exclusively based in the geography of the Marsh has been es-
tablished. Nevertheless, the HMGA does provide some support to farmers and 
has helped develop local markets by leveraging recent popular interest in locally 
produced food.
Ultimately, the late 1930s represented a nadir of sorts for agriculture in the 
Holland Marsh. While individual farmers would struggle over the decades, 
never have the conditions of deprivation been as systemic and widespread as 
during those years. In part, this is because of the protective measures Marsh 
farmers were able to institute aer 1940, demonstrating a point scholars have 
made clear: agriculture is rarely (if ever) completely capitalist – liberal-state pol-
icy modies capitalist agriculture in ways that insulate the industry and farmers 
from the harshest e	ects of unfettered capitalism. At the same time, however, 
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the organizations enabled through liberal-state policy and other forms of inter-
ventionist state support helped drive the continued transformation and manipu-
lation of biophysical nature in the Holland Marsh. 
e kinder, gentler capitalism 
in the elds of the Marsh have masked, to some degree, the ecological contradic-
tions of production, though these would surface in the decades to come.
Wartime Sacrice, Social Supports, and Physical 
Infrastructure Produce Stability in the Holland Marsh
With the Second World War in full swing, a number of developments signi-
cantly a	ected the production of crops, farming practices, and the agricultural 
landscape in the Holland Marsh. First, perhaps learning from the false starts of 
the 1930s, growers became far more successful at organizing the social infrastruc-
ture they needed to support the development of markets and their survival as 
farmers. As a result, the 1940s saw the strengthening of provincial supports and 
the introduction of important local ones. With strengthened social networks 
came the ability to advocate for and organize important infrastructure projects. 
New transportation networks and the emergence of nascent storage and cooling 
technologies allowed Marsh growers to transform the freshness of their produce 
from a vulnerability into an important asset. Second, given the country’s impor-
tance as a provider of calories during the Second World War, Canadian farmers 
were gaining strength as a respected and powerful cultural bloc, despite the si-
multaneous demise of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, their polit-
ical protest party.37 For farmers in the Marsh, the war provided not only hungry 
markets for their overabundant crops but also a chance for growers (many of 
them newcomers) to “prove” themselves as valuable, contributing members of 
Canadian civil society. Both the cultivation of credibility and the development 
of social and physical infrastructure during the wartime and immediate postwar 
years were crucial to stabilizing farming in the Holland Marsh.

rough the materiality and discourse of war, food and farmland became 
deeply entwined with state making through nationalism and antifascism. As 
consumers of food, most civilians were expected to endure shortages of staples 
such as oils, butter, grains, and meat while making do with what was at hand. 
As producers of food, farmers were expected to endure shortages of labour, ma-
terials, and machinery. From the growers’ perspective, the sacrices were signif-
icant: During the 1943 harvest, for example, Marsh farmers collectively lost an 
estimated $20,000 a day to rot and overripening for want of labour to harvest 
their crops.38 
e hundreds of students who lived in wartime work camps in 
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the Marsh from late summer until school started in September were recalled to 
the elds in 1943 aer classes had resumed. F.W. Davis, manager of the Ontario 
Farm Service Force, asked that three hundred of them be allowed to return: “It 
will be impossible for these crops to be harvested unless those students who have 
been working on farms during the summer return for another two weeks.”39
Partly resulting from the growers’ hard work and partly from the cultural, po-
litical, and material importance of food to the war e	ort, agriculture as a noble, 
even heroic, pursuit displaced far-less-attering narratives framing rural people 
as inferior to their urban counterparts. 
e lowly “Marsh Muckers” emerged as 
crucial contributors to society in the eyes of the public. Wartime rhetoric became 
entangled with agriculture and catapulted farmers and farm workers onto the 
discursive front line. During the 1943 planting season, farmers “organized them-
selves into a sort of mobile commando unit, a sort of combined operations force, 
and as a eld dries, no matter on whose farm, this commando unit swoops on it 
with tractors and horses, and gets it turned over and seeded in short order.”40 In 
the wartime rmament, such collective action was understood as essential, and 
farmers were celebrated for displaying the kind of seless teamwork required to 
win the war, both at home and abroad. Popular culture and media were quick 
to use military rhetoric to emphasize their contributions. In 1941, newspaper 
ads also called on women to join the ght in the elds as a way of helping the 
beleaguered people of Britain: “Unless pickers are forthcoming, 8,000 bags of 
onions will remain unharvested. Here is an opportunity for women who have 
been sympathetic about Britain’s onion plight to give a helping hand in Canada’s 
program to release food for Britain.”41

e role farmers played in providing food domestically and abroad certainly 
had a role to play in Canada’s emergence as a middle power by the end of the 
conict. At the same time, the homefront duties of war gave recent immigrants a 
chance to demonstrate their patriotism to their new communities while provid-
ing the state with an opportunity to conscript these new arrivals into the trap-
pings of nationalism. 
e (largely) European diasporas in the Holland Marsh 
were celebrated for seizing on the opportunities to contribute: “Holland Marsh 
settlers are proving themselves second to none in Canada when it comes to pa-
triotism, according to Victory Loan campaigns . . . Germans, Czechs, Italians, 
Romanians, Russians, Poles, Scandinavians and many other nationalities live 
in peace on the marsh and are showing their loyalty in this campaign, although 
incomes were poor up until this year.”42

e emergence of the Marsh farmers (and their rural counterparts elsewhere) 
as respected, contributing members of society can be understood as part of a 
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broader process of the rise of a “modern countryside.”43 
e use value of farm-
land and the political power of its inhabitants became readily apparent partic-
ularly during the Second World War, shiing slightly the dynamic between the 
city and the countryside. Liberal notions of an ordered, productive, and prof-
itable rurality, coupled with a need for calories at home and abroad, animated 
state-making projects, making farmland and farmers an important part of the 
postwar transition. Aer their struggles of the previous decade, the interna-
tional crisis of the conict and the national response to it helped Marsh farmers 
nd some stability in the 1940s.

is stability was further facilitated by an emerging period of agricultural 
modernization during the decade, foreshadowing the emergence of the “green 
revolution” of the 1950s. 
e Canadian economy was just starting to pull out of 
the Great Depression, and stocks of most food commodities had been exhausted 
due to wartime’s double pressures – on the one hand, an increase in demand to 
meet the soldiers’ caloric needs, and on the other, a decrease in supply, at least 
initially, as the agricultural sector gured out how to maintain production with 
signicantly less experienced (and even inexperienced) labour.44 In any case, the 
remaining farmers and workers were expected to increase production so that the 
Canadian government could meet its food-export obligations while ensuring 
that the domestic population still had enough to eat.
Despite (or perhaps because of) farmers’ struggles to launch supportive social 
infrastructure throughout the 1930s, the OFA transformed in the 1940s and 
1950s into a permanent, robust, and integrated farm-advocacy organization. 
is 
largely progressive and successful period of the organization’s history was ush-
ered in during the spring of 1940, when members voted to allow membership to 
women and women’s farm organizations. At the same time, there was a shi to 
decentralize power as the OFA sanctioned and supported the development of 
county-level decision-making bodies across the province. 
e early 1940s also 
saw it establish young people’s committees in each county and a province-wide 
federation newspaper designed as a communication and learning tool. Perhaps 
most importantly, in 1944, the OFA was enshrined as an ocially recognized 
association under the Agricultural Associations Act. 
is enabled it to obtain 
the power, in 1946, to collect membership fees, providing a stable funding 
mechanism and allowing the organization to develop its programming and ad-
vocacy work.45
Despite never coming to fruition, some Marsh farmers attempted to orga-
nize their own growers’ union in 1948 and 1949. 
ey expressed four familiar 
issues they wanted addressed by the union: fair marketing protocols to prevent 
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the unscrupulousness of commission agents; a reduction in the price spread be-
tween what producers received and what consumers paid; a uniform inspection 
protocol throughout the province; and legislated oor prices for agricultural 
commodities.46 Ultimately, the union failed to materialize in any meaningful 
sense, seemingly due to lack of support and interest. 
e principles motivating 
the organizing group, however, were carried on partially by other active farm 
organizations, including the OFA.
Another important development for farmers across Ontario was the launch 
of the National Farm Radio Forum, a joint initiative between the Canadian 
Broadcasting Company, the Canadian Association for Adult Education, and 
the Canadian Federation of Agriculture. With the motto “Read, Listen, Dis-
cuss, Act,” the forum ran across Canada throughout the agricultural o	season 
between 1941 and 1965. It was designed to bring farmers together to collectively 
learn and engender social activism through the rapidly expanding new medium 
of radio. In addition to radio programming on various topics of concern to grow-
ers across the country, printed educational materials were mailed out to regis-
tered participants in advance of each broadcast to facilitate discussion in local 
groups. At its peak in 1949, the forum had over twenty-one thousand individuals 
registered as participants and had inspired the establishment of sixteen hundred 
local discussion groups.47
Within this emerging farmer-friendly milieu of the Second World War and 
immediate postwar era, momentum was clearly strong for social organizing 
among farm organizations, both federally and provincially. For growers in the 
Holland Marsh, still recovering from the collapse of their earlier e	orts to estab-
lish a marketing board and co-op in the mid-1930s, there was inspiration to be 
had in the success of organizations beyond the canals. Beginning in the 1940s, 
Marsh farmers returned to social organizing, but this time around, they focused 
their e	orts more explicitly and intentionally on the development of physical 
infrastructure.
By the late 1930s and early 1940s, innovations in cold-storage technologies 
were emerging in areas of intensive horticultural cultivation in the United 
States, notably California, as well as within the muck-crop areas of the Great 
Lakes basin such as Kalamazoo and Celeryville.48 
e introduction of reliable, 
a	ordable, and widespread cold storage had a profound e	ect on the production 
of crops in the Holland Marsh. (
ese socionatural dynamics are discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 4.) While almost every farmer eventually would have 
his or her own cold-storage facility, in the early and middle 1940s, the technol-
ogy was still very expensive and, as a result, largely inaccessible. 
e costs were 
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prohibitive for all but the most commercially successful growers, meaning that, 
for the vast majority of Marsh Muckers, access to cold storage meant banding 
together despite crop and cultural di	erences.
In 1946, 158 of the roughly 500 growers in the Holland Marsh pooled nan-
cial resources to develop the Bradford Co-op Storage plant.49 Drawing also on 
support from enabling federal legislation, including the Cold Storage Act and 
the Co-operative Marketing Loan Act, the federal and provincial governments 
each provided grants covering 30 percent of the cost to build the facility, leaving 
the farmers to cover the remaining 40 percent. A 1945 report to the York County 
Council unsurprisingly “pointed out that in view of the tremendous loss of vege-
tables through lack of proper storage, this plant would be of great value.”50 At its 
peak, the plant had the capacity to store up to y thousand crates of vegetables 
at a time, representing a signicant capability to manipulate supply and avoid a 
glutted market. 
e Bradford Co-op also contained an ice-packing plant, which 
allowed farmers to ship their produce farther aeld of the Marsh than previously 
possible. Having the capacity to put crates of vegetables on ice before shipping 
signicantly lengthened the amount of time produce could be kept fresh and, 
therefore, the distance over which they could be shipped. 
is meant that Marsh 
farmers were no longer solely dependent on the Toronto market. Indeed, in 1946, 
lettuce from the Holland Marsh was, for the rst time, consumed from Saska-
toon to Halifax.51 Another private facility, which other farmers could access for 
a fee, was also opened in 1946, the Holland River Gardens Company. Equipped 
with an icing and shipping wing, it could allegedly ice an entire railcar of pro-
duce within minutes.52
Other important physical infrastructure projects were started in 1946, in-
cluding the construction of Highway 400. Up until then, the only road linking 
the Holland Marsh with Toronto (and markets beyond) was the increasingly 
congested Yonge Street. Contrasted with the “narrow brush mattresses of the 
muskeg of the marsh,” the new four-lane superhighway would enable motorists 
“to sail across the wet atlands at 50 miles an hour.”53
Unfortunately for the growers of the Holland Marsh, development of the new 
physical infrastructure they viewed as their salvation was much slower moving 
than the natural cycle of the seasons and the seemingly ever-increasing yields 
pouring out of the elds. During the wartime and immediate postwar years, 
rock aggregate for concrete could not be mined fast enough to keep up with 
demand across the province, resulting in massive delays in various construction 
projects, including the completion of Highway 400, which would not open 
until the early 1950s. Marsh growers, meanwhile, lacked the nancial resources 
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to build as much storage as they needed, stuck in a cycle perpetuated by price: As 
long as wholesale prices remained so low, farmers would not have the nancial 
resources or access to the credit required to build more storage and cooling facil-
ities, yet they would not be able to control the wholesale price by manipulating 
supply until they had access to more storage and cooling facilities. 
e storage 
shortage was so acute that the Ontario government began making various pub-
licly owned buildings available for produce storage, including several at the Ca-
nadian National Exhibition in Toronto.
Still, throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s, supply remained stubbornly 
prolic, largely uncontrollable, and thus mostly unprotable. 
is remained par-
ticularly true of the more perishable, less storable vegetables, including lettuce. 
Eventually, Holland Marsh growers would cease growing lettuce almost entirely, 
somewhat reluctantly ceding the market to subsidized growers in Quebec. Yet 
during the 1940s and 1950s, the clumsy process of specialization – an incipient 
imperative of the mass industrialization of the agricultural sector during the era 
– was still playing out in the elds. Before the farmers nally gave up on growing 
lettuce in the Marsh, much of it was ploughed back into the elds because it was 
cheaper than storing and shipping it. As one reporter described it,
According to the men who grow vegetables, selling lettuce at the price they 
receive from wholesalers (two cents a head) is an absolute losing propo-
sition. In their elds they have enough lettuce to make every housewife 
happy, at half the current price (10 to 15 cents) – but somewhere between 
the time their product is dumped on the wholesaler’s oor and the time it 
appears in a grocery store window, the price of lettuce is in line with every-
thing else. It’s high enough to keep Mrs. Toronto going all out on lettuce. 

us a surplus builds up.54
Despite the problematic nature of lettuce – or rather their problematic rela-
tionship with it – Marsh farmers were increasingly meeting the needs of “Mrs. 
Toronto” by the early 1950s. 
ough there was no unied organization to ani-
mate the collective concerns of all growers there, progress was still being made on 
developing necessary physical infrastructure – roads, storage, and icing plants. 
While still in embryonic form, these emerging technologies and infrastructure 
allowed the farmers greater control over the supply of their crops. Instead of 
glutting the local market with produce every fall, they were beginning to have 
the capacity to release it gradually, increasingly able to manipulate how long 
their crops would stay fresh and thus how far they could be transported. Grow-
ers were confronting and (partially) transcending the biophysical limitations 
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of their crops, thereby expanding the scope and number of markets available 
to them. Marsh farmers were no longer dependent only on the local market 
but could reach willing buyers across the country, from “Mrs. Saskatoon” to 
“Mrs. Halifax.”

e Holland Marsh was, if somewhat stubbornly, becoming the vision Wat-
son and Day had foreseen – a highly specialized area of horticultural production 
churning out high-quality yields through the application of modern technolo-
gies. A 1949 issue of Trade and Transportation feted “the hardworking, indus-
trious folk” of the Marsh with a special issue: “
ey are expert gardeners. 
ey 
are specialists. 
ey produce nothing but vegetables.”55 Included in the issue was 
a letter from then prime minister Louis St. Laurent addressed to the “people 
of an important Canadian industry.”56 He commended the Marsh farmers for 
“the manner in which they have so vigorously and successfully cultivated what 
was formerly a waste and apparently useless land. 
e extent to which they have 
co-operated in the application of scientic methods and in the use of modern 
equipment has resulted in a great benet to the country.”57
Conclusion
By the early 1950s, the social and physical infrastructure the Holland Marsh farm-
ers had struggled to develop was yielding two important benets. First, they had 
begun to harness the freshness of their produce as a protable biophysical attri-
bute. Freshness was improved to the extent that muck crops were arriving at their 
destinations in better shape than at any point in the history of Marsh agriculture, 
despite travelling greater distances. Previously a vulnerability, it was transformed 
into an asset to be leveraged by the farmers. Moving into the 1950s, the notion of 
freshness became both a material reality and a discursive strategy mobilized to 
develop markets, both locally and farther aeld. 
e factors contributing to this 
development – social organizing and physical infrastructure – are lost within 
more conventional approaches to the history of agriculture. Indeed, the notion 
that freshness is a produced socionatural attribute is largely taken for granted. 
Without liberal-state interventions in the form of enabling policy and funding 
supports, Marsh farmers would have continued to face profound instability. Sec-
ond, the earlier liability of volume was also transformed into an asset through the 
application of emerging technologies. Enabled by the development of improved 
cold-storage transportation and upgraded transportation infrastructure, the 
dispersal of produce over time created a kind of articial scarcity across space. 
While originally bound to nearby markets (essentially the Greater Toronto Area), 
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improvements in transportation allowed Marsh crops to be sold as novelty items 
in Halifax, Saskatoon, and New York. With the horizon of these new markets, 
Marsh produce also became a scarcer commodity in the Toronto area.
But as a result of the farmers’ work to control certain biophysical characteris-
tics of their crops, ecological contradictions of the agricultural enterprise in the 
Holland Marsh would soon begin to surface. 
is period, extending into the 
twenty-rst century, was arguably (and tragically) ushered in by the Hurricane 
Hazel ood of October 1954. Lives were lost, harvests were decimated, and elds 
were washed away. Yet despite the torrent of news coverage and commentary on 
the devastation wrought by the hurricane, no one thought to point out that the 
so-called natural disaster was, in at least equal measure, social in character. In 
other words, the Marsh had ceased to become – at least discursively – a marsh. 
To the farmers (and their customers in Toronto and across the continent), the 
Marsh was emerging as a sophisticated and technological landscape of food pro-
duction. As Maclean’s Magazine put it in 1953, it had emerged as the “biggest 
kitchen garden in the country . . . a dreary stretch of ancient lake bed . . . [trans-
formed into] . . . a black goldmine.”58 
e busy struggling of a farm community 
over two decades – through social organizing and physical infrastructure proj-
ects meant to wrangle prots out of their produced natures – had e	ectively 
erased the memory of the Holland River valley, the wetlands, and the actual 
marsh. 
e rst nature of the Marsh had been transformed into a socionatural 
agricultural landscape. Yet the contradictions on which this transformation re-
lied would soon be revealed. 
e infamous 1954 hurricane underscored in dra-
matic fashion the folly of ignoring the contradictions of nature’s production.
98
Ch a pter 4
Agricultural Modernization, Ecological Contradiction,  
and the Production of Instability, 1954–80
B y the early 1950s, the vision of the original Holland Marsh boosters had seemingly come to fruition. e disparaging imagery of the “dis-mal swamp” had been thoroughly expunged from popular imagination, 
replaced by a sanitized imaginary of domesticated, albeit slightly unruly, crops. 
At the same time, the materiality of the landscape had similarly been tamed. 
e disorderly wetland had been torn apart, drained, canalized, and reassem-
bled into orderly elds producing steady, plentiful vegetable yields. Meanwhile,
hungry and protable markets were springing up across Canada and the United 
States, made increasingly accessible by nascent storage and shipping technologies 
and providing an increase in demand for market-garden crops Marsh farmers
were only too happy to meet. In short, by the 1950s, the domesticated “smiling
farms” promised decades earlier had seemingly arrived.
While on the surface farming had never been better in the Holland Marsh, 
seeds of future challenges were being sown. From the early 1950s onward, the 
cultural and political clout growers had held in previous decades began to wane 
substantially in the context of a broader pattern of rural restructuring. Farming 
as something the majority of a large rural population did was about to change 
signicantly. As the rural population declined and fewer farmers owned increas-
ingly larger farms, a period of agricultural rationalization took hold. Following 
these broader national and global trends in agriculture during the era, growers in 
the Marsh would embrace the tenets of an aggressively productivist agriculture – 
the mechanized, chemical-dependent farming of the green revolution, with the 
promise of increased yields and the elimination of unpredictability.
e postwar agricultural system sought a “radical simplication” of farming
and farmland administration in order to make it “more directly apprehended, 
controlled, and managed.”1 is system of “high-modernist agriculture,” as some 
have called it, was mobilized through attempts to mechanize and standardize 
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processes in order to produce a more uniform, predictable biophysical nature. 
Within this context, the trend was toward the development of more durable 
crops, more ecient farming practices, and atter, more extensively drained and 
irrigated elds. e emergence of high-modernist agriculture would also usher 
in a shi
 in scale. While farming had been “global” in a nominal sense for cen-
turies, the extent to which it now moved from a local to a globally integrated 
enterprise shi
ed substantially.2
e Holland Marsh, however, while subject to these broader trends in the
political economy of agriculture, would remain somewhat insulated from them. 
e strengthening imperatives of global trade and multinational monopolistic
chemical and seed companies would aect the Marsh, but that inuence re-
fracted through the specicity of the muck socioecology. e Atlanticist food
order characterized by government support (public investment and enabling
legislation) for mass production, mass consumption, and global trade of agri-
cultural products constitutes only part of the broader historical development of 
the Marsh during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. ese grand trends in the polit-
ical economy of agriculture applied unevenly in the Marsh, given the manifest
dierence in the crops grown there. Although carrots and onions would come
to be globally traded commodities, in the immediate postwar years, muck crops 
were not nearly as integrated as grains and oil seeds.
As the Holland Marsh farmers adopted, translated, and adapted the emerging 
edicts of an increasingly productivist and globalized agriculture, they could not 
escape the associated ecological contradictions. e negative externalities and 
undervalued costs of chemical inputs and a reliance on a rapidly expanding net-
work of markets would come to have alarming consequences on Marsh farmers 
and on the surrounding environment. e ecological contradictions of intensive, 
chemical-dependent agriculture would manifest themselves in ways specic to 
the Marsh, ultimately resulting in the imposition of new regulations and protec-
tive measures as an era of environmental politics emerged.
Celebrations heralding the beginning of a new era of agriculture wrested from 
the unpredictability and limits of biophysical nature belied the ecological con-
tradictions just below the veneer. In 1953, the Lake Simcoe Conservation Club 
successfully petitioned the Ontario government to ban further development 
of the part of the Holland Marsh that extends north beyond Yonge Street (or 
Highway 11): “Any further development of the marsh as farmland will lead to 
the extinction of nesting and spawning grounds. e natural resources have de-
creased alarmingly. Further agricultural development will lead to the complete 
extinction of all sh and wildlife in the marsh.”3
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is kind of conservationist sentiment had surfaced around the Holland
Marsh much earlier. Dr. D.A. Bentley, head of the Department of Biology at 
both the University of Toronto and the Royal Ontario Museum, raised some 
concern that the original draining of the Marsh would result in the loss of im-
portant bird habitat. In a 1926 column in the Toronto Daily Star, Bentley pointed 
out that there had been no research (nor anything included in Baird’s engineer 
report) about the how draining the area would aect the resident wildlife. Ulti-
mately, Bentley concluded: “I do not think, however, that there is any cause for 
alarm in Ontario yet. . . . ere is still a great deal of territory where birds of these 
types may nd a living.”4 In contrast to this fairly reserved expression of concern, 
a far-more-critical voice of the initial drainage plan emerged about a decade later.
Bride Broder, a columnist for the Globe, wrote a scathing condemnation of 
the draining of the Holland River valley in 1937, standing in stark contrast to 
the overwhelmingly prevalent sentiment of the time:
.  .  .  the clearance of the Holland marshes looms as one of the great and 
inexcusable mistakes – to call it by no harsher name – of those who have 
the right to say what shall, and shall not, be done with this territory or that. 
e drying up of the great cisterns that nature provided for the slaking of
the thirst of the country around them, has been criminally wasteful so far
as the present is concerned; it has been actual the
 from the future. Also – 
and this should have been considered – good gardeners know that bog land,
while it yields an almost tropical luxuriance in the rst season or two . . . ,
having no substance, does not last.5
Her vivid indictment condemns the drainage project as an unmitigated en-
vironmental catastrophe, robbing future generations of the inherent benets of 
the wetland. Her reaction is at least in part a result of what many others ignored 
(willfully or otherwise) – that muck soil degrades rapidly, becoming less pro-
ductive not long a
er being brought into production and eventually subsiding 
completely.
To be sure, the ecological troubles of the kind implied by Bentley and made 
explicit by Brode began to surface in the early 1950s. And with the introduc-
tion of chemical-dependent farming in the Holland Marsh, “environmental” 
concerns moved beyond the conservationism of these critiques, becoming in-
stead internalized matters of human health, safety, and livelihood. Yet even be-
fore these ecological externalities unaccounted for in the popular celebration 
of Marsh agriculture, the arrival of Hurricane Hazel served to underscore the 
hubris of the original boosters. is storm dramatically emphasized the point 
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that nature could never really be conquered – certainly not as it was widely pre-
sumed to be.
Hurricane Hazel and Nature’s Revenge
With crops rolling o the elds as though from a well-oiled conveyor belt, farm-
ers in the Holland Marsh could be forgiven for forgetting about the fundamental 
biophysical character of the geological landscape of the pre-agricultural wetland. 
Indeed, by the early 1950s, the Marsh had been thoroughly separated (at least 
discursively) from its material referent and had emerged as the quintessential 
example of modernist, protable agriculture. e fortune of the muck growers 
was such that, just over a year before they were in desperate need of charity as 
a result of their own catastrophe, Dutch farmers there were doing well enough 
nancially to send $100,000 to aid ooded farmers in the Netherlands.6
e summer before the storm, Holland Marsh growers were being feted for
their exemplary yields and innovative applications of technology. Farmers from 
across the province descended on the Marsh in the summer of 1954 for a tour 
hosted by the edgling Ontario Soil and Crop Improvement Association. Partic-
ipants observed a phantasmagoria of bursting elds and state-of-the-art packing 
facilities.7 Poised on the “threshold of becoming the nation’s salad bowl,” as the
Globe and Mail enthused just three months before the hurricane struck the area, 
the bounty resulting from the Marsh farmers’ ostensible victory over biophysical 
nature was about to be shared across the country: “Man’s victory over limp let-
tuce with construction here of the rst vacuum cooling plant for leafy vegetables 
in Canada will soon make it possible for housewives in Vancouver and Halifax 
to buy lettuce as fresh and crisp as the day it le
 the prolic market gardens of 
the district.”8
In the midst of the harvest of yet another bumper crop, the storm gathered 
in early October 1954, as many of hurricanes do, in the Caribbean Sea. A
er 
causing signicant damage to a handful of island nations and parts of the East-
ern Seaboard of the United States, Hurricane Hazel arrived in southwestern 
and central Ontario on October 15, 1954. Initial weather reports indicated that 
the storm would dissipate on arrival in the province; however, the reverse was 
true. e storm intensied and stalled over central Ontario for the better part 
of two days. Winds of up to 110 kilometres an hour were recorded in the Greater 
Toronto Area as Hazel dropped nearly 300 millimetres of rain.
e economic toll was immense, with some estimates putting the cost of
the storm damage for Ontario at over $100 million (equivalent to $1 billion 
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in 2020).9 According to Ontario Ministry of Agriculture documents, Holland 
Marsh farmers claimed crop losses of nearly $2 million (or roughly $19 million 
today).10 Hazel’s human toll was even more brutal, leaving thousands of families 
across central Ontario homeless, and eighty-two people dead. In the Marsh, one 
person was killed, and the damage to the elds and farming infrastructure was 
nothing short of catastrophic.
Given the wetland geology of the area, much of nearly 300 millimetres of rain 
that fell from Hazel was simply absorbed into the peat, muck, and porous bed-
rock – at least initially. When the Holland Marsh became supersaturated and 
the broader Lake Simcoe watershed was unable to absorb any additional rainfall, 
water began to back up and furious ooding occurred. One long-time resident 
recounted how sudden the ooding was:
I was 15 years old. I was at home with my dad, and it had rained really hard 
for about two and a half days. But everything was still stable at 6:30. At 6:45 
the neighbour and I were out digging trenches between the houses and the 
water was up to our knees already. It was instantaneous. Our cellar lled 
with water, almost to the top step, in half an hour. ree or four young 
guys, one guy had a driver’s license, we drove out to the road, and the water 
hadn’t really risen that high. It had risen, but . . . [w]e watched the water 
rise up to the 400 [the highway]. And the cars were starting to stop. And 
the church. e church, Springdale, oated about a mile into the bank of 
the 400. .  .  . It raised the water level so fast that farmers had only about 
10 minutes to choose between to take the tractor or the truck, which was 
going to be more useful. It was unbelievable.11
e water descended on the farmland from all directions as Lake Simcoe
overowed and backed up the Holland River toward the Marsh. e canal and 
its pump system were clearly outmatched, while the dykes were easily shredded 
by the torrent of water. A postmortem of the events found that thousands of 
baskets and crates of harvested vegetables acted as a kind of buckshot, propelled 
by the force of the water and aiding it in blasting through the dykes. Within 
hours, the entire Holland River lowlands had once again become a lake. As 
the Toronto Daily Star put it three days later, “Swollen and ugly the river rose, 
washed away banks and dykes, homes and machines, smashed the puny works 
of man’s years of toil and created a lake, bringing the valley in full cycle back to 
its starting point.”12
As weather events typically are, Hurricane Hazel was framed as a “natural” 
disaster. But of course the storm was only a disaster to the extent that it damaged 
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“man’s puny work” – in as much as it aected human settlement – revealing the 
social character of the storm. e reporting in the days following, understand-
ably angry in tone, reproduced a discursive binary between nature and society 
through a demonization of the former and a lionization of the latter. e discur-
sive and material distancing of the Holland Marsh from its natural origins – a 
project decades in the making – had been eliminated in just hours. Interestingly, 
some familiar disparaging language returned to circulation with respect to the 
landscape. According to one observer, from the air, the Marsh “resembled noth-
ing so much as a huge, sluggish, mud-laden pond. . . . [T]he water lies, inert and 
paralyzing, over the richest farmland in Canada.”13
e incursion by biophysical nature – especially water here – was clearly dev-
astating to the Marsh farmers. ey had spent the better part of three decades 
constructing a landscape specically designed to control water. e canal sys-
tem, the bridges and overpasses, the dykes, and the intricate network of drainage 
ditches were all victims of the ood in their eyes. As “the muddy waters spilled 
over the proud highway that was once the province’s main road to the north,” 
more than the elds or decades of work to physically transform the landscape 
were being washed away – the Promethean vision of Day and the early Marsh 
boosters was at risk, along with the livelihoods it had come to support.14 As one 
headline put it, Hazel had turned “prosperous market gardeners [into] penniless 
refugees.”15
Eorts to regain control over the protable elds were swi
 and decisive. Ve-
hicles, hay bales, and other detritus le
 in the wake of the storm were used to 
reinforce Highway 400 into a massive dyke, used to hold the water west of the 
highway at bay while the water east of it was pumped out toward Lake Simcoe.16
Within days of the ood, pumps were own in from around Canada to begin 
the drainage work. For nearly a month and a half, an army of machines pumped 
out 170,000 gallons of water per minute, twenty-four hours per day.17 Once the 
elds were suciently drained, “operation mop up” commenced, a military-style 
undertaking to remove the mountains of water-logged, decaying vegetables; 
shattered houses and barns; and other debris. e provincial deputy minister 
of public works determined that this was “too onerous, odorous and unpleasant 
a task to be done manually,” so a eet of heavy and high-powered equipment, 
along with two thousand contract workers, were brought in to clear the elds.18
Redraining the Holland Marsh was heralded as an “engineering miracle.” Al-
though millions of bushels of onions, carrots, and potatoes were lost, the entire 
area was drained before the water could freeze, saving the following year’s sea-
son.19 Indeed, some farmers even managed to salvage some crops that had been 
Figure 4.1. Water returns to the Holland Marsh. From Bradford West 
Gwillimbury Local History Association, Governor Simcoe Slept Here (2006).
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put in storage before the storm hit. Decades-old concerns re-emerged, however, 
as biophysical nature in its pathogenic form (cholera and other water-borne dis-
ease) was feared to have returned a
er the ood through the waterlogged vege-
tables. Ultimately, a
er a mild public-health scare, the Ministry of Health ruled 
saleable “all vegetables which are normally cooked before eating, e.g., beets, po-
tatoes, carrots,” while those typically eaten raw were directed to be destroyed.20
Both the provincial and federal governments provided rapid and abundant -
nancial aid, temporary housing, and cleanup support. By the following spring, 
the vast majority of farms and farmers were prepared for the new growing season.
In the a
ermath of the ood, the provincial government established the 
Carswell-Shaw Commission to appraise the overall damage from Hurricane 
Hazel and to make recommendations to avoid similar levels of devastation in 
the future from other (inevitable) storms and oods. e commission made a 
number of recommendations that demonstrated an appreciation for the socio-
natural character of the disaster, including putting a moratorium on building in 
ood plains and establishing green-belt areas in the Humber River and Etobi-
coke Creek valleys. It further recommended that the main dyke in the Holland 
Marsh be raised forty-ve centimetres and widened enough to allow the farmers’ 
houses to be rebuilt on top, not in the low elds where they had been originally.21
e surprisingly activist recommendations from the Carswell-Shaw Com-
mission can be understood, in part, as a function of the remarkable extent of 
the damage le
 in the wake of the hurricane. Hazel was a powerful storm that 
caused signicant damage throughout the Caribbean, the United States, and 
Canada. Its severity gave political leaders, policymakers, and farmers cause to 
reexamine human-environment relations. But the recommendations of the 
report are also part of a broader context of conservationist thought percolat-
ing throughout Ontario during the late 1940s and early 1950s, foreshadowing 
farmland- preservation policies to come.
e Ontario Conservation and Reforestation Association, founded in 1936, 
had been instrumental in successfully lobbying the provincial government for 
the rst conservation legislation in the province.22 In the early 1940s, the Con-
servative government, cleaving to the le
 in response to growing popular support 
for the social-democratic Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, established 
the centralized Department of Planning and Development, which included the 
Conservation Branch. Later, in 1946, the Conservation Authorities Act was 
dra
ed to provide guidance and funding for municipalities to create local con-
servation authorities based on watershed geographies.23 is led, in 1951, to the 
formation of the Upper Holland Valley Conservation Authority – the precursor 
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to the current Lake Simcoe Region Conservation Authority – with jurisdiction 
over the Holland Marsh.
Despite the catastrophic damage from the hurricane, the commission’s rec-
ommendations, the institutional presence of the conservation authority, and 
the conservationist sentiment of the era, very little changed in terms of farming 
practice in the Holland Marsh. Within a year of the storm, human habitations 
in the Marsh – not situated on the embankments, as the commission had rec-
ommended – had returned, perhaps even grown. Very little dyke work, save for 
the most necessary repairs, was completed. e thought of abandoning farming 
in the Holland River valley was all but unthinkable. Indeed, by 1955, the Marsh 
had become the exemplar of Ontario agriculture once again, held up as a tem-
plate for wetland development from the shores of Lake Huron to the bog lands 
of northern Ontario.24 Just ve months a
er the catastrophic ooding in the 
Marsh, a Conservative Party member from Temiskaming, A.R. Herbert, regaled 
the Ontario legislature with his Promethean vision for northern Ontario, “a 
large area of some hundred square miles where black muck of the type originally 
found at Bradford await but draining and clearing to become productive of the 
same type of vegetables grown so profusely at the Holland Marsh.”25
e crops emerging from the muck elds had simply become too prolic and 
protable to consider interventions detrimental to their production. At the same 
time, the speed and determination of the Marsh farmers to clean up the damage 
from Hurricane Hazel seemed to add to the lore of the area. e Marsh emerged 
from this event solidied as a reference point for archetypal muck-crop farming, 
nally a mythical equal to Celeryville or Kalamazoo. e lessons available from 
Hazel, however, were not part of the conversation. A group of “industrious new 
Canadians from Holland and Belgium,” for example, were busy converting a 
“waste land” of a duck-hunting preserve near Lake Huron “into rich market 
garden plots” just a year a
er the devastating ooding, death, and destruction 
wrought by the hurricane in the Marsh.26
An editorial in the Toronto Daily Star just a few years later gushed excitedly 
about the “black gold rush” occurring in the Marsh. is celebratory piece put 
a ne point on the pace of the Marsh’s transformation, while speculatively ges-
turing at the frontiers of muck-crop farming:
irty years ago you could shoot wild ducks in the heart of the Holland 
Marsh, south of Bradford, and nobody would hear your shots. Twenty years 
ago you could buy land in the newly drained wilderness at a few dollars an 
acre and build a shack far from your nearest neighbour. Today you have to 
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pay over $1,000 for that acre and chances are you’ll live in a streamlined 
house as modern as Metro Toronto, complete with TV, maybe a couple of 
sleek new cars, and friendly neighbours all over the place. Tomorrow, if you 
want to join the black gold rush, you may have to buy land at the bottom of 
what is now Lake Simcoe.27
In the end, Hurricane Hazel – the anniversary of which still inspires a hand-
ful of romantic news stories mourning the death and destruction it caused and 
heralding the ultimate triumph of humans over nature – only served to reinforce 
the perspective that the landscape could be controlled. More than this, the storm 
fortied the view that the landscape should be productive and protable above 
all else. Perhaps Hazel’s gravest sin was to reintroduce an unpredictable “nature” 
back into the Holland Marsh – a trespass the farmers, with ample support from 
the state, worked diligently to rectify. e elds emerged post-Hazel as more thor-
oughly expunged of their natural origins as farmers redoubled their eorts to 
sculpt the landscape into something somehow outside of nature. By the late 1950s, 
the smiling farms imaginary was as strong as ever, with the elds emerging as a 
thoroughly technologized landscape, replete with fancy cars and colour TVs “as 
modern as Metro Toronto.” e clear message was that, despite Hazel’s unwel-
come incursion – or in part perhaps because of it – the Holland Marsh was a sani-
tized, safe, and modern site of food production – a Ford-like factory in the elds.28
Post-Hazel Renewal and the Triumph of Specialization
e timing of the Holland Marsh’s emergence as a highly productive agricul-
tural landscape, while perhaps coincidental, was not incidental. In many ways, 
farmers there were following the conventional lead in an era of productivist 
agriculture in full swing by the mid-1950s – a capital-intensive approach to 
agriculture- cum-celebration of science and technology in the pursuit of stabil-
ity, intensication, and increased yields. While prots and yields soared as a 
result, chemical, technology, and machine-dependent farming also ushered in 
the productivist treadmill – a reliance on capital-intensive inputs begat a further 
reliance on capital-intensive inputs.
e introduction of new technologies during this era was a strategy for over-
coming the “cost-prize squeeze,” a situation in which the combined costs of pro-
duction outpace increases in farm income.29 Growers confronted with this typ-
ically have two options, either lower production costs or increase yields. Many 
farmers choose to employ both tactics. As agricultural scholar Anthony Winson 
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observes, the typical strategy for escaping from the cost-price squeeze results in a 
further reliance on machines and chemicals:
For the most part, the forces pushing net farm income down were met by 
attempts to increase the volume of production on the farm with the “trac-
torization” of agriculture and a dramatic increase in the use of chemical 
sprays, it becomes possible, at lease for some, to work much more farm land 
without raising the input of increasingly expensive farm labour. e incor-
poration of ever greater volumes of chemical fertilizers and other inputs, 
such as hybrid seed varieties, helped boost yields per acre.30
Within the Holland Marsh, these pressures took on a greater acuity, given the 
intensive (rather than extensive) character of cultivation. At least part of what 
makes muck farming so protable is the scarcity of available land. e number of 
muck-soil hectares under tillage at any given point is a fraction of those of min-
eral soil under production across Ontario. is point was not lost on the Marsh 
farmers of the late 1950s. Postwar suburban expansion coupled with a rural land-
scape already largely under production served to compel would-be farmers and 
agricultural speculators to set their sights on new conquests for drainage. Given 
an increasingly crowded southern and central Ontario, the frontiers of agricul-
ture were seen to lie at the bottom of untouched swamps and lakes.
Yet muck-crop speculators eager to start the pumps were confronted with a 
shi
ing ecological paradigm, one in which the Conservation Authorities Act 
made it dicult, indeed largely impossible, to turn wetlands into new elds. 
Increasingly, the state was intervening in unfamiliar ways by placing limits on 
how and where farmers could operate. A shi
 in the character of conservation-
ism was providing a counterpoint to farming as an activity of land stewardship. 
While Day and the early Marsh boosters were seen to be “improving” the land 
with underdrainage – providing a service by bringing the land into production 
through cultivation – by the late 1950s and early 1960s, there was a change to the 
contours of “environmentalism.” Partly as a result, the era of muck-crop farming 
as a kind of extensive agriculture in Ontario had come to a close. No longer could 
new land, whether just down the road or at the bottom of a swamp, be easily had 
in Ontario, meaning that farmers were forced to focus on intensive farming – 
getting the most out of the land they did have.
With so few opportunities for investing in the creation of more land, Marsh 
farmers, for the most part, turned toward investing in their existing land as a 
way of increasing production and prots. Investments in intensication were 
made in various ways in the Holland Marsh, but the driving force behind the 
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pursuit of prots was crop specialization. e form that biophysical nature took 
(crops) and the social congurations of agriculture in the Marsh began to shi
 
to accommodate this specialization. Put dierently, what was grown and how it 
was grown began to shi
 fundamentally in the mid-1950s. Indeed, a novel eld of 
plant breeding – phytoengineering – emerged in the 1950s, the explicit intention 
of which was to design more uniform and durable produce. As two exponents of 
phytoengineering noted: “Machines are not made to harvest crops. . . . In reality, 
crops must be designed to be harvested by machine.”31
Figure 4.2 illustrates the extent to which the crop base in the Holland Marsh 
has changed since the 1950s. e dramatic shi
 in lettuce production provides a 
vivid example. While in 1954, more land in the Marsh was dedicated to lettuce 
than any other crop, very little of it is grown there today. What little lettuce 
production that does remain is not the robust iceberg variety popular in the 
1950s and 1960s, but rather mixed greens and mesclun mix, a lettuce with a much 
dierent sociocultural and political-economic prole.32
As lettuce production migrated from the Holland Marsh, almost all of it 












Sources: Department of Agriculture, “Holland Marsh Vegetables” (1954), Archives 
of Ontario, Hurricane Relief, Holland Marsh, 1954–56, B355358; Ontario Department 
of Agriculture and Food, “Announcement: Special Committee to Study Holland 
Marsh” (1967), 2, Archives of Ontario, ARDA – Holland Marsh 1967–70 B388426; 
Planscape, 2009.
Figure 4.2. Shi
ing nature and composition of crop cover, 1954–2009.
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through supportive subsidies and legislation) seemed to pursue this market to 
the extent it did – a fact that reinforces the need for far more scholarly work 
on the histories of various agricultures across Canada. But it is clear that Que-
bec did actively pursue this specialization and quickly became by far the most 
prolic lettuce-growing province in Canada. In 2011, as an example, Quebec 
produced 70 percent of the greenhouse-grown lettuce in Canada.33
For a time, however, the Holland Marsh was a lettuce juggernaut, shipping 
produce across Canada and throughout the United States. Some of the older 
farmers there remember the transition away from lettuce and point specically 
to provincial legislation as the driving force behind the change:
We all used to do lettuce and celery. When I married Tony [Bake], we grew 
lettuce and celery too. But slowly, there’s only about 2 or 3 farmers out here 
now, because Quebec kills us, because the province of Quebec understands 
the importance of feeding people, and they subsidize their Quebec farmers. 
So they can push it into our markets cheaper because they’re gonna get 
subsidized.34
Others point to ostensible qualities of the relatively fresher muck soil in Que-
bec compared to the longer-farmed Holland Marsh muck:
Quebec had much newer soil than we did, and so they had better quality. 
But for some reasons we had better celery quality than they did, but I don’t 
know the reason for that and I don’t think they do either. So we tend to 
have better celery than they do, but they have better lettuce. ere used to 
be 2,000 acres of lettuce grown here at one time.35
While crop specialization has increased over time, cultivation in the Holland 
Marsh was in some ways an exercise in specialization from the very beginning. 
e original boosters did not drain the land with the intention of growing grain 
or tomatoes or with the thought of raising cattle or sheep. e Marsh was al-
ways intended for growing primarily carrots, onions, and, to a lesser extent, cel-
ery. is is due, in part, because Day and the early boosters learned from muck 
croppers in Michigan and Ohio that these crops leveraged the biophysical and 
biochemical attributes of the soil and temperate climate to a greater extent than 
did others. e so
, peaty dirt is much gentler on carrots and onions during 
harvest. e tighter-packed, granular mineral soil tends to be more abrasive than 
muck soil, causing microscratches on these subterranean vegetables as they are 
pulled from the earth and resulting in shorter storage life. Beyond this, there 
are a number of reasons that make carrots and onions not only particularly well 
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suited to muck soil but also productive crops to grow together. One long-time 
muck-crops researcher has noted:
Onions and carrots actually are almost perfect rotation crops. It would be 
hard to pick ones that are better. One’s a monocot, one’s a dicot; the root 
structures are dierent; the chemicals, the insecticides, the insects and dis-
eases are completely dierent; the herbicides you use on them are almost 
entirely dierent. But, you’re rotating, you know; one year it’s onions, one 
year it’s carrots.36
e so-called natural advantages of the Holland Marsh and the extent 
to which specializing in carrots and onions seems like an obvious choice is 
predicated, however, on the productivist assumptions of capitalist agriculture. 
Specialization is, a
er all, rst and foremost an accumulation strategy.37 It typ-
ically makes sense, within the logic of capitalist agriculture, to concentrate 
production on a particular crop in as much as it is a way of rationalizing pro-
duction and therefore maximizing prots. In other words, there is nothing 
inevitable about the produce grown in the Holland Marsh, but rather it is the 
result of social and natural processes. Muck soil can support a wide variety of 
other crops, but none t both the biophysical and biochemical conditions of 
the soil and climate and the social constraints of prot quite so well as carrots 
and onions.
It was this socionatural conuence that caused an acceleration and intensi-
cation of crop specialization toward these two crops in the Holland Marsh from 
the 1950s through the 1970s. It was a decisive shi
 facilitated by a move toward a 
more industrial form of agriculture at a time when a edgling agro-industrialism 
was beginning to have a profound inuence on how food was grown, processed, 
sold, transported, and consumed. Science, technology, and capital were deployed 
in the elds and beyond in order to rationalize production, reduce risk, and in-
crease sales. e speed and magnitude with which biophysical nature was being 
transformed in the Marsh increased considerably under the escalating demands 
of prot. e production of nature there was about to become far more intensive 
than it had ever been.
Research, Markets, and Marketing in the Making of Muck Crops
e Experimental Station for Organic Soils was established in the Holland 
Marsh in 1946. Now called the Muck Crops Research Station, the facility has 
run essentially as an extension program of the Department of Horticulture at 
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the University of Guelph since it began, save for the few years it operated under 
the auspices of the Ontario Ministry of Agriculture and Food.38
e station extended and formalized the presence of the University of Guelph 
as established by Professor Day in the very earliest days of the Holland Marsh. 
e nearly continual presence of formalized research there is unique for agricul-
tural areas in Canada. ere are a handful of other research stations across the 
country, and most provincial governments do have some form of research-based 
agricultural-extension programs. None of these, however, are dedicated in quite 
the same way to such a specic, niche form of production targeting such a rela-
tively small geographical area.39
e station’s work ramped up in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and focused 
largely on plant pathology, pest management, and cultivar trials.40 Although its 
research has always been primarily applied work, meant to be manifest in the 
elds of the Holland Marsh, it has rarely been directly commercial. Within the 
broader political economy of global agriculture, the Marsh is of negligible value. 
So while the station does do some fee-for-service research for seed, fertilizer, and 
pesticide companies, the results are only very narrowly applicable in an applied 
sense (that is, only to other muck soils) and thus largely valueless within the logic 
of global agribusiness.
Yet within the Holland Marsh, the work of the station has been signicant 
on a number of fronts, the most important of which is through the cultivar-trials 
program, which began in the early 1960s. Although commercial interest in plant 
germplasm dates to at least the late nineteenth century, the biotechnology rev-
olution in agriculture arrived much later.41 Famously, in 1951, James Watson 
and Francis Crick succeeded in identifying and isolating deoxyribonucleic acid, 
DNA, the crucial genetic material that, among other things, transmits genetic 
information responsible for inherited traits. In the millennia previous to Wat-
son and Crick, agriculturalists slowly adapted crops (either intentionally or not) 
through the selection of seed from plants with desirable qualities – high yield-
ing, robust to cold, resistant to drought, and so forth. With the discovery of 
DNA and the subsequent development of techniques to manipulate it, scientists 
could begin creating changes in seed germplasm by direct manipulation at the 
molecular level.
While the station does not conduct genetic modication onsite, their cultivar 
trials are designed to test genetically modied seeds on behalf of various compa-
nies. Every spring it will typically grow dozens of dierent kinds of carrots and 
onions to test which ones perform best. e seeds, supplied by various compa-
nies that pay to have the station run these cultivar trials are designed to express 
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various protable traits.42 Both time and form are particularly important in this 
respect. As farmers in the Marsh were swapping out lettuce for carrots and on-
ions in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the edgling cultivar trials were facilitating 
a further specialization within this narrower crop selection. Not only were fewer 
kinds of vegetables being grown but also fewer varieties of each vegetable. As 
demanded by an increasingly commercialized, industrialized agriculture of the 
1960s, desirable traits in cultivars moved away from taste toward uniformity, 
colour, resistance to pests, durability in storage and shipping, and rapid growing 
time. One long-time, multigenerational farmer candidly admitted:
One of the things [about]  .  .  . a carrot grown in the muck, peat, mostly 
muck peat type soil, [it] is a lot tastier than anything else you get out there. 
If you grow the right variety. Unfortunately, we’re growing varieties that 
you could drop on the oor and the carrot won’t break, because we me-
chanically harvest and all that. It looks nice, but it doesn’t taste all that 
great sometimes. Most of our carrots, some of our carrots, I wouldn’t even 
eat them. It’s just got that . . . . [T]hey look great, but they don’t have the 
taste. en other varieties that we grow, man, I can’t stop eating them. But 
you grow them because that’s what the store [buys] . . . [T]hey like a nice 
looking carrot right?43
e station does not formally endorse any particular cultivar, though grades 
are assigned for discrete qualities (uniformity of shape, colour, overall appear-
ance) as well as overall performance (storability, durability) for each. In addition, 
qualitative descriptions of the mature vegetable are provided for each trial. e 
evaluation notes for the trial of a brand of carrot seed called Achieve included 
these comments: “Good length & width, Good smoothness, Good weight, Ta-
pered & full tips, Good appearance, Uniformity of shape a little uneven, Fair 
exterior colour but a little uneven, Extra-large core size, Cavity spot slightly 
noticeable, Poor to average interior blending, Red ring around core (40–80%), 
Translucency throughout the core (20–80%).”44
e results of the cultivar trials are presented at the annual Muck Vegeta-
ble Growers Conference and are also compiled into a he
y annual report pub-
lished by the University of Guelph. e farmers’ process for deciding which 
seeds to grow from year to year is based on a variety of calculations, with great 
weight given to the results of the station’s cultivar trials. It is very unlikely that 
a farmer would use seed that had not been through this process and equally as 
unlikely that a manufacturer would attempt to introduce a new variety of seed 
into the Marsh without having it tested rst. In this respect, the station can be 
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understood as an intermediary between the broader political economy of seed 
manufacture (and agribusiness more generally) and the Marsh farmers.
e presence of the station is in many ways the embodiment of the productivist 
ethic gathering during the late 1950s and early 1960s. It functioned (and continues 
to function) as a site of translation between the global imperatives of commer-
cial, industrialized agriculture and the in situ specicity of muck-crop farming. 
In addition to the cultivar trials, the station also conducts “minor use” testing 
on chemical fertilizers and pesticides. With funding from Agriculture and Agri-
Food Canada, it examines the applicability and ecacy of various pest and nutri-
ent treatments – chemicals originally designed for use on larger-scale cash crops, 
such as corn or soybeans – on muck crops. ere is no nancial incentive for the 
manufacturers of agrochemicals to go through the lengthy process of registering a 
product for use on a crop of niche production, so the state facilitates this by paying 
research stations to do the work. In this respect – through minor-use testing on 
carrots and onions – the Muck Crops Research Station has made a signicant 
contribution to the attempts to build stability not only in the Holland Marsh but 
also beyond to other muck-crop areas in Ontario, Quebec, and elsewhere.
Consumer Tastes and the Postwar Diet
Attempts to optimize nature in the Holland Marsh also emerged, at least in 
part, beyond the elds. e postwar years brought a signicant shi
 – qualita-
tively and quantitatively – in consumer demand. At the dinner table, this was 
expressed as a demand for an idealized form of prepackaged freshness and conve-
nience. As nature’s biophysical form was manipulated into uniformity through 
phytoengineering, it was also increasingly sculpted to meet consumer expecta-
tions of freshness, nutrition, and authenticity, characteristics easily discursively 
fused onto the carrots, onions, and celery grown in the Marsh.
Increasingly, consumer expectations were mediated through the emergence 
of retail grocery chains and mass-market advertising. In the case of the food 
from the Holland Marsh, large chain stores invoked science in advertisements 
as a way of adding gravitas and authority to their claims of freshness. An ad 
typical of the era, from the grocery chain Dominion, reads: “Science assures 
you quality-controlled freshness. . . . rough scientic quality-control aided by 
‘round the clock refrigeration’ .  .  . Dominion is able to maintain the exclusive 
standard of freshness your family deserves!”45 Ads like these had the eect of se-
miotically reinforcing the notion that the Marsh had transcended its murky or-
igins to emerge as a domesticated and sanitized site of scientic food production. 
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More than this even, the implication is that freshness, while perhaps a charac-
teristic inherent to vegetables, exists insuciently in nature. Only through the 
application of science and technology can its full potential be realized.
For farmers in the Holland Marsh, there was some limited truth to this pro-
ductivist narrative. As growers began shipping to markets farther away in order to 
avoid glutting local markets and driving down prices, time (particularly in the be-
ginning) was not on their side. Unlike cash crops that hold value with relative sta-
bility over time – grains and oil seeds that can be easily stored for long periods of 
time – the fresh produce rolling o the Marsh elds has a much shorter shelf life 
and is much heavier and trickier to ship, all of which makes its transport more ex-
pensive. Time as a characteristic of biophysical nature – how long it takes a given 
piece of produce to lose freshness – became a serious concern for Marsh farmers 
within the context of shi
ing consumer expectations in the postwar years.
rough a combination of cultivar trials, which sought to breed traits that 
would extend a vegetable’s shelf life and make it more resistant to damage during 
harvest and transport, and improvements in packing, shipping, and storage tech-
nologies, growers were able to manipulate their crops to be more resistant to time 
and space. ese interventions ensured, or at least increased the chances, that the 
carrots, onions, and celery emerging from the Marsh met the expectations of con-
sumers in an increasingly competitive marketplace. Indeed, long before the con-
temporary Holland Marsh Gold branding scheme had been conceived, “Holland 
Marsh” was a term very o
en leveraged as a competitive advantage. Invoking the 
Marsh was a way of semiotically fusing idealized notions of a sanitized, modern-
ized nature to vegetables through advertising. Carrots became “Holland Marsh 
carrots” and onions “Holland Marsh onions” in order to capitalize on the natural 
imaginary of the area – very carefully cra
ed and purged of the invocation of wet-
lands, swamps, mosquitoes, and the like. During this era of high- productivism, 
consumers wanted their nature with a dose of sterilizing modernism.
As farmers organized production around meeting commercially mediated 
imaginaries of what various crops ought to look like, they were altering the 
composition of biophysical nature within the Marsh. And as they sought to do 
so in as ecient and protable way possible, they also transformed their own 
material practices.
Modernization and Mechanization in the Holland Marsh
Emerging high-tech crops and shi
ing consumer expectations in the immedi-
ate postwar period created changes to the material practices of farming in the 
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Holland Marsh. Since the very beginning, the materiality of the muck landscape 
had demanded customized applications of technology. Mass-manufactured 
equipment tended to be too large and heavy for the boggy elds of the Marsh. 
e typical tractor was unt for a variety of reasons – the chassis was too heavy, 
the axles were too narrow, and the tires were too thin, among others – all of 
which would result in it sinking into the muck, which happened many times in 
the earliest years of farming in the Marsh. As a result, many of the machines used 
there, from spraying equipment to onion harvesters, were o
en heavily modied 
by Marsh farmers. e specic mechanical demands of the muck soil have even 
spawned a cottage industry of sorts, with at least two light-equipment modiers 
operating within the boundary of the canal.
Previous to the era of high productivism, however, agriculture in the Holland 
Marsh was largely a low-tech, stoop-labour family aair. Many made do working 
two- or ve-hectare parcels of land, by hand, and selling their produce to packers 
in the Marsh or to grocers in Toronto. But as demand increased, costs rose, and 
growers looked to produce a more ecient, uniform biophysical nature, farming 
changed signicantly in the Marsh. Two companies, in particular, were respon-
sible for ushering in the productivist paradigm to farming in the Marsh in the 
early 1960s – Federal Farms Limited and Hardee Farms.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, nonfarmers from Toronto founded both companies. 
Philip and Morris Latchman formed Federal Farms Limited in 1948, while 
Abraham Dees, a “farm-born city slicker,” founded Hardee Farms Limited in 
1954.46 In 1970, Federal Farms would restructure in an attempt to deal with 
cash-ow issues and emerge as Federal Diversiplex Limited. Later that decade, 
in 1978, Federal Diversiplex and Hardee would merge, creating COBI Food 
Services Incorporated, a food manufacturing and distribution company still in 
operation, though with no discernable presence in the Holland Marsh. While 
their tenure was short, Hardee Farms and Federal Farms had a signicant and 
lasting eect on the Marsh.
Both Dees and the Latchman brothers were considered “collar and tie” farm-
ers, more businessmen than agriculturalists, feted in the popular and industry 
press for bringing “sophistication” to farming and making the “muck bloom” 
through “super-mechanization.”47 e Latchmans’ bona des came from their 
background as middlemen – buying low in and around the Holland Marsh and 
selling high in Toronto. ey were disciples of the new freshness and marketing 
paradigms and wanted to turn the Marsh into a climate-controlled conveyor 
belt of picture-perfect carrots, onions, and celery. In an address to a group of 
nanciers and nancial analysts in New York City in 1962, Morris assured the 
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crowd, “please remember that we are not farmers in the business of farming. We 
are merchandisers in the business of farming. We were experienced in product 
movement, marketing and distribution in the vegetable industry long before we 
planted our rst stalk of celery.”48
Both Hardee and Federal poured vast amounts of capital into farming in 
the Holland Marsh in an eort to rationalize and modernize production to the 
greatest extent possible. Indeed, overextending cash ows and alienating them-
selves from potential investors would ultimately undo both companies. In the 
early 1960s, however, both were ush with capital. Hardee Farms owned over $5 
million worth of muck elds, spread throughout the Marsh, southern Quebec, 
and parts of Florida. ey also owned state-of-the-art processing facilities in 
both Canada and the United States. Foreshadowing the nancialization of ag-
riculture to come, Hardee raised the capital required for such prolic holdings 
by becoming, in 1960, the rst farm business in Canada to be publicly traded on 
the Toronto Stock Exchange.49
Federal Farms, meanwhile, owned about 450 hectares in the Holland Marsh, 
a signicant landholding given that most farmers operated on ve-to-ten-hectare 
plots in the 1960s. Even today, many families there make due with forty-to-
eighty-hectare tracts of land. Federal also processed roughly half of the produce 
grown in the Marsh, as well as vegetables from around North America at their 
facility there, then shipped to supermarkets throughout Canada and the United 
States. Indeed, in the early 1960s, Federal’s main business was to supply super-
market chains with “a constant, day in day out source of fresh vegetables for their 
shelves, in enormous quantities.”50 In an audacious media stunt meant to display 
its agricultural mastery, Federal Farms became the rst company to ship Marsh 
produce overseas, sending two thousand cases of celery to Britain in 1963.51
Both companies aggressively sought to transform the Holland Marsh through 
research and development and the introduction of emerging technologies. Hard-
ee’s activities in this respect were largely centred on water management in muck 
soil through the development of a hydrological system that could allegedly “keep 
one step ahead of alternating oods and droughts.”52 e operation was designed 
with the ability to oscillate between drainage and irrigation, able to meet both 
demands with a single system. e company also developed techniques to ma-
nipulate water levels to warm the muck soil when there was risk of frost or un-
seasonably cold weather.
Federal’s innovations, arguably more signicant and lasting, resulted in some 
fundamental changes in the ways in which produce in the Holland Marsh is 
processed, distributed, and sold. ree in particular have le
 an indelible mark 
Figure 4.3. Bushel baskets (A) were supplanted by the now omnipresent pallet box 
(B). A, courtesy of the Bradford West Gwillimbury Public Library; B, by the author.
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on muck-crop farming in the Marsh. First, one of the most enduring contri-
butions of Federal was its adoption of the pallet box, which Latchman argued 
“revolutionized production” in the Marsh and “made high-speed, ecient pro-
duction line operation possible.”53 Although the pallet box is now omnipresent 
on the Marsh landscape, previous to 1960 all produce there was stored in either 
bushel baskets or light wooden crates (see Figure 4.3). Before the pallet box, veg-
etables were handpicked and dropped into these baskets and crates. ese were 
then picked up, again by hand, and carried over and li
ed on to a atbed trailer. 
e baskets would then be brought to either a processing or storage facility. For 
storage, they would be lined up in rows or sometimes very carefully stacked, 
though this was risky, given the imsy materials with which they were made. 
In the processing facility, they would be moved around and emptied by hand, 
then sent back into the elds to be relled. is was all done manually because 
neither the bushel baskets nor the crates were conducive to mechanization, for a 
tractor or forkli
 could not pick up and move a bushel basket without crushing 
it – besides, using a piece of heavy machinery to pick up a bushel basket of onions 
is overkill when a worker can easily do it manually. In short, the baskets and light 
crates were incongruent with mechanization.
On the other hand, the pallet box was custom designed for the era of mech-
anization. Its adoption considerably sped up the process of harvesting, and 
transportation and storage became far more ecient. Importantly, the boxes 
also enabled mechanical harvesting. Once Federal brought the pallet box to the 
Marsh, onions and carrots could be mechanically harvested directly into the 
container, which was already loaded onto a atbed trailer. With a holding ca-
pacity of roughly a tonne, each pallet box can be ooaded with a forkli
 and 
whisked away to either a storage facility or a processing line. In storage, they can 
be vertically stacked without damaging any produce and in such a way as to take 
advantage of nearly every square metre of storage space.
e most important consequence of using the pallet box, however, was the 
eect it had on the speed of production. e laborious process of lling, moving, 
and packing bushel baskets and light crates by hand was eliminated. Suddenly, 
a tonne of onions could by swept away by a machine, moved around with ease, 
processed, stacked in cold storage, or loaded onto a truck with the pull of a lever. 
As Morris Latchman proudly put it, “For the layman, the best analogy I can 
draw is this: the pallet box has been to Federal Farms, what the airplane has 
been to travel.”54
e second important innovation Federal introduced to the Holland Marsh 
was vacuum cooling. e company did not invent the technology, but it was the 
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majority owner of Brad-Vac Cooling Company Limited, the rst vacuum-cooling 
plant of its kind in Canada. rough this subsidiary, Federal was also the Cana-
dian patent-rights holder for a cooling technique used primarily on lettuce and 
celery. All vegetables begin to degrade the moment they are harvested. Once the 
“eld heat” is removed, however, the degrading process slows considerably. e 
quicker a vegetable can be cooled, the less it will degrade. Brad-Vac initially had 
the capacity to chill eight thousand heads of lettuce in twenty minutes in the 
early 1960s, in the process extending their shelf life from two to three days to 
ve to seven days. is represented an enormous competitive advantage for the 
farmers who could aord to use the facility.
For lettuce, in particular, this was a revolutionary technology. A ckle, deli-
cate, and labour-intensive crop was made far more robust by the advent of rapid 
cooling. Indeed the Brad-Vac plant made it possible for Marsh farmers to seek 
markets for their produce far beyond the Greater Toronto Area. By the early 
1960s, Federal was shipping lettuce across a wide swath of North America, from 
the Rocky Mountains to Newfoundland and Labrador and throughout the east-
ern and midwestern United States. As Morris Latchman estimated in a speech 
to Wall Street nanciers, “With Brad-Vac, our market has expanded from two 
million people to 100 million.”55
A third technology that fundamentally changed farming in the Holland 
Marsh was polyethylene. Similar to the vacuum-cooling process, food-grade 
plastic wrap helps prolong the freshness in vegetables. By the late 1950s, many 
Marsh farmers and businesses were wrapping everything from lettuce to carrots 
and onions in polyethylene. As with the pallet box and rapid cooling, Federal 
Farms did not invent food-grade polyethylene, though they did have the capital 
to become an early adopter of the technology and certainly served to popularize 
its use throughout the Marsh. Using plastic wrap to prepackage vegetables was 
primarily a way for farmers to appeal to discerning postwar consumers and the 
ascendant grocery chains looking for freshness (or at least the appearance of 
it). e plastic packages were convenient for the chain stores to purchase and 
display and attractive to customers in an era of modern, sanitized consumerism, 
giving a sense of uniformity, predictability, and freshness. Polyethylene helped 
expunge just a little more of the feral “nature” from the produce of the Marsh. 
As Morris Latchman put it, “our idea was that packaged vegetables should be 
of consistent quality year-round – just like a can of soup is consistent, no matter 
what season.”56
Each of these interventions, in their own way, was ultimately meant to pro-
duce a “better” nature – a fresher, more durable, more attractive, and ultimately 
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more standardized and predictable consumer product. Although they may not 
have understood it as such, Dees and the Latchman brothers were dealing in the 
complexity of the production of socionatures. e innovations they introduced 
to the Holland Marsh were meant to transcend the limitations of biophysical 
nature and conventional farmland while trading on an imaginary of modernized 
crops in an eort to shape and appease postwar consumer demands for sanitized 
freshness.
By the time Federal Farms and Hardee Farms merged in the late 1970s, the 
Holland Marsh had been transformed into an industrial-agricultural landscape, 
a highly mechanized and rationalized space producing increasingly homogenous 
crops. But transformations of this kind are rarely benign. Instead, capital and 
technology-heavy investments tend to be accompanied by an inherent contradic-
tion – the so-called negative externalities of production. As the rst industrialists 
of the Marsh were ostensibly modernizing the elds, they were also inadvertently 
accelerating the degradation of the very conditions they required for production.
e Gathering Contradictions of Agricultural Modernization
If business was good on the Holland Marsh previous to Hurricane Hazel, it 
was spectacular a decade a
er the storm. Weather persisted as a minor irritant 
from time to time and had some minor eects on seasonal yields and price, but 
the many technological, capital-intensive investments made were managing 
to control the biophysical nature of the elds enough to allow for widespread 
prots. But if these were the halcyon days of the Marsh, the peace and prot 
belied the growing contradictions of productivist, chemical-heavy, and intensive 
agriculture.
Indeed, by the mid-1960s, social and ecological relations in the Holland 
Marsh were showing signs of stress. Shi
ing labour demands there, as a result 
of mechanization and the associated proliferation of packinghouses, eliminated 
jobs in the elds but created them in the factory. Federal Farms and other compa-
nies, including River Gardens and United Farms, engaged in a noteworthy and 
very public battle with unionized employees striking for better conditions and 
wages. e increasingly powerful companies attempted to invoke a still-existent 
clause in labour law that denied farm labourers the right to collectively organize 
and bargain. e Ontario Labour Relations Board ruled against them, however, 
determining that packinghouse employees were not farm workers since they did 
not actually work on farms.57 Its decision in the original case led by Federal 
Farms read, in part, “With respect to its plant operations the Board nds that 
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the respondent is not engaged in agriculture or horticulture but rather that the 
respondent is engaged in a commercial enterprise of preparing vegetable produce 
for market.”58 In other words, the employees who worked in the processing facil-
ities and packing plants were factory workers and thus had the right to organize 
their labour and collectively bargain with the employer. is victory, while im-
portant, was ultimately temporary. Within years of the ruling, the imperatives 
of global agriculture would result in the consolidation and elimination of many 
processing and packing facilities in the Marsh and throughout Ontario. e 
recent closure, then partial reopening of the tomato processing plant in Leam-
ington, Ontario, puts a ne point on the continued instability of Ontario-based 
vegetable processing in an era of global, industrialized agriculture.59
In addition to labour strife, other socioecological issues emerged in the 1960s. 
For the rst time in the history of the Holland Marsh, there was concern for the 
muck soil itself. ere had been eeting anxiety subsequent to Hurricane Hazel 
(and other minor ood events) over the fact that the soil was carried from the 
western part of the marsh toward the eastern end as the water drained, creating 
an unequal distribution of wealth, as it were. ese concerns were quickly al-
layed as the piles of muck were evenly distributed with trucks and tractors. By 
the mid-1960s, however, the fears were more systemic, related to the longer-term 
sustainability of the soil. In 1963, the Ontario Agricultural College (OAC) at the 
University of Guelph found that the muck was subsiding at a rate of 3.3 centi-
metres per year, “a high rate of subsidence,” especially given that the ground was 
frozen solid ve months a year.60 e authors emphasized that this rate equalled 
around 30 centimetres every ten years, “a substantial and serious loss of organic 
soils whose average depth is 3
 [nearly 92 centimetres] or less.”61
Researchers posited that a well-designed water-management program could 
reduce the rate of soil loss and extend the productive life of the Marsh. In 1967 
(a
er yet another signicant ood), a special committee was struck, headed by a 
coauthor of the subsidence study, Dr. Ross Irwin. It was charged with the task of 
studying “all aspects of the drainage of the Holland Marsh, notably, (1) pumping 
facilities, (2) interior centre drainage (Holland River), (3) interior main drainage 
network, (4) use of drainage and irrigation water, (5) dykes, (6) soil depletion, 
[and] (7) ood control.”62 It is unclear what, if anything, ever materialized from 
this or the proposed study. It is telling however that the special committee, which 
was assembled specically to investigate the problem of subsidence in the Marsh, 
was not instructed to investigate the role of farming and cultivation activities. 
Subsidence is, a
er all, a distinctly socionatural phenomena – the product of 
water and wind erosion and the natural decay of organic matter in the muck soil, 
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though hastened signicantly by the human activities of intensive cultivation. 
e committee members clearly prioritized farming preservation over farmland 
or landscape preservation.
Other ecological contradictions were beginning to be exposed by the late 
1960s and early 1970s as well. Following growing concern regarding the use of 
chemical pesticides inspired by Rachel Carson’s ground-breaking 1962 mono-
graph, Silent Spring, the use of DDT was severely restricted in Canada on Janu-
ary 1, 1970. Biologists were debating the extent to which the bioaccumulation of 
DDT in sh in Lake Simcoe was cause for concern, but researchers were having 
trouble securing funding from the provincial or federal governments to study 
the actual Holland Marsh soil for signs and implications of harmful pesticides.63
A lifetime resident of Bradford oered a powerful anecdote about pesticide use 
on the Marsh during this era:
Well, it requires a tremendous amount of fungicides and a tremendous 
amount of insecticides to grow the crops they do. Me, personally, two 
friends of mine I went to high school with . . . were at a place out near the 
400. And for that time in the 1950s they really were paying well. I was too 
young, I couldn’t get a job. And I’m glad I didn’t. If I did, I would be dead 
now, I think. Because they carried the weed killer in the sprayer on their 
back. And they never wore a shirt. And their bodies took on the liquids. 
One guy died in his 40s and the other guy died when he was 55. Both died 
of liver failure, you know. And they used open tractors and sprayers. Even 
now we walk on one of the canals, my wife and I. And if you see a tractor 
two miles away or a mile away, you can smell that stu.64
Although the Marsh was initially given special permission by the provincial 
government to continue using DDT a
er the onset of the January 1970 ban, 
eventually, the chemical was disallowed everywhere. Regardless, a variety of 
other sources of contamination were already beginning to be highlighted as prob-
lematic in and around the Marsh. From health risks associated with parathion, 
a chemical used to replace DDT, through to nitrogen and phosphorus runo 
causing algal bloom outbreaks on Cook’s Bay and Lake Simcoe, the ecological 
contradictions of muck-crop farming were becoming increasingly apparent.65
Not to be overlooked, issues related to the discursive and material expan-
sion of the Greater Toronto Area began to appear in the Holland Marsh in the 
1970s. Real-estate ads from the growing town of Bradford boasted of newly built 
homes “only minutes from Hwys 400 and 85. Situated on a 2-acre lot with a 
magnicent view of Holland Marsh.”66 Torontonians, meanwhile, were urged to 
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explore the “other Yonge Street” – the section that grazes the northern end of the 
Marsh – in the weekend section of the Toronto Star.67 ese physical corridors 
linking the city with the Marsh – Yonge Street and Highway 400 – so o
en 
used to move produce, were increasingly used to facilitate a growing leisure econ-
omy of day-tripping Torontonians. Idealized, bourgeois conceptions of pastoral 
agriculture bumped up against the reality of an urbanizing countryside – one 
day-tripper noted in a letter to the editor their “shock and dismay” at seeing a 
billboard erected on the side of Highway 400 in the Marsh, which imposed a 
“disastrous eect [on the] beautiful landscape.”68
ese emerging conicts at the intersection of peri-urban agriculture and 
suburban expansion compelled the province, for the rst time, to hire research-
ers to investigate land-use planning and agricultural acreage. e growing reali-
zation that suburban expansion was bumping up against farmland, with urban 
residents using the countryside as a recreational amenity, by the late 1970s, led 
the province to begin taking the issue of farmland preservation seriously for the 
rst time.69
Conclusion
Beginning in the mid-1950s, the contradictions of the attempts to fully rational-
ize, standardize, and sanitize production in the Holland Marsh began to mani-
fest in and around the elds. e dramatic events of Hurricane Hazel provided 
an opportunity for a recalibration of agriculture there, though instead eorts to 
tame the landscape were redoubled, and the techniques of modernist, productiv-
ist agriculture were intensied. At the same time, a nascent environmentalism 
was emerging, leading the provincial and federal governments to begin under-
standing wetlands as places to conserve, not drain and farm, while also directing 
more scrutiny at the practice of industrialized, chemical-intensive agriculture.
Without the option of simply making more farmland – one available in de-
cades previous – farmers sought to get more out of existing land, to make na-
ture work “harder, faster, and better.”70 Innovations introduced to the Holland 
Marsh by Dees and the Latchman brothers sought to harness biophysical nature 
in order to intensify production, increase control, and ultimately maximize prof-
its. At the same time, commercially mediated imaginaries of nature played into 
the material changes in the elds as farmers responded to an emerging postwar 
food aesthetic.
By the 1970s, the contradictions of capitalist agriculture began to manifest 
in earnest. As growers intensied production, they also deepened the extent to 
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which they were drawing on the conditions of production – the soil was sub-
siding, the water was contaminated, and the health of the human and nonhu-
man ecologies were beginning to decline. In sum, the emerging socionatural, 
political, and economic challenges the Holland Marsh was facing heading into 
the 1980s were symptoms of the gathering contradictions of an unsustainable, 
capitalist agriculture coupled with the ascendant pressures of an urbanizing 
countryside. Productivist farming had resulted in more prot on the Marsh, 
but it also created an agriculture that was more dependent on capital, chemicals, 
and proprietary research and technology. Any recollections of the Marsh as a 
wetland or lessons from Hurricane Hazel were, by the late 1970s, distant mem-
ories. Production continued to increase unabated, though the socioecological 
contradictions kept piling up.
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Crisis and the (Re)production of the Holland Marsh, 1980–Present
T he industrial logic underpinning global agriculture begin-ning in the late 1940s hit full stride by the late 1990s. Capital-intensive, input-reliant, and long-haul agriculture of the so-called green revolution 
emerged as the de facto approach to farming in the last decades of the twen-
tieth century. Increasingly, this operative logic was becoming edict – farmers 
unwilling to subscribe to the rules of industrial agriculture had little chance of 
success. Technologies developed in the 1960s and 1970s related to seed manipu-
lation and cooling, storing, and shipping fresh produce had been improved and 
widely dispersed by the 1980s, making “distance and durability” the new pivot 
of an emerging global agricultural system.1 By the early 1980s, produce from the 
Holland Marsh was whipping around the world in ways Professor Day would 
not have dared dream.
A new international division of agriculture emerged during this period, ca-
tering to year-round access to fresh produce for auent consumers in the Global 
North coming from farms largely in the Global South.2 As agricultural capital 
relocated to climates in which two or even three harvests of fresh produce per 
year could be had, a host of what food and agriculture scholar Harriet Fried-
mann has labelled “New Agricultural Countries” emerged.3
is resulted in traditionally more perishable crops becoming more fully in-
tegrated into global exchange markets than they ever had been before, meaning 
that Holland Marsh farmers were brought into competition with growers from 
around the world. e uneasy reality of trade liberalization created downward 
pressure on prices due to low-cost carrot and onion imports from California and 
later China. Pressures from rapid suburbanization, increasing (and increasingly 
public) concerns over pollution and contamination from the elds, the compulsion 
to adopt new technologies, and a dramatic shi in regional regulatory regimes 
have all complicated the prospect of muck-crop farming over the past forty years.
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A profound change in the Holland Marsh, beginning in the 1980s, is the 
extent to which the area became subject to external scrutiny, including, impor-
tantly, the arrival of farmland-protection policies. Previously, farmers in the 
Marsh, while a curiosity to many outsiders, were able to operate largely free of 
public scrutiny. But this rapidly changed for two reasons. First, negative exter-
nalities of intensive agriculture began to manifest themselves in the elds of 
the Marsh and beyond. As human and nonhuman health deteriorated in and 
around the area, state and quasi-state actors moved in to regulate and impose 
limits on agricultural production there. e liberal state, in other words, came 
to amend its laissez-faire position with respect to farming and began imposing 
restrictions on production in the elds of the Marsh – an attempt to mitigate the 
contradictions of nature’s production. Second, the rapid suburbanization of the 
countryside brought the city closer to the Marsh and vice versa, both materially 
and semiotically, thus creating points of tension between the rural farmers and 
their urban consumers. In this respect, land-use planning and local urban poli-
tics became intimately entangled with food and farming.
e growers’ strategy (gamely facilitated by burgeoning corporate research,
development, and biotechnology sectors) for coping with these colliding pres-
sures has been to nd ways to enlist biophysical nature in the agricultural pro-
cess in ever more ecient ways – a search to control biophysical nature with 
increasing precision in order to get the very most out of the declining soil. 
Higher-than-average crop yields have been a feature of Marsh agriculture since 
Day’s rst test plots. But the political economy of agriculture was far dier-
ent in the 1920s than it was in the 1980s and beyond. As farming in the Marsh 
approached the new millennium, the stakes for choosing the right seeds, pest 
treatments, and crop-monitoring regime were never higher.
Yet while the pressures of capitalist agriculture permeated the Holland 
Marsh, it was an uneven, incomplete inltration. Despite the best eorts of a 
multitude of farmers, engineers, and planners to corral, contort, and control the 
biophysical landscape over the decades, nature continued to be unpredictable. 
Weather was too wet or too dry, too hot or too cold. Water transgressed dykes, 
backed up pumps, and ooded elds. Equally important, social and material 
limits in the form of conservation regulation and legislation, starting in earnest 
in the early 1990s, have also shaped the production of nature in the Marsh. e 
politics of environmental conservation and rehabilitation have imposed a new 
production paradigm, led to material changes in the elds, and even called into 
question the future of farming in the Holland Marsh.
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Menacing Fields and the Unmaking of “Smiling Farms”
By the early 1980s, the contradictions of chemical-dependent capitalist agricul-
ture were beginning to be exposed in the Holland Marsh. e generous use of 
synthetic fertilizers, fungicides, and pesticides over the decades had led to some 
decidedly undesirable yields that were beginning to aect the health of the land, 
water, and people in and around the Marsh. e pathologies – symptomatic 
of the widespread adoption of productivist agriculture – were revealed to an 
increasingly anxious public in a litany of dire news headlines throughout the 
early 1980s. In the rst few years of the decade, the bad news from the Marsh was 
seemingly endless, and headlines departed distinctly from the “smiling farms” 
narrative of the original boosters in the 1920s. e more alarming of them: “Hol-
land Marsh Widely Polluted, Report Says”; “Simcoe’s Fishing Future Gloomy”; 
“Birth Defects High in the Holland Marsh”; and “Probe Rural Birth Defects.”4
ese reports displaced the idyll of milk-fed, hardworking farmers and
high-yield carrots and onions with a far-bleaker tale of toxic farms, polluted 
lakes, dying sh, and human birth anomalies. e emerging disasters seriously 
challenged the identity of the Holland Marsh as a unique local getaway or as a 
site of pristine, natural peri-urban farming. Instead, its biophysical nature was 
cast as a threatening, menacing force, demonstrating once again the tangled dis-
cursive and material character of the production of nature.
e Holland Marsh’s bucolic imaginary began to be challenged in earnest
when a Newmarket-area pediatrician contacted the York Region’s medical of-
cer of health in the summer of 1978 to express his concern over “the apparent 
high number of congenital anomalies among infants born to families in the 
Holland Marsh area.”5 At the ocer’s request, researchers at the University of 
Toronto and various regional health authorities conducted a feasibility study 
to determine whether a full-scale community-health survey of the Marsh area 
should be launched.
Even before these medical authorities caught on, evidence of chemical con-
tamination had already been mounting. A peer-reviewed article published in 
the Journal of Economic Entomology in 1978 found high levels of DDT, banned 
a decade previous, in the soil and water of the Holland Marsh.6 To be clear, this 
was not the result of recent use, but rather a legacy of the pesticide’s prior use. 
at it remained in perceptible concentrations long aer the ban went into eect 
is a testament to the chemical’s persistence. Additionally, the organophosphorus 
compounds ostensibly designed as safer alternatives to DDT (many of which,
including parathion, malathion, and diazinon, have been banned or restricted
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in recent years) were discovered to be rapidly accumulating at dangerous levels 
in the water and soil of the Marsh and beyond. e ndings from this 1978 
study were more or less conrmed by Ministry of Environment scientists in an 
in internal, unpublished memo.7
Despite accumulating evidence of chemical contamination, nding that the 
dierences in congenital abnormalities in the Holland Marsh and the control 
areas were “statistically signicant,” and determining that the Marsh (in partic-
ular West Gwillimbury) was a “high risk” area for birth defects, the authors of 
the feasibility study ultimately concluded that an exhaustive community-health 
survey was not warranted.8 Instead, they seemed to opt for a “wait and see” ap-
proach. Meanwhile, presumably to cast some doubt on the ndings that the 
Marsh constituted a high-risk area for birth anomalies while distancing them-
selves from the potential fallout, ocials at both the Ministry of the Environ-
ment and the Ministry of Agriculture publicly challenged aspects of the very 
study they had a part in producing.9 is is perhaps not surprising, given that the 
ruling provincial Conservative Party of the day was not lled with keen environ-
mentalists. In addition to challenging the more troubling aspects of the report, 
the opposition Liberals also publicly called out the provincial government in the 
summer of 1981 for abandoning plans to clean up Lake Simcoe.10
e reasons for not pursuing the matter further, while perhaps partly polit-
ical, cannot be attributed entirely to the unreceptive political climate. Proving 
causation in clusters of noncommunicable disease is a notoriously challenging 
scientic proposition, even within in the contemporary context.11 e authors 
of the report indeed pointed out that the data were “tentative,” given the small 
sample size (495 total births in and around the Holland Marsh) and duration 
of the study (a ve-year period between 1973 and 1978). James Williams and his 
four coauthors admit that “there is a body of scientic thought in the literature 
calling agricultural chemicals, particularly organophosphorus pesticides, into 
question,” though they continue, “No direct link between the chemicals and 
congenital anomalies has been demonstrated.”12 ey could have determined in 
their feasibility study that the abnormally high number of birth anomalies in the 
area constituted a ready empirical case to test the hypothesis that organophos-
phorus pesticides have no eect on infant health. ey could have also concluded 
that additional study was warranted, given that the incidence of birth anomalies 
within the Marsh was statistically signicant. Instead, they determined that fur-
ther attention was not warranted, a position seemingly encouraged by ocials 
from the Ministry of the Environment.13 Given the improbability of ever being 
able to determine causation in a case such as this, and the resource-intensive 
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character of conducting an environmental-cluster analysis of noncommunicable 
diseases, it is not surprising that the researchers would recommend no further 
investigation into the matter, regardless of the political tenor of the day.14
Williams and his colleagues do share an original causal hypothesis, one that 
may hint at the extent to which the wartime image of the Holland Marsh farm-
ers as homefront heroes in previous decades had been replaced in the 1980s by 
a far-less-attering narrative. ey note that their initial assumption was “that 
patterns of intermarriage among families” in the Marsh was a risk factor for 
birth abnormalities, a hypothesis eventually dismissed due to “the apparent eth-
nic diversity of the area.” In other words, their initial working hypothesis was 
that endemic intermarriage and inbreeding among Marsh residents had led to 
the high rates of birth anomalies, a supposition that exposes a gross misunder-
standing of the social and cultural history of the Marsh.
In any case, the ve researchers ultimately concluded that the burden of con-
ducting a full-scale community-health survey outweighed the potential benets: 
“Community surveys of potential risks and hazards are dicult to design in 
terms of rigorous scientic requirements, costly to execute, they may involve 
hundreds of people, and, they take time. In summary, the results of the study 
indicate that a community survey of risk factors is neither warranted nor fea-
sible.”15 Despite the decision to not undertake further public study, the Min-
istry of the Environment did commit to continued monitoring of water and 
soil samples.16 Regulatory changes were forthcoming in the early 1980s, but the 
political reaction to the 1981 report reveals that, at least in the beginning, the 
provincial government was reluctant to address – even publicly acknowledge 
– the existence of environmental degradation and contamination in the area.
Conceivably, this reluctance was at least partly a result of wanting to protect the 
image and the industry of the Holland Marsh. In an era of high unemployment, 
agriculture remained a steady economic driver in Ontario.
Yet despite the apparent eorts of the governing Conservative Party and oth-
ers, containing the ecological deterioration in the Holland Marsh was dicult, 
given the unpredictable character of biophysical nature and its disregard for os-
tensible boundaries. e considerable eorts made by the early boosters to phys-
ically partition the Marsh from its immediate surroundings with a canal were, 
inevitably, incomplete. In reality, the canal system only ever appeared to sever 
the Marsh from the surrounding landscape. Attempts to control the environ-
ment were not as complete as may have been assumed. e Marsh remains very 
much physically connected to adjacent areas, particularly the Lake Simcoe wa-
tershed, through the ow of surface and groundwater. e ostensibly necessary 
132 chapter 5
socionatural interventions required of capitalist agriculture – using pesticides, 
fungicides, and fertilizers to protect and boost yields – “underproduced” the 
immediately surrounding ecology, as James O’Connor might put it. rough 
the process of production, farmers were destroying the conditions necessary for 
further production, including, potentially, their own health. Human and non-
human well-being within the Marsh suered, but the negative externalities of 
industrial farming inevitably moved beyond its boundaries. Water served as a 
vector, enabling the agricultural chemicals to transgress the borders of the canal 
system via the Holland River and groundwater ows. And as the industrial in-
puts spilled out of the Marsh, the health of Lake Simcoe and its greater water-
shed declined steeply.
By the early 1980s, Lake Simcoe was suering a very public death. Its water 
was becoming hypoxic – starved of oxygen. is was particularly true of Cook’s 
Bay, the southernmost part of the lake and the direct catch basin of the Holland 
River.17 Researchers pointed to dangerously high levels of phosphorus in the 
water and very clearly implicated farming in the Holland Marsh as a signicant 
source of the contamination.18 A key ingredient in fertilizer, phosphorus was 
polluting Lake Simcoe and accelerating the growth of algae, which were me-
tabolizing dissolved oxygen in the water at an unsustainable rate. is resulted 
in signicant ora and fauna causalities, ultimately threatening the freshwater 
shing industry in the area.
While health matters in the Holland Marsh at this time were largely invisible, 
aside from the occasional news story, fertilizer runo was far more conspicuous. 
As elevated levels of phosphorus exited the Holland River, large algal blooms blan-
keted the surface of Cook’s Bay and southern parts of Lake Simcoe. ese blooms 
were not only threatening the health of the lake’s ora and fauna – and the via-
bility of the local freshwater shery – but also an ugly nuisance for the increasing 
numbers of urban recreationists and holidaymakers. Local boosters had begun 
positioning Lake Simcoe as a vacation destination closer to home for Torontonians 
in light of a agging economy, high interest rates, and increasing gas prices. Algae, 
“creeping across the bays, fouling the water and coating shoreline rocks with oily 
green slime,” was more than just an ecological issue – it was not good for business.19
Eorts to transform Lake Simcoe into a getaway for the urban middle class were 
severely undercut by the green, slimy, transmogried water.
e collective public nger pointed at the Holland Marsh. To be fair, there
were other contributing sources across the watershed, including urban euent 
(sewage, soap residues, and the like, especially from the burgeoning towns of 
Aurora and Newmarket), within the lake’s watershed. e net result, in any case, 
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was a three-fold increase in phosphorus levels from estimated presettlement 
rates.20 Decades of overfertilizing had nally come to a crisis point. e provin-
cial government, still reluctant to be seen as putting “the squeeze on farmers” or 
of favouring an “agricultural-economic trade o,” wanted to nd solutions that 
did not interfere with agricultural production.21 As a result, the issue was largely 
le unaddressed until well into the early 1990s.
Increasingly, however, non- and quasi-state actors were beginning to have 
more inuence in public and private matters, including environmental health 
and agriculture. In the early 1980s, the Lake Simcoe Region Conservation Au-
thority (LSRCA) spearheaded the Lake Simcoe Environmental Management 
Strategy.22 is was an initiative meant to address the ailing ecological health of 
the lake. ere was here, undoubtedly, a symbiosis of sorts: e budding LSRCA 
put itself at the centre of a very public debate about the health of Lake Simcoe 
in light of government inaction, boosting its own brand while addressing the 
broader ecological issue. e strategy featured a series of reports on the lake’s 
health, many of which focused specically on the dynamics of phosphorus leach-
ing from the muck soil of the Holland Marsh.23
Phosphorus interaction with mineral soil was fairly well understood, but in 
the mid-1980s, very little was known about how the element interacted with (and 
importantly leached from) muck soil. Researchers with the LSRCA found that 
the Holland Marsh elds were indeed saturated with phosphorus from overfer-
tilization and that it was leaching into Lake Simcoe. But they also found two 
signicant complicating factors unique to muck soils. First, as the muck breaks 
down, or subsides, organically (as it inevitably does), phosphorus is created. Al-
though this is considered to be of “minor signicance” under normal conditions, 
with phosphorus levels already so damagingly high from fertilizers, any addi-
tional amount was too much.24
Second, researchers found that as the muck subsides, the eect is a greater 
concentration of phosphorus per unit of soil – that is, the existing amount of 
phosphorus, plus the phosphorus created during the process of subsidence, now 
exists in an overall smaller volume of soil. is is signicant – “a serious concern 
for the future” – because the higher the concentration of the mineral in a given 
volume of soil, the more readily it leaches.25 So, while the phosphorus problem 
in the Lake Simcoe watershed was largely caused by agricultural activity, it was 
exacerbated by muck-crop farming specically.
By the early 1990s, and as a direct result of the work conducted by the 
LSRCA, programs to reduce phosphorus loading were implemented. An ongo-
ing focus has been on determining how much external phosphorus is required 
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in muck-crop fertilizers, an issue the Muck Crops Research Station continues to 
study. Coupled with national bans on phosphate additives in laundry soap and 
other consumer products and ongoing monitoring of levels in its waters, Lake 
Simcoe has seen a signicant reduction overall in recent decades, though work 
to reduce phosphorus runo continues.26
e initial public and eventual political concern over pollution levels in the
Holland Marsh and phosphorus levels emanating from it contributed to two 
developments that would have signicant consequences for agriculture in the 
area. First, pressure from the public and from nonstate actors resulted in in-
creased scrutiny of farming practices in the Marsh. is was spurred on by pub-
lic concern for the ecology of the Marsh and its surrounding area. is would 
eventuate in the implementation of various legislative and policy interventions 
meant to regulate farming there by both state and nonstate actors. As regional 
environmental sensibilities evolved throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Marsh 
was pulled into a regional geography of conservation and featured prominently 
as a site in the province’s conservationist agenda. Second, and as an attempt to 
maintain competitiveness in the global trade of horticultural crops, ecological 
modernism ourished in the Marsh. Farmers, private businesses, and the state 
doubled down on modernist, techno-optimistic notions of the production and 
control of biophysical nature in attempts to build a better, more ecient, and 
more ecologically sound nature.
Socionature, Regulation, and Conict: Smiling Farms 2.0
Eorts aimed at rehabilitating the material ecology and the ecological reputa-
tion of the Holland Marsh began in earnest just as the city and countryside were 
becoming increasingly intertwined, both materially and discursively. On the one 
hand, the urban areas and supportive infrastructure around the Marsh – present 
since its initial draining – were rapidly expanding outward, bringing the city 
ever closer, as it were. On the other hand, nature’s imaginary – the idealized 
agricultural pastoral – began to be leveraged by Marsh farmers, boosters, and 
developers in new ways. Whether invoked to sell carrots, onions, or peri-urban 
real estate to urbanites, “nature” in the Marsh has been heavily conscripted in 
recent years. In eect, these eorts have brought (at least discursively) the coun-
tryside closer to the city.
At the same time, rehabilitating the Holland Marsh’s reputation as a safe, 
natural area of agricultural production has also relied on a contradictory dis-
cursive move – an imaginative distancing of the Marsh from proximate urban 
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areas, especially Toronto. In the 1990s, the Marsh was redened in contrast to 
urban areas – those working to rehabilitate its ecological reputation attempted 
to recuperate some of the wildness the earlier boosters worked so fastidiously 
to expunge from the elds in the rst place. e Marsh as urban getaway, or a 
“natural” agricultural landscape, has no appeal if it is seen to be toxic. Yet while 
notions of an external and pristine nature in the Marsh have been exhumed 
to sell produce in Toronto and empty house lots in Bradford, it is a patently 
dierent kind of biophysical nature than the historical, pre-agricultural variety. 
is new conception of nature has come with a litany of material regulations
and technological caveats stipulating new ways of being and interacting with
the elds and crops.
Within the Holland Marsh, the politics of nature’s production have typically 
been enabling – that is, liberal-state policies have provided supportive regulation 
and legislation to allow farming to occur (as an obvious example, allowing the 
conversion of the wetland in the rst place). But, more recently, agriculture in 
the Marsh has been aected and shaped by a shiing liberal-state intervention 
of the kind Karl Polanyi observed over eighty years ago.27 Liberal economic state 
policy, when confronted with the contradictions of its productivist polices, tends 
toward interventionism. is double movement, as Polanyi put it, created ten-
sions in the elds of the Marsh and resulted in important social and material 
changes to nature’s production.
Institutions, rules, regulations, and legislation have always been pertinent 
in the Holland Marsh, particularly since the introduction of agriculture there 
(recall the original enabling legislation of the Ontario Municipal Drainage Aid 
Act). But as part of the more general trend of external forces penetrating the 
Marsh, beginning particularly with the movement to restore its ecology and 
ecological reputation in the mid-1980s, there has been a considerable increase 
in the regulatory and institutional presence. Various ministries, departments, 
and organizations, both state and nonstate, are all attempting to shape biophys-
ical nature according to their various prerogatives and normative conceptions of 
what the socioecological constitution of the Marsh ought to be. Jamie Reaume, 
then executive director of the Holland Marsh Growers’ Association, put a ne 
point on the matter in a 2014 prebudgetary presentation to the provincial Stand-
ing Committee on Finance and Economic Aairs:
I deal with basically twenty-three ministries. I always laugh about the fact 
that I deal with twenty-three provincial ministries, fourteen federal min-
istries, two conservation authorities, one county and one region that really 
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don’t get along very well, ve municipalities, and I have a myriad set of 
regulatory regimes that we all have to fall under. at is very hard for the 
farmers.28
Regardless of the actual number of ministries, authorities, regions, rules, and 
regulations having some jurisdiction within the Holland Marsh, the qualitative 
eect is clear: Farmers are extremely frustrated by what they see as unnecessary 
interference to their livelihoods. For current-day Marsh growers, most of whom 
grew up helping their parents and grandparents on the farm, this increased regu-
lation is something that has happened over the course of their adult lives – rather 
rapidly, in other words. One disgruntled farmer summarized the general senti-
ment: “We’re overregulated. All these authorities. It’s getting crazy. . . . [T]alk 
to the other guys. . . . [E]verybody wants to regulate you to death. For what?”29
A good number of regulatory changes since about 1995 are related to environ-
mental and land-use management – in part, as discussed above, to restore the 
ecology and ecological reputation of the Holland Marsh. Perhaps not surpris-
ingly, then, these rules and regulations tend to be the ones that most complicate 
the farmers’ lives. Among them, a recent initiative by the provincial Ministry of 
the Environment to monitor water taken for irrigation in the Marsh has been 
particularly contentious. Ontario requires, with few exceptions, any company or 
organization that uses more than y thousand litres of water per day to obtain 
a permit and track their usage. Marsh farmers see this as needless meddling be-
cause their elds are surrounded by water, and drought has never really been an 
issue for them. As one long-time grower put it:
We’ve now had since 1934, Lake Simcoe; that has never failed. . . . [W]e’ve 
been irrigating out of there for 80 years .  .  . and now they want us to let 
them know how much we get out of there. Maybe in the future they want 
to control it? And that’s good for areas where people are running out. But 
let’s worry about that if Lake Simcoe were to dry up and we would have to 
control it. We don’t need any permits for that. And it’s just a government 
regulation that’s useless.30
Along similar lines, the LSRCA has a number of initiatives clustered largely 
around protecting and restoring water quality in the Holland Marsh and be-
yond, work enabled by the passing of the Lake Simcoe Protection Act in 2008. 
From phosphorus monitoring and reduction programs to riparian protection 
programs meant to reduce the amount of soil erosion on the banks of the canal 
and silt transference, the LSRCA has had an increasingly prominent role in 
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shaping nature in the Marsh. Not surprisingly, its role in the socioecological 
politics of the area has been fraught at times. e introduction and privileging 
(through incentives and programs) of a particular, normative socionatural per-
spective lies at the heart of the enmity.31 As an example, in a 2009 “report card 
update,” the LSRCA gave the West Holland River a grade of D for phosphorus 
concentration. Within the Holland River subwatershed, the authority clearly 
ngers agriculture – specically in the Marsh – as the culprit of ecological dis-
tress and demise: “Impacts from the agricultural areas include the removal of 
riparian vegetation; the input of sediment-laden sediment which impacts both 
water quality and the habitat of sh . . . the use of large volumes of water for irri-
gation, and the changes to the hydrology of the system by the articially main-
tained polder system; channelization.”32
According to the Ontario Ministry of the Environment, only 4 percent of the 
phosphorus now entering Lake Simcoe originates in the Holland Marsh. is 
suggests that the Marsh is a very small contributor, though it is worth pointing 
out that it is the only source, of the ve noted, identied with such specicity. 
All other agricultural activity in the watershed, as an example, is folded into 
“watershed streams,” which includes “streams or tributaries that include the 
runo from urban, rural and agricultural areas in the watershed.”33 So, while 
a 4  percent contribution may not seem signicant, the LSRCA has deemed 
it noteworthy enough to single out – a point that has not gone unnoticed by 
Marsh farmers.
Perhaps more poignantly, the ministry identies the Holland Marsh as prob-
lematic as a result of its current socioecological conguration as elds. Refer-
ring to wetlands as “natural heritage features” in the “Lake Simcoe Phosphorus 
Reduction Strategy,” the ministry emphasizes that they “help to regulate water 
quality by ltering contaminants and retaining excess nutrients before they reach 
water sources.” It further points out that the “loss of key natural heritage features 
and shoreline areas along Lake Simcoe has impaired the ability of the natural 
heritage system to perform these multiple functions.”34 In other words, had the 
marsh of one hundred years ago, which ostensibly performed these water-quality 
services, not been turned into an area of intensive agricultural production, phos-
phorus levels in Lake Simcoe would be much lower. e Marsh, then, is a double 
culprit, according to the ministry. First, agriculture there is responsible for add-
ing to the overall phosphorus load in Lake Simcoe through the overapplication 
of fertilizers, soil subsidence, and the like. Second, it has resulted in phosphorus 
from other sources not being removed from the hydrological ecology. As a gen-
eral remedy, the protection plan calls for the safeguarding of existing wetlands 
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and remediation and restoration of “natural areas or features.”35 In other words, 
the ministry’s discourse seems to suggest that it would prefer to see the Marsh 
returned to a pre-agriculture state.
is perspective seems to clash with that of another central institutional and 
regulatory presence in the Holland Marsh – also an appendage of the provincial 
government – the Greenbelt Act (2005). is pioneering legislation enshrines 
a variety of protections for the rural countryside generally and for agricultural 
land specically. e protected greenbelt area – the largest of its kind in the 
world – encompasses a large swath of land that curves around the so-called 
Golden Horseshoe of Lake Ontario, from the Niagara Escarpment in the south 
to the Oak Ridges Moraine in the northeast.
e regulatory regime of the Greenbelt Plan includes a distinctive delineation 
for agricultural land, Specialty Crop Area (SCA). At the moment, there are two 
such designated areas in the province – the Niagara Peninsula Tender Fruit and 
Grape Area and the Holland Marsh. According to the province’s documents, 
the Niagara area was aorded special status “based on provincial soil and climate 
analysis of current and potential tender fruit and grape production areas.” e 
Marsh, meanwhile, was given the designation based on a fairly vague description, 
including “provincial muck soil analysis and current agricultural production in 
the region.”36
Functionally, the SCA designation includes rigorous land-use parameters and 
restricts the ability of regional and municipal governments to redesignate land 
uses in the Marsh. Only “normal farm practices and a full range of agricultural, 
agricultural related and secondary uses are supported and permitted.”37
e denition and implications of the SCA were updated recently in a Pro-
vincial Policy Statement (PPS), the preeminent land-use planning and develop-
ment mechanism in Ontario. Currently, an SCA is, in part, “designated using 
guidelines developed by the Province, as amended om time to time.” Also ac-
cording to the latest PPS, these areas are described as places that grow “tender 
fruits (peaches, cherries, plums), grapes, other fruit crops, vegetable crops, green-
house crops, and crops from agriculturally developed organic soil.”38
e recent policy statement also outlines conditions under which activ-
ity other than farming can be conducted within an SCA. e extraction of 
mineral-aggregate resources is allowable, according to the 2014 PPS, “provided 
that the site will be rehabilitated back to an agricultural condition.” But if full 
restoration cannot be achieved, mining and associated development is still per-
mitted provided “there is a substantial quantity of high quality mineral aggre-
gate” in the area.39
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Despite the ostensible intentions of the Greenbelt Plan to protect the coun-
tryside generally and farmland specically, there remains an economic caveat 
that reveals an instrumentality to how the province conceives of biophysical 
nature and landscapes. It is not surprising, for example, that the two SCAs – af-
forded the most comprehensive protections – are also among the most protable 
agricultural lands in Ontario. Similarly, mining and aggregate extraction are 
highly protable ways of exploiting land and, likely for this reason, allowable, 
even privileged, within a supposedly ecologically protected zone.
Operationally, the greenbelt legislation aects the farmers’ land in at least 
two ways. First, it freezes the development rights of landowners within each 
designated area and prevents them from “freely disposing of their property in 
the marketplace.” Second, it imposes a new “positive obligation” on landowners 
by requiring them to provide or to continue providing “environmental ameni-
ties.”40 e expectation within the logic of the plan is that amenity services will 
be present in the countryside as a consequence of restricting its development. 
e onus, in this respect, is placed on the farmers.
In this regional environmentalism as expressed through the Greenbelt Plan,
the imaginary (or ideology, as Neil Smith has put it) of nature is on full display. 
ere is no mention of subsidence at all within the plan or the SCA legislation.
Indeed, it seems as though the sociocultural perceptions of the muck soil have
superseded its biophysical reality. In other aligned reports sponsored by Friends 
of the Greenbelt, the idea that muck is a sturdy, unassailable substance is reg-
ularly reproduced. Shelley Petrie and three colleagues write that the Holland
Marsh is protected “because of its soil quality and importance in Ontario’s ag-
ricultural history” while making no mention of subsidence.41 Jessica Bartram,
Susan Lloyd Swail, and Burkhard Mausberg, meanwhile, bring up the inevi-
tability of subsidence (though they do not use the technical term) in only one
paragraph of a thirty-three-page report on the challenges of Marsh agriculture.
Yet even then, they casually write o any immediate consequence of subsidence
by suggesting that the soil will be “stripped of its fertility in 100 to 200 years.”42
Neither of these reports mentions the subsidence estimates of either McDonald 
and Chaput or Mirza and Irwin.
As the muck soil continues to subside, it is unclear what the eect will be 
on the conditions of private-poverty ownership in the Holland Marsh. Many 
there insist that the area will always remain agricultural land due to the SCA 
designation and its location within a ood plain. ese claims, however, can 
be scrutinized. First, provincial legislation and the legal basis of property are 
both impermanent and changeable, and there is no guarantee that, as the soil 
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continues to subside, the SCA designation will remain in place. Beyond this, 
the most recent PPS indicates, as noted, that the Marsh or any other SCA can 
be mined for high-quality mineral materials, if present. Furthermore, no reme-
diation of the SCA is required if the extraction process renders “restoration of 
pre-extraction agriculture capability unfeasible.”43 Suggesting that the area is a 
ood plain as a way of rationalizing that it will never be built on, meanwhile, 
underappreciates the fact that the Marsh is already a built environment highly 
tuned to managing water levels.
For the farmers, the introduction of the Greenbelt Plan has been received, for 
the most part, as yet another set of rules and regulations that might eventually 
have some eect on them. Many also see it as a potential and partial element 
protecting their agricultural livelihoods. Area residents typically invoke the idea 
that the Holland Marsh is in a ood plain as evidence that it will always remain 
agricultural land. Some now understand the protections aorded to agriculture 
under the plan as further proof of the immutability of agriculture in the Marsh. 
As one farmer, who refers to the protections for the Oak Ridges Moraine, an 
area protected by the greenbelt, explains: “Well rst o, we’re not really worried 
it’s going to be taken over by development, because it’s zoned for agriculture. 
And it’s also in a ood plain. And it’s also a green area, Oak Ridges Moraine, as 
well. So it’s protected from industry.”44
Optimism is almost a job requirement for farming, given the vagaries of 
weather, markets, and dozens of other factors likely to intervene in one’s liveli-
hood and income throughout the course of any given year. So it is not surprising 
that most growers in the Holland Marsh feel that agriculture will always exist 
there. ey might admit that muck-crop farming may end but are condent that 
the transition to mineral-soil and greenhouse farming (which has already begun) 
will provide them the opportunities and lifestyle aorded by the muck soil. But 
such optimism in this case may be misguided. e protective measures currently 
aorded by the Greenbelt Act, like those of any piece of legislation, are imperma-
nent and subject to political machinations and election cycles; they may very well 
change. e current denition of the Marsh as a designated SCA is premised, 
in part, on the uniqueness of the muck soil. But as the muck subsides, leaving 
only mineral soil, the question of whether it will continue to be a protected 
agricultural area is a very valid one. Mineral-soil farming is not as protable as 
muck-soil farming – the nancial calculus vis-à-vis peri-urban development may 
one day tip in favour of the latter. Ultimately, the question of whether agricul-
ture will remain in the Marsh over the next one hundred years is impossible to 
answer at this point. How biophysical nature is dened and produced, and what 
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kinds of biophysical natures are privileged, will all be central to the future of 
Holland Marsh agriculture.
e City, Countryside, and Crops: Contradictions and
Conicts in the New Nature of the Holland Marsh
High interest rates, escalating housing prices, and the pursuit of cheap land ig-
nited a building boom in the hinterlands of the Greater Toronto Area beginning 
in the early 1990s. On the south side of the Holland Marsh, the boundaries 
of Aurora, Newmarket, and Vaughan began to creep northward, while on the 
north side, those of Bradford and Barrie expanded southward. More recently, 
discussions have emerged within the Bradford City Council to encourage com-
mercial and industrial development on either side of Highway 400.45 While the 
Marsh will continue to be a protected SCA (at least for now), building as close to 
it as possible – to maximize the utility of Marsh produce and to create employ-
ment closer to Bradford and the urbanizing hinterland – is emerging as a high 
priority. As one Bradford politician put it:
ey’ll never build on the Marsh. e only development I championed was 
putting employment on either side of Highway 400. My argument is, peo-
ple can say, “Oh, either side of the 400 is valuable farm land.” Well that ship
sailed when you paved it over with 6 lanes of highway, so now let’s maximize 
the utility of that massive piece of infrastructure, so you can actually put a
business there, or businesses plural there. You hop on an interchange, and
you get to the largest market in the country in, you know . . . from our bor-
der to Steeles Avenue is 20 minutes. I measured it. I know these things.46
Local job creation is a key priority for many urban politicians in and around 
the Holland Marsh. Given the mechanization and consolidation of agriculture 
in recent years, it now employs far fewer people than it once did – farm popula-
tions are diminishing, an appreciable trend since at least the 1980s.47 At the same 
time, beginning in roughly the early 1990s, housing developers in Bradford, cap-
italizing on relatively cheap land, began luring homebuyers to the area with the 
promise of the “Bradford bonus,” proximity to the Marsh and “a pleasing mix 
of . . . small-town charm and big-city conveniences.”48 is double pressure – an 
increase in urban population and a decrease in agricultural work – created the 
impetus to make nonfarm job growth a key priority in the area.
e west part of Bradford, in particular, has experienced intensive subur-
ban development in recent years. A new commercial and retail development, 
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consisting of dozens of stores and straddling both sides of Holland Street West, 
now anchors signicant residential neighborhoods of hundreds of homes di-
rectly adjacent to it. Increasingly, the pull of this commercial-retail power centre 
draws residents from across Bradford, threatening ongoing eorts to revitalize 
the downtown core. A couple of blocks from the development centre, at the 
intersection of Holland Street West and Professor Day Drive, sits a brand-new 
Figure 5.1. Sprawling city meets the elds. New luxury homes and burgeoning 
subdivisions on the edges of the Holland Marsh increase demand for new roads, 
water service, sewage disposal, power generation, and the like. By the author.
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library, archives, and community centre, providing further amenities on the west 
side of town.
ese changes in and around the Holland Marsh – the accelerated material
and discursive urbanization of the rural landscape throughout the 1980s and 
1990s – are emblematic of Terry Marsden’s idea of the “consumption country-
side.” While Marsden’s focus lies in Europe, his observations are instructive to 
North America. As a host of broadly political economic trends emerged in the 
1990s, including intensied neoliberal globalization, new information and com-
munication technologies, and the de/reregulation of state activities, the coun-
tryside was pulled into an increasingly globalized, and urbanized, society – or 
rather the increasingly globalized and urbanized society began to extend into 
the countryside. As a result, according to Marsden, rural areas became “pro-
gressively less self-sucient, self-contained and sectorally controlled, and ever 
more open to the wider forces (economic, social, political) shaping  .  .  . global 
development.”49
As Bradford expanded, other villages in the area grew into towns, and towns 
nearby into cities, a host of infrastructural needs emerged, ranging from road im-
provements and expansions to sewage-treatment facilities, garbage dumps, and 
power plants. is is the oen invisible (to urban residents) shrapnel spiraling 
out of urban development. Yet to farmers in the Holland Marsh, the pressures 
of this growth around them have had material consequences on their trade. In 
some instances, these frustrations have occurred over idiosyncratic issues. In one 
recent case, farmers became agitated by the inability to make a le turn out of 
the Marsh toward one of the main packing plants in Bradford because trac 
has become so heavy in recent years. Given that they oen make multiple trips 
per day and, more importantly, depend on selling their produce to the packing 
houses in a timely manner, being held up by trac is no small inconvenience. 
Eventually, the issue was resolved when a local politician succeeded in having a 
trac light installed at the intersection in question. Nevertheless, residual re-
sentment regarding local roads remains.
In other cases, issues garnering wider attention have arisen. Conict over the 
siting of a gas-red power plant within eyeshot of the Holland Marsh in 2008 
was particularly erce. According to the project proponents, Pristine Power’s 
York Energy Centre was designed to be a peaking generation facility, meaning 
that it would only produce energy when the wider power grid required addi-
tional capacity. With the recent population growth in the area, however, energy 
is increasingly in high demand, which led many local residents to believe that 
the plant would run – burning gas and polluting their environment – far more 
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oen than ocials claimed in their proposal.50 Opponents argued that siting 
the plant so close to the Marsh and the south canal posed too great a risk to 
the ecological health and economic viability of the area should a fuel leak ever 
occur.51 Beyond this hypothetical possibility, it was feared that the plant’s emis-
sions and the water requirements as a matter of routine operation would put the 
environment and nearby farms at risk. Growers felt that their concerns were 
misguidedly dismissed within a planning process that privileged the production 
of joules over the production of calories –as one farmer-blogger put it, “you can’t 
eat energy.”52 Despite the angry opposition, construction of the plant and the 
associated infrastructure needed to bring in fuel and to distribute the generated 
power proceeded; it was completed in May 2012.
Growers, not surprisingly, typically oppose developments on the immediate 
margins of the Holland Marsh. Such projects are viewed as threatening incur-
sions and have created anxiety within the agricultural community. As the farm-
ers look from their elds up to the hills beyond, increasingly they see a colonizing 
urbanization that makes them feel as if they are “under siege.”53 As another Marsh 
farmer put it, “I feel like I’m beginning to farm inside a city.”54 With increasing 
numbers of urbanites looking for cheaper real estate and a pastoral lifestyle in the 
countryside, tensions increase. Such rural migrants buying land in the Marsh, 
perhaps even more than the commercial/retail/infrastructure developments in 
the highlands, are seen as direct threats to the elds. As one farmer observed,
You get some people from the city, nothing against city people. We need 
city people, we love city people, however, when they’re investing in real es-
tate, they buy it and think, “Well, I can do whatever I want to with it.” No, 
you can’t. And they set up a business, or they start burying construction 
materials (in the elds). . . . You have people who will come out here, and 
they get 10 acres and a house and they pay half a million for it and think, 
“Oh my god, I’ve died and gone to heaven,” because in the city you get a 
postage stamp and pay $500,000 for it.55
Part of the worry is that urbanites buying property in the Holland Marsh are 
increasing the spread of tenant-farmed land there and further adding to grower 
vulnerability. While no denitive aggregate data exists on land tenure in the 
Marsh, it seems that as nonfarmers move in to purchase property, increasingly, 
more elds are being rented out to the farmers than are owned by them. At 
the same time, dierences in what each group values about the land have also 
become apparent. One long-time grower has seen an increase in this dynamic 
in recent years,
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You tend to rent some of other people’s land with yours. But it’s also hard 
to.  .  .  .  [W]hat’s happened is that you have a house, a nice house, and a 
barn, a little outdated maybe. . . . It’s almost useless for us to buy that, be-
cause we don’t need that 300, 400 thousand dollar home, and that barn is 
just totally outdated, and we don’t need that. And you get somebody from 
Toronto, and they say, “Oh, I like that house, I’d like to live here, and I 
get 5 or 10 acres of land.” So sometimes it just goes to total strangers. And 
they just rent it out to you. Sometimes they try to farm it themselves, but 
that doesn’t work. Well, they get a little bit of income. Say they paid $500 
thousand for the whole thing, for 10 acres and the house and all that stu. 
It doesn’t pay for us to buy it.56
Urban aesthetics and imaginaries – in other words, the ideas and perceptions 
that “city people” have about nature – clearly also have a role in shaping the 
materiality of the Holland Marsh. Modern Torontonians moving to the Marsh, 
an ostensibly empty, open, natural landscape, make the same mistake that the 
original Marsh boosters did. Both the contemporary city people and the original 
boosters had perceptions about nature and landscape that erase important and 
ongoing histories. What was a First Nations’ shing grounds, cover for boot-
leggers, or an important part of a complex ecology was dismissed by the early 
boosters in much the same way that current-day agriculture and agricultural 
practices are oen dismissed by urban notions of the rural.
Bradford residents, as an example, have been known to complain about the 
very elds they have chosen to live near – elds they have been drawn to based on 
a pastoral imaginary. Complaints from urban residents based on noise or odour 
have become fairly routine as a symptom of the colliding city and countryside. 
One farmer-advocate expressed her frustration in what she sees as the threat 
posed by urbanization:
So we’re not pumping pesticides into the water, the lake, or anything like that. 
Pesticides are being used for sure, but the products now are almost entirely 
reduced risk materials. ere are a few exceptions. But the growers are doing 
a very good job of applying them properly, and managing them properly. But, 
when somebody’s got their newborn baby out in their back yard, and they 
think they can smell something, you know, that doesn’t help. So too much . . . 
urbanization close to the Marsh is always a threat. . . . Irrigating at night is 
the best time to irrigate, but you know the neighbors complain because the 
pumps keep them awake, and of course they have to irrigate when it’s hot 
and dry, and people have windows open, unless they have air conditioners.57
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Certainly, the expectation of all residents, whether urban, suburban, or rural, 
should be to be able to live free from the risk of chemical poisoning. And, of 
course, bringing concerns related to chemical pesticides to the fore, as did the 
Newmarket medical ocer of health in the late 1970s, oen can have important 
implications. Complaints from urban residents on the southern hills of Brad-
ford about the odour of pesticide treatments are certainly justied – this is not 
meant to minimize them. But it is worth emphasizing that these conicts arise 
precisely at the intersection – sometimes almost literally – of the elds and front 
yards. While this will undoubtedly result in a variety of longer-term implica-
tions, it is clear that farmers are already worried that it means the continuation 
of a broader, somewhat disconcerting trend – farm practices being determined 
by nonfarmers. As one long-time employee of the Muck Crops Research Station 
put it: “I think that’s the biggest threat that . . . it’s the pressure from people who 
aren’t farming, to change farming practices or stop farming. So that’s a pressure 
that I’m concerned about.”58
e Evergreen Revolution and Building a
“Better” Nature in the Holland Marsh
As these multiple farmland pressures – ecological, pedological, nancial, and 
demographic – descend on the area, Holland Marsh farmers are responding in 
familiar ways. In the 1960s, mechanization was the tactic through which the 
paradigm of productivist agriculture was introduced. Fiy years later, the ap-
proach seems to be a technologization of farming, though the end goal remains 
the same – to extract prot from the muck soil and maintain a viable livelihood. 
e techno-optimism present in the Marsh throughout its history is seemingly
being doubled down on as growers seek ways of insulating against the constant
vagaries of weather and markets while surviving the more substantive issues of
subsidence and suburbanization.
is technological zeal was on full display at the 63rd Annual Muck Vegetable 
Growers Conference, hosted by the Muck Crops Research Station and the Uni-
versity of Guelph.59 Dr. George Lazarovits, director of research at A&L Biolog-
icals, a private, for-prot agricultural research and diagnostics laboratory, gave 
an illuminating presentation titled “e New Era of Diagnostics and Biological 
Control.”60 Speaking to a crowd of close to seventy-ve people (consisting of 
farmers, crop researchers, and agro-industry representatives), Lazarovits shared 
a story about Dean Glenney, a corn and soybean farmer in Dunnville, Ontario, 
a small town close to where the Grand River meets Lake Erie. He recounted 
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how Glenney had noticed that the rows of corn and soybeans closest to the fence 
posts in his elds seemed to be more successful than those elsewhere. e stalks 
grew taller, the ears of corn were fuller and plumper, and the plants seemed more 
resistant to extreme weather conditions. Flummoxed initially, Glenney eventu-
ally speculated that the dierence had something to do with the fact the soil of 
the rows closest to the fence posts was oen not tilled as thoroughly as elsewhere. 
Hitting a fence post with a tiller can result in costly repairs to both the fence 
and the machine; rather than risk catastrophe, he would typically give the posts 
a wide berth.
Testing his hypothesis, as the story goes, Glenney began to till fewer hect-
ares and, eventually, stopped tilling his elds altogether. When he seeded in the 
spring, he was careful to drive his seeder in the exact same spot from year to year 
in order to minimize soil compaction. An agricultural engineer by trade, Glen-
ney even custom built a special seeding machine to minimize soil disturbance. 
He refers to this technique as “fence row farming,” premised on leaving the soil 
as undisturbed as possible. As Glenney put it, “e secret is to just get out of the 
worms’ way.”61
Of course, no-till farming did not originate on Glenney’s farm. e tech-
nique has been used around world as a counterpoint to mechanized farming for 
decades. Still, for the past few years, Glenney has been a quasi-celebrity among 
the farming community in Ontario. In 2015, he was even crowned “Soil Cham-
pion of Ontario” by the Ontario Soil and Crop Improvement Association. e 
attention he has been getting is, within the farming community, no idle curios-
ity. Glenney’s fence-row farming, as Lazarovits pointed out in his presentation, 
has consistently generated corn and soybean yields twice the national average. 
He has been studying Glenney’s farm and farming techniques in an attempt to 
isolate the science (and, thus harness the prot potential) of fence-row farming. 
Lazarovits claimed that his ndings conrm recent speculation in the broader 
commercial-agricultural research sector that a third agricultural revolution is 
underway. As he put it to the conference attendees in early April 2014: “From 
8000 BC to 1950 we went through the agricultural revolution. From 1950 to 
2010 we went through the green revolution. And from 2010 to 2050 we’re going 
to go through the evergreen revolution.”62
e so-called evergreen revolution in farming is taking place in the rhizo-
sphere, an ever-changing, curiously indenable area at the root-soil interface. 
First identied by the German agronomist Lorenz Hiltner in 1904, the rhizo-
sphere is a complex physical, biological, and chemical protean amalgam. It “is not 
a region of denable size or shape, but instead, consists of a gradient in chemical, 
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biological and physical properties which change both radially and longitudinally 
along the root.”63 In other words, as roots grow, their chemical, biological, and 
physical properties change as does the character of their particular rhizosphere.
Scientists of various agriculture-related disciplines now believe the rhizo-
sphere to be, in eect, the most important factor in plant health and crop yields. 
Not surprisingly, this has led to a burgeoning interest from those with a pecuni-
ary interest in agriculture. Lazarovits speculates that through a prolonged period 
of nondisturbance, Glenney has developed a unique, robust microbial ecosystem 
uniquely adapted to corn and soybeans, one that stimulates a robust and tai-
lored rhizosphere. Early results of his experimentation have demonstrated that 
the soil bacteria and pythium in Glenney’s soil are fewer and far more uniform 
than in control soil, suggesting that Lazarovits’s tailored-ecosystem speculation 
is on track.
As the alleged third agricultural revolution marches onward, some concern-
ing and familiar arguments are recirculating. Indeed, the Indian agronomist 
Mankombu Sambasivan Swaminathan, considered by many to be one of the 
fathers of the green revolution, is now a chief prognosticator of the evergreen 
revolution. Analogous to its predecessor, the evergreen revolution is promising 
lower input costs, higher yields, and increased prot for farmers – and in the 
process farmland loss is being further destabilized as a legitimate concern as 
it was during the height of the previous period. But while the green revolution 
relied heavily on chemical inputs (fertilizers, pesticides, and the like) and genetic 
manipulation of seed germplasm, the evergreen revolution will allegedly improve 
on these past practices with better science, information, and technology. In some 
ways, the modernist proclamations of twentieth-century agriculture are simply 
being rearticulated through the science and technology of the twenty-rst.
e failures of the agricultural green revolution typically go unspoken in the
boosterist accounts of this putative third revolution. Yet it is worth recalling the 
many negative social and ecological consequences of technology-reliant, prot- 
driven agriculture. Agro-food system scholar and activist Jack Kloppenburg 
provides a useful list:
ese include the exacerbation of regional inequalities, generation of in-
come inequalities at the farm level, increased scales of operation, special-
ization of production, displacement of labour, accelerating mechanization, 
depressed product prices, changing tenure patterns, rising land prices, ex-
panding markets for commercial inputs, agrichemical dependence, genetic 
erosion, pest-vulnerable monocultures, and environmental deterioration.64
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Yet many patterns of the green revolution are being reproduced by its succes-
sor, including an emphasis on ecological modernist and productivist notions of 
biophysical nature. While Glenney was content to simply get out of the way of 
the worms, as he put it, a whole host of commercial, prot-driven agricultural 
companies are scrambling to very much insinuate themselves in the rhizosphere 
through the manipulation of bacteria. As Lazarovits put it, “We have to gure 
out how to exploit these microorganisms to produce better crops.”65 He contin-
ued: “What we’re hoping to do – and many companies are very interested in 
this – is to develop a method of bio-fertilizing plants, putting those good guys 
back in the soil. And if you can do that, it may take much less than the ve or six 
years to get the growth promotion that Dean’s site took.”66
is is Glenney’s “leave it alone” approach done in a hurry – an attempt to
impose a capitalist time scale on a biophysical process in order to speed up the 
arrival of increased production. e evergreen revolution is emerging in ways 
familiar to the green revolution before it but refracted through the paradigms 
of just-in-time delivery, information and communication technologies, the In-
ternet, and social media. And while understanding and, more to the point, ma-
nipulating rhizosphere ecologies are thus far incomplete projects, a new wave of 
science and technology, based on information and diagnostics, is already blan-
keting the growing elds.
Lazarovits’s presentation on Glenney was well placed, given that the commer-
cial appeal – and hubris – of this forthcoming iteration of agricultural activity is on 
full display at the annual Muck Vegetable Growers Conference. In some ways, his 
presentation was evocative of Professor Day’s test-plot yield demonstrations eighty 
years previously. Of course, the particular technologies on display dier, yet each 
represents an attempt to harness biophysical nature through cutting-edge technol-
ogies for the purpose of demonstrating human mastery and increasing prots. In 
a departure from Day’s presentations in the 1930s, the contemporary conference, 
designed primarily to bring muck-crop researchers and farmers together, heavily 
features commercial agrochemical, agro-technology, and agro-research compa-
nies. ese businesses are willing to pay for access to the conference participants 
– potential customers – through presentation slots, trade show displays, and paid 
advertisements in the conference directory. e trade show portion of the confer-
ence, set up in an erstwhile hockey rink at the Bradford and District Community
Centre, features a mix of agricultural equipment manufacturers, chemical and
technology companies, seed companies, and farm-management companies. Re-
gardless of the function, all of them emphasize the extent to which cutting-edge
technology is an essential element of farming in the contemporary period.
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eir technologies promise to reveal to farmers the real secret of farming, 
which is not to simply get out of the worms’ way, as Glenney suggests, but to 
push biophysical nature aside. Ads for various technologies and agrochemicals 
featured in the conference guide are instructive. One such technology, Field 
Manager Pro 360, promises to let farmers “see [their] farms like never before.” 
e product ostensibly enables them to probe below the surface of their elds 
with a stratied, analytic precision. e tacit pledge is that exposing the sub-
surface stratum will reveal important, commodiable information to farmers.
Within the paradigm of capitalist farming, peering into the depths of one’s 
elds is only useful in as much as it is protable. Phostrol, a phosphorus-based 
fungicide manufactured by Nufarm, which similarly suggests that peeling back 
the skin and gazing into the very heart of biophysical nature can (perhaps should) 
similarly reveal undiscovered prot. Its ad features the image of a money- lined 
potato and strikingly demonstrates the extent to which the pursuit of prot 
through the exploitation of biophysical nature has become normalized. Perhaps 
not all farmers see their carrots, onions, and potatoes lined with twenty- dollar 
bills, but the normative implication here is that they should. DuPont, mean-
while, warns farmers, “is year in the Marsh, one move will make all the dif-
ference.” e promise in its ad seemingly strips away the inherent contingencies 
of nature’s production in the Holland Marsh – inclement weather, pests, oods, 
poor markets, and the like – reducing the determination of success down to the 
use of DuPont’s fungicide. e operative notion here is precision – with one, 
almost clinical, sure-re “move,” Marsh farmers can be guaranteed of a prot-
able season.
e notion of precision is increasingly pervasive and inuential within the 
agricultural sphere. While there is a rich tradition of (attempts at) controlling 
aspects of biophysical nature in the Holland Marsh – from the initial canal de-
velopment to tame the landscape, to the introduction of cold-storage and ship-
ping technologies, and so on – the precision paradigm strives for something 
beyond simple control.
Within the context of this green revolution 2.0, modernist notions of human 
control over biophysical nature have been redoubled – the expectation now is 
that biophysical nature is fully able to be manipulated, customized, and sani-
tized of uncertainty and unpredictability. As DuPont promises surgical-like pre-
cision with “one move,” PlantProof claims to bring the kind of control previously 
only aorded to indoor greenhouse environments to the outdoor environment 
of the muck soil of the Marsh. Attempts are being made, in other words, to 
transcend the messy, contingent outdoors of the farm elds through a discursive 
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and material transformation, with the intended result of an imposition of ulti-
mate control.
e evolution of seeding in the Holland Marsh is emblematic of the desire
to construct and control biophysical nature with ever more precision. While, 
initially, farmers in the Marsh, much like anywhere, would collect seeds each 
year to sow the following season, that practice has long since ceded to an in-
ternational political economy of seed manufacturers. As one long-time Marsh 
grower recounted:
ey used to do that, in the very, very beginning for a little while. But that 
petered out pretty quick and it’s all gone now. ere are certain areas that
really lend itself [sic] for growing, reproducing seed. And it’s like a dry cli-
mate where they do that. And they also now have places in South America, 
so if they have a crop failure here, they still have a chance of getting the seed 
for you in South America. You got two chances. And, so, these seed compa-
nies have become multinational; they’re just all over the world.67
Of course, the seeds now grown in the Holland Marsh have been modied, 
designed, and tested to express certain – protable – characteristics, including 
uniformity, yield, weight, and the like. ese are the seeds of the green revo-
lution. ose of the evergreen revolution, however, typically undergo further 
processing, with a coating of growth-promoting, pest-deterring chemical mate-
rial applied well before planting. Each seed is encrusted with an application of 
various chemicals – importantly, this coating is designed to give them a sculpted 
uniformity. e chemicals promote protable growth, as has been the case for 
decades now, while the shape of the seed facilitates precision planting. In the 
high-stakes context of muck farming, the distance between seeds is a crucial 
consideration. Most farmers now use a variation of an air seeder, a device that 
controls planting with air pressure. Rather than allowing it to roll on a belt, as 
traditional seeders do, air seeders control the coated, uniform seed with a much 
higher degree of precision, allowing farmers to plant with great accuracy. As one 
grower who had recently converted to using an air seeder explained:
You know, you wanna put 9.5 seeds per foot, well you can put 9.5 seeds per 
foot. Before you used to have to guess, you used to weigh the seed and do 
all that stu. And still, depending on your speed and that, you’re always 
o. Now, it’s very accurate, you get a lot better crops.68
e pursuit of seed-application perfection is a tactical intervention, part
of a broader strategy farmers employ in order to simply stay in business in an 
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increasingly competitive sector and in the context of increasingly precarious 
ecological conditions. An additional motivation for precision specicity is the 
simple reality of the subsiding muck soil. e notion of simply walking away 
from the Holland Marsh and letting it return to whatever socionatural hybrid 
it might become if le fallow is out of the question. e strategy is to farm more 
carefully – with more precision – in an attempt to extend the protable life of 
the muck soil, to get as much out if it as possible before the soil vanishes com-
pletely. ere is an element of ecological stewardship here, to be sure, but the 
more immediate concern of simply staying in business is the priority.
In a similar vein, the use of diagnostic technologies in the Holland Marsh, 
while present for many years, has intensied recently. e Integrated Pest Man-
agement System run by the Muck Crops Research Station, versions of which are 
oered by all of the major seed and agrochemical companies operating in the 
Marsh, provides extensive eld surveillance and feedback. While eld scouts 
are still used by most pest-management programs – usually summer students 
literally walking the elds looking for outbreaks and infestations – drones are 
beginning to appear over the Marsh. Armed with high-powered cameras, these 
vehicles are the latest technology conscripted into the increasingly fevered world 
of crop surveillance. Although drone use is not yet mainstream in the Marsh, 
according to one farmer, the station has been experimenting with them as part 
of their system.69
Once a drone, farmer, or eld scout has identied an infested site, the com-
mon practice now is to text message, email, or tweet a picture of it either to a 
specic oce (the station or an agrochemical company) or to a wider commu-
nity of farmers in order to identify the pest and devise a treatment. One farmer 
explained this process:
You know, guys with their smart phones [go out] now, walking their 
crops, checking it. ey see some kind of weed, take a picture of it, put 
it on Twitter, “What is this?” or they send it, they email it to their crop 
advisor at Cargill or wherever they get their inputs from, and they get back 
to you and say, “Oh you need this chemical, this crop protection treatment 
product.” It’s neat. You can get answers right away now, there’s not that lag 
time. It’s pretty neat – it’s exciting stu.70
Undoubtedly, the pursuit of precision has served to change, in some fun-
damental ways, the process of agriculture in the Holland Marsh. Farming is a 
ckle undertaking, even within the carefully built environment of the Marsh. 
e elimination of contingencies through manifold technologies – advanced 
A Legacy of Contradictions 153 
pesticide treatments, rebuilding the canal, seed coatings, and air seeders – is, 
however, only ever partial and largely based on perception. e biophysical na-
ture farmers want – pliable, predictable, and protable – and the one promised 
to them by the purveyors of agricultural technologies and techniques remains, 
and likely will remain, beyond reach. Biophysical nature will continue to op-
erate in uncontrollable ways, possibly through ever-evolving diseases and pests 
in the muck soil, perhaps through a storm of similar magnitude to Hurricane 
Hazel, and inevitably through the subsidence of the soil. Attempts to forestall 
and eliminate the variability, degradation, and downright surprising character 
of biophysical dynamics remain an important fulcrum on which the production 
of socionatures teeters.
Conclusion
e hubris of the green revolution resulted in a decidedly toxic socionatural 
amalgam in the Holland Marsh, leading to the emergence of a variety of so-
cioecological contradictions during the last decade of the twentieth century. 
While initially obstructionist, or at least reluctant to be transparent about the 
extent and eects of chemical-dependent farming in the Marsh, the liberal state 
eventually became interested in regulating the production of nature in the area 
when Lake Simcoe’s deteriorating ecological health led to public shaming. New 
rules and regulations on chemical and phosphorus use in the Marsh eventually 
changed the socionatural congurations beyond it; algal blooms are no longer 
as signicant an issue now as they were in the late 1990s. As a legacy of this, the 
provincial government, through the Ministry of the Environment (along with 
the LSRCA) and the Greenbelt Act, has become increasingly implicated in the 
production of agriculture in the Marsh.
A close inspection of farming in the Holland Marsh, particularly since 1990, 
demonstrates the extent to which the liberal state, politics, and planning are 
active forces in remaking agriculture there. e imposition of water-taking pro-
tocols, the banning and restriction of certain pesticides, and the inevitability of 
subsidence – as examples – all commingle in sometimes cooperative, sometimes 
contradictory ways to coproduce farming in the Marsh.
e compulsion of competition and the struggle for livelihood has led many 
Marsh farmers to embrace the coming agricultural “evergreen revolution” prom-
ised by the burgeoning agro-technology and agro-research sectors. ese indus-
tries claim the ability to create a more precise and protable crop without the 
negative externalities of the green-revolution technologies. But as farmers, aided 
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by the agro-tech sector, push to transcended the biophysical limits of crops in the 
pursuit of a stable livelihood, the spectre of James O’Connor’s insights regard-
ing the second contradiction of capital loom over them – intensive agriculture, 
regardless of the promises of emergent technologies, tends to damage the condi-
tions it needs for ongoing production. How these contradictions will manifest 
remains to be seen, but that they will manifest seems nearly certain.
Holland Marsh farmers are at the centre of these divergent, competing con-
ceptions of what kinds of biophysical nature are (or ought to be) produced in 
their elds. To be sure, they continue to pursue the most immediately prot-
able path possible. Increasingly, however, they are doing so in a regulatory and 
technological milieu rife with radically dierent normative conceptions of what 
biophysical nature in the Marsh ought to be. Farming continues – almost im-
probably – despite the crush of suburbanization, soil subsidence, and federal, 
provincial, regional, and municipal rules, regulations, and legislation. Yet incon-
sistencies in the kind of socionatures resulting from these myriad processes and 
protocols mean that growers operate in a radically ambivalent context. Despite 
decades striving for certainty and predictability, ultimately uncertainty and con-




O n January 23, 2015, Avia Eek, a long-time Holland Marsh farmer and councillor for Ward Six in King Township, tweeted about a recent trip to the grocery store with her husband, Bill: “Bill & I did some gro-
cery shopping tonight. 3# of #Canada #onions $1.99. Our #Farmers are getting 
$3.00 for 50# #disgusted.”1 Records from the Toronto Daily Star con
rm that 
farmers were getting essentially the same price (between $2.85 and $3.25) for 
y 
pounds of cooking onions now as they did in the spring of 1958 – almost sixty 
years previous to Eek’s tweet.2 I found the Toronto Daily Star produce-market 
column a few months earlier, and when I saw Eek’s tweet, I sent a reply high-
lighting the similarities in price: “@eekfarms, Toronto Star, March 1958. 50lb 
cooking, $2.85–3.25, crate of Spanish, $4.00–4.25. Almost 60 years ago.”3 I also 
included a digital reproduction of the original newspaper column. e exchange 
between Eek and I received a number of responses from other Twitter users com-
menting on the low onion prices, with thoughts and opinions on everything 
from the increased cost of production to the greed of the oil and gas industry 
undermining other key sectors of the Canadian economy. It was a quintessen-
tially twenty-
rst-century discussion about some very old issues. e onion, an 
enduring agricultural product of the Holland Marsh since the very beginning, 
had gone digital.
e reasons for low onion prices in 2015 reect a socionatural amalgam of per-
sistent and emergent issues. On the one hand, 2014 was a bumper year for Hol-
land Marsh onions, exceeding even the strong yields many in the area consider 
a standard. e local market was ooded with high-quality onions even before 
the problem was exacerbated by reemerging Cold War geopolitics. Responding 
to growing tensions with the European Union, the Russian government estab-
lished a variety of trade embargoes, including the importation of onions. e 
drop in demand this created signi
cantly impacted major producing markets in 
Europe, including the Netherlands, costing the sector there tens of millions of 
euros.4 is complicated geopolitical impasse eectively created a glut of onions 
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on the global market. Excess European supply spilled out around the world, in-
cluding to the Caribbean, a key destination for Marsh produce.5 A bumper crop 
locally and an excess supply in the global market combined to drive down prices, 
leaving farmers in the Marsh with a signi
cant surplus of onions that they had 
great diculty 
nding a market for.
Holland Marsh farmers of 2015 were thus confronted with a very similar prob-
lem as that of their forebears of the 1930s. When the Marsh was 
rst brought 
into agricultural production in the early 1930s, supply far outstripped the de-
mand of the local market, causing many to simply plough their crops back into 
the muck. In 2015, cold-storage, transportation, and advanced seed- germplasm-
manipulation technologies were such that the crises of glut and price could be 
forestalled, though not inde
nitely. By the late spring of 2015, the 2014 vintage 
onions in cold storage were approaching the end of their shelf life, which forced 
farmers to dump the crop for whatever price they could get, wherever they could 
get it – cutting their losses while 
guratively ploughing the 2014 harvest back 
into the 
eld. is vignette, unfortunate though it was for the Marsh farmers 
who, once again, were bearing the brunt of a disjuncture between supply and 
demand, encapsulates the dynamics I have attempted to highlight and articulate 
throughout this book.
Chronicling the histories of our areas of local agricultural production is 
important. While there are many rich community-produced histories of agri-
culture across Canada (including several on the Holland Marsh), there are far 
too few scholarly accounts of local and regional agriculture in Ontario, or even 
around Canada for that matter.6 e profound eects agriculture has had on 
the fabric of Ontario has been captured to some extent through macro and na-
tional perspectives refracted largely through the staples-thesis lens. Yet these 
accounts cannot capture the local particularisms, stories, and cultures of the 
sundry agricultural regions across the province. Muck-crop farming, as a handy 
example, is scarcely mentioned in any of the canonical contributions of Ontario’s 
agricultural history. Capturing the history of the Holland Marsh is crucially 
important to adding texture to our understanding of Canada’s agricultural past, 
present, and future. It can help us move beyond thinking about agriculture (in 
the singular) and instead refocus on exploring the agricultures (in plural) that 
exist across the province and across the country. Local food systems will be in-
creasingly more important in the months and years ahead, and it behooves us to 
know something about them.
One of the key issues the story of the Holland Marsh raises is the limit of the 
liberal state to stabilize small-scale domestic production. While the Marsh is a 
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erce economic driver, it sits in a relatively small car. e federal state is far more 
likely to intervene in matters related to canola, corn, or soybeans than they are 
to carrots or onions. Ontario has fewer levers to pull in terms of farmer-income 
stabilization, and the relevant municipalities scarcely have the resources to main-
tain the drainage system, let alone bail out Marsh farmers in times of intense 
downward pressures on price or (socio)natural catastrophe.
e liberal-state apparatus has undoubtedly supported the Holland Marsh 
– from enabling the initial drainage to developing the specialty crop designa-
tion, though this support has almost exclusively been within the domestic realm. 
Since the mid-1980s, there has been less state support in the form of agricultural 
income-stabilization programs as international trade agreements have emerged.7
e tools available to municipal, provincial, and federal governments to support 
domestic agriculture are being dulled by international neoliberal trade policy. 
e 2014 crisis notwithstanding, the Marsh has largely been insulated – at least 
as it relates to prices – from the eects of global agricultural instability. It seems 
likely, however, that as emerging international trade developments continue to 
supersede and frustrate national and subnational policy, global politics will play 
a larger role in the Marsh in the years to come.
International developments in agro-technologies have had, arguably, a much 
more profound inuence on the Holland Marsh than international politics thus 
far. From the adoption of ice-packing facilities, pallet boxes, and food-grade plas-
tic wrap in the 1950s to the introduction of novel chemicals and seed varieties, 
the Marsh has relied on technologies developed internationally to enable and 
stabilize production. Even the dredger that cut the original canal system was a 
US import.
In some instances, individual farmers and investors (like the Latchman 
brothers) have introduced technologies into the Holland Marsh. In other cases, 
institutions have played a key role in the integration of agro-technologies. e 
Muck Crops Research Station, with its cultivar trials and minor-use testing of 
agrochemicals, has been instrumental in translating and adapting essential agri-
cultural inputs developed within the broader political-economic milieu of global 
agriculture to the speci
c context of the Marsh.
e station has played a crucial role in the ongoing productivity and stability 
of the area. Its annual reports, as an example, provide farmers with important in-
sight into the performance of seed, developed elsewhere, in the Holland Marsh. 
Similarly, the minor-use tests provide growers there (and muck-crop farmers else-
where) a rigorous assessment of the ecacy and safety of agrochemicals devel-
oped for other contexts and purposes. But it may also be the case that translating 
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these technologies to the context of the Marsh will lead to future instabilities. 
e ecological contradictions and consequences of chemical-dependent, mono-
culture farming are a continual, and destabilizing, spectre of contemporary cap-
italist agriculture.
ese contradictions are partly driven by how “nature” is understood. Shi-
ing perceptions of nature – an ever-evolving imaginary – has been a driving force 
of landscape change in the Holland Marsh. e cultural resonance of biophys-
ical nature – what it means within a given time and place – is directly related 
with how it is conscripted into use. e same dismal swamp that was written o 
by a generation of colonial explorers was understood just years later as an oppor-
tunity to produce a landscape in the image of the liberal-state ideal of orderly, 
smiling farms. How the Marsh has been (mis)understood has had a profound 
inuence on how it has been used and the shape it has taken.8
Of course, the materiality of the Holland Marsh’s biophysical nature has 
played an equally decisive role in the history of the area. Running water, sub-
siding soil, crumbling dirt canal walls, rain, snow, and sundry other examples 
demonstrate that biophysical nature is not so easily ordered into smiling farms. 
e novel administrative bodies that have emerged to corral discrete aspects of 
material nature – the station for seeds, the Holland Marsh Growers’ Association 
for the plants and 
elds, and the Holland Marsh Drainage Commission for the 
canal system – combine with these biophysical characteristics in the continual 
reproduction of its socionatural landscape.
It is also important to recall how liberal-state policy has served to shape agri-
culture and socionatures in the Holland Marsh. At times, the state has appeared 
to operate as a monolithically capitalistic force within the Marsh, supporting 
the initial destruction of the wetland and the contamination of the surrounding 
area for economic development and pro
t. From the early twentieth century 
to roughly the late 1950s, the state was (on the whole) supportive of whatever 
initiatives industry proposed for the area, from its initial drainage through 
to the chemical recklessness of the green revolution. Despite the apparent 
one-sidedness of its actions during this period, it is clear that the state was not a 
coherent, monolithic force. e dynamics James O’Connor anticipates in terms 
of the second contradiction of capitalism were implicit in the state’s support of 
agriculture in the Marsh. While not evident initially, by the 1980s, the ecological 
externalities of intensive industrial agriculture in the area were manifesting in 
ecological catastrophe. Responses to these ecological contradictions and limits 
were imported into the very fabric of the state through various protective polices 
and production regulations. In other words, even when appearing to act as a 
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uni
ed, coherent force, the state’s actions have been far more ambivalent and 
contradictory when looked at in a historical trajectory.
Over time, and in response to public outcries about the condition of the eco-
logical health of the Holland Marsh and surrounding area, the state’s presence 
there has become a much more obviously activist force. Any farmer is happy to 
share multiple ways in which the state regulates, impinges on, and restricts the 
conditions of production – from monitoring water taking and banning chemi-
cals to food safety and traceability protocol, the state has erected multiple poli-
cies that change the way growers do their work.
e historicity of the Marsh demonstrates that ongoing socionatural change 
is fundamental to shaping its future context. e drainage of a wetland on the 
scale of the Holland Marsh for any purpose in contemporary Ontario is very un-
likely. But in 1920s Ontario, it was heralded as an exemplary land-improvement 
project. e intervening century consists of a trajectory – by no means inevita-
ble – of contingent historical moments. As the landscape has changed over the 
years, the institutional matrix of the state – its branches, ministries, and policies 
– implemented in the Marsh shied in response. Similarly, what “nature” meant 
to various 
gures and populations throughout the past hundred years has been 
a dynamic and decisive force in how nature has been produced in the Marsh.
Indeed, in some respects, the history of the Holland Marsh pivots on the 
changeable character of its natural imaginary. e earliest colonial settlers to 
the area –John Simcoe and John Galt – imagined the marsh as a wasteland, “a 
mere ditch swarming with mosquitoes, ies, bullfrogs and water snakes.”9 Many 
years later, W.D. Watson would look out onto the same wetland and imagine 

elds teeming with crops and, in 1911, wrote evocatively to William Day about 
his “pride at the immense possibilities which lies in the scheme.”10
e history of the Holland Marsh resists the imposition of either a declen-
sionist or progressive narrative structure. It does not suggest that the ongoing 
imagining of the Marsh has resulted in the creation of either a vaunted pastoral 
sanctum or a devastated septic wasteland. e truth is rather messier than either 
of these edi
ces permits.
Still, there have been severe material eects – declensionist, even catastrophic 
in character – as a result of the production of particular kinds of nature in the 
Holland Marsh. e health of humans and nonhumans alike has suered in 
and around the Marsh as a direct result of agricultural activity. e remaining 
ambiguities about its role in elevated levels of birth anomalies in the 1960s will 
likely never be conclusively resolved. But given that many of the chemicals used 
at the time have since been banned – precisely because they have proven to be 
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detrimental to human and nonhuman health – it seems clear that farming in 
the Marsh did play some role. Neither birth anomalies nor vast algal blooms 
t 
neatly into the smiling farms narrative, yet they are material truths to confront 
about the kinds of nature we produce through agriculture.
is ambivalence signals an ongoing tension in the Holland Marsh – at least 
since the popularization of environmentalist sentiment in about the 1960s – 
between “the environment” and farming. Most farmers would likely insist that 
they are stewards of the land because their livelihoods depend on the health of 
the land. Yet this clearly does not make every farmer an unmitigated environ-
mentalist. Maintaining the land in a state amenable to agricultural production, 
in practice, usually diverges signi
cantly from what many environmentalists 
would consider stewardship. Even a hypothetical agro-ecological variety of farm-
ing, within the context of the delicate muck soil, would be too destructive to be 
considered ecologically sound. Yet at the same time, growing vegetables does 
intuitively seem to be “environmentally friendly” in some respects. But how can 
this be reconciled within the context of the Specialty Crop Area (SCA) designa-
tion that remains substantively silent on the one thing most important to Marsh 
faming, the muck soil?
Part of the problem of evaluating the ecological consequences of the produc-
tion of nature in the Holland Marsh is that, in order to do so, an arbitrary baseline 
of sorts has to be established – an imaginary time when the ecology of the area 
was ostensibly “better” than it is now. One approach is to assume that the Marsh’s 
pristine apogee was at some point in its pre-agriculture existence, and every in-
tervention since then has been tantamount to pulling another petal o of the 
rose. is, of course, is a far too linear conceptualization, one that disregards the 
subtler aspects of the production of nature revealed throughout these chapters. 
Yes, there has been ecological contamination of the human and nonhuman en-
vironment, however, it is also the case that harmful chemicals have been banned 
and discontinued, phosphorus levels have been moderated, and safer, healthier 
farming techniques have continued to emerge. In other words, protective social 
limits have been placed on the production of nature in the Marsh. If the basis of 
comparison is pathogenic or bacterial, one could make the argument that the area 
is actually cleaner now than it was previous to the introduction of agriculture, 
given that the risk of contracting cholera there now is virtually nonexistent.
is is not to let farming o the hook completely. As many have pointed out, 
the compulsion of capitalist, productivist agriculture is to seek pro
t above all 
else, which tends to be socially and ecologically unsustainable. ere is a paradox 
here, framed in theoretical terms by O’Connor and others: capital needs nature 
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to reproduce, but in reproducing, capital destroys the very nature it requires. 
e “negative externalities” of farming there (and elsewhere) continually lurk 
throughout the production process. In the case of the Holland Marsh, the con-
tradiction is literally grounded: e more intensively the soil is farmed, the more 
quickly it subsides.
Farmers have been experimenting with growing lower-value mineral-soil 
crops as well as building more greenhouses on the edges of the Marsh, where the 
muck soil has all but disappeared. It is dicult to say how long it will be until all 
of the muck in the Marsh is gone, but that it will one day be gone, and that the 
process is occurring in earnest, are irrefutable facts. What then will become of 
the Holland Marsh? It seems likely that the deterioration of the muck soil will 
happen slowly enough to allow growers in the area ample time to adjust to the 
changes, should they want to, and to continue farming mineral-soil or green-
house crops. But it also seems clear that the Marsh will be a very dierent place 
in the absence of that formidable biophysical, cultural, and economic substance 
that set it apart from the start.
Here again, appreciating the speci
c socionatural history of the area makes 
clear the limits of farmland-protection policies within the context of the Hol-
land Marsh. e state’s intervention in the form of the Greenbelt Plan legislation 
and its associated SCA designation seems, in this case, to be inadequate to the 
task of preserving the muck-crop farmland. e mineral soil beneath may last for 
generations, but it is not at all clear that the per-hectare returns from farming it 
would be enough to insulate the area against suburban development.
In 1961, popular historian Pierre Berton mused about the forthcoming half 
century in a Toronto Daily Star column. He envisioned a dystopian future of 
overpopulation and food shortages. By 1989, he envisioned the mayor of Toronto 
announcing that the city had 5 million inhabitants:
is huge consumer market, he said, ensured the prosperity of the Queen 
City which had out-stripped the rosiest predictions of the demographers. 
A few people complained about the price of bread, that had risen to $5 a 
loaf because of the wheat scarcity, and there was some nostalgia, too, about 
the good old days of green vegetables. But it was generally agreed that the 
draining of the Holland Marsh and its conversion into a popular midtown 
apartment district had been a magni
cent engineering feat. As the mayor 
said in his statement: “You just can’t stop progress.”11
Fiy years on from Berton’s perfervid imaginings, urban development is rap-
idly 
lling the space around the Holland Marsh. As the muck soil subsides, it 
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may be the case that the provisions aorded to the area under the SCA designa-
tion will also erode – there is nothing particularly distinctive about mineral soil, 
aer all. Minimally, the end of the muck soil would have to result in an end – or 
at least rerationalization – of the SCA designation. Similarly, the subsidence of 
the muck will also erode the value of the land in the Marsh. According to a 2013 
report, land there was valued at between $20,000 and $25,000 per acre (roughly 
between $50,000 and $60,000 per hectare).12 To put this into perspective, farm-
land in southcentral Ontario can be had for as little as $9,500 an acre ($23,000 
per hectare).13 At the same time, former agricultural land rezoned for residential 
and commercial development in the area around the Marsh fetches as much as 
$54,000 an acre ($130,000 per hectare).14 As regional populations grow, land be-
comes scarcer, and the distinctiveness of the Marsh erodes, Berton’s predictions 
may still come to pass.
As the Holland Marsh faces the dawning of another geologic era – the An-
thropocene – amidst the roiling chaos of climate change and COVID-19, its 
function as a node of local food production has never been more important. A 
broad consensus among food-systems scholars and advocates suggests that solu-
tions to food-system challenges can be found in place-based eorts focused on 
strengthening existing links – and forging new ones – between eaters and grow-
ers.15 Terry Marsden, a key scholar of the subject argues for an “eco-economy 
paradigm which re‘places’, and indeed relocates, agriculture and its polices into 
the heart of regional and local systems of ecological, economic and community 
development.”16 e director general of the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations recently noted that relocalizing food systems is “critical 
to achieving the goal of eradicating hunger and malnutrition, guaranteeing more 
sustainable food systems which are also more resilient to the eects of climate 
change, and ensuring a healthy and nutritious diet for all.”17 In Ontario, the 
provincial government has recently encouraged communities to develop regional 
agro-food strategies to support long-term economic prosperity and community 
development.18
ese are all positive developments and might signal that liberal-state policy 
may be moving beyond its productivist predilection. Confronting the past short-
comings of these approaches to agricultural production and farmland protection 
speci
cally, and the “management” of socionature more generally, are increas-
ingly urgent projects. We need to think beyond such past ways to understand 
what eective farmland-preservation and food-systems policy consists of. While 
no answers are oered here, it does seem clear that solutions will not be found 
in either techno-centric or eco-centric approaches. Observing that all nature is 
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produced is a far-dierent argument than suggesting that all nature is controlla-
ble, as techno-centrists believe. e folly in assuming that nature has been fully 
tamed has been revealed at many times throughout the history of the Holland 
Marsh. Given the fundamental need for food, reooding it in an attempt to 
return the area to its pre-agricultural state, as eco-centric perspectives might 
suggest, is a similarly untenable solution.
Agro-ecological and regenerative agricultural practices are charting courses 
that seek to balance the pursuit of a robust yield against a broad concern for 
people and the environment.19 ese approaches demonstrate that there need 
not be a trade-o between production, ecological health, and social well-being. 
A central motivation of the original Marsh boosters – to provide fresh produce 
to local markets – well aligns with agro-ecology. Provisioning local markets in a 
socioecologically regenerative way, aimed at girding the local food system against 
the destabilizing eects of climate change, global pandemics, and other unfore-
seen crises, however, will require us to reexamine our relationship to, and gover-
nance of, the landscape. As we approach the one hundredth anniversary of the 
transformation of the dismal swamp, perhaps it is time to once again reimagine 
the smiling 
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